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EAP Mutual Cryptographic Binding
draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind-00

Document type: Replaced Internet-Draft (individual)
Document stream: No stream defined
Last updated: 2012-07-31 (latest revision 2012-03-05)
Intended RFC status: Unknown
Other versions: (expired, archived): plain text, pdf, html

Stream State:No stream defined
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: Replaced by draft-ietf-emu-crypto-bind
Responsible AD: (None)
Send notices to: No addresses provided

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found here:
http://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-bind-00.txt

Abstract

As the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) evolves, EAP peers rely increasingly on information received from the EAP server. EAP extensions such as channel binding or network posture information are often carried in tunnel methods; peers are likely to rely on this information. [RFC 3748] is a facility that protects tunnel methods against man-in-the-middle attacks. However, cryptographic binding focuses on protecting the server rather than the peer. This memo explores attacks possible when the peer is not protected from man-in- the-middle attacks and recommends mutual cryptographic binding, a new form of cryptographic binding that protects both peer and server.

Authors

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Margaret Wasserman <mrw@painless-security.com>
Dacheng Zhang <zhangdacheng@huawei.com>

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid)