Network Working Group C.S. Perkins
Internet-Draft University of Glasgow
Intended status: Informational M. Westerlund
Expires: November 07, 2013 Ericsson
May 06, 2013
Securing the RTP Protocol Framework: Why RTP Does Not Mandate a Single
Media Security Solution
draft-ietf-avt-srtp-not-mandatory-13.txt
Abstract
This memo discusses the problem of securing real-time multimedia
sessions, and explains why the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP),
and the associated RTP control protocol (RTCP), do not mandate a
single media security mechanism. Guidelines for designers and
reviewers of future RTP extensions are provided, to ensure that
appropriate security mechanisms are mandated, and that any such
mechanisms are specified in a manner that conforms with the RTP
architecture.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 07, 2013.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. RTP Applications and Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RTP Media Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. RTP Session Establishment and Key Management . . . . . . . . 4
5. On the Requirement for Strong Security in Framework protocols 5
6. Guidelines for Securing the RTP Protocol Framework . . . . . 6
7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] is widely used for
voice over IP, Internet television, video conferencing, and other
real-time and streaming media applications. Despite this use, the
basic RTP specification provides only limited options for media
security, and defines no standard key exchange mechanism. Rather, a
number of extensions are defined that can provide confidentiality and
authentication of RTP media streams and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)
messages. Other mechanisms define key exchange protocols. This memo
outlines why it is appropriate that multiple extension mechanisms are
defined rather than mandating a single security and keying mechanism
for all users of RTP.
The IETF policy on Strong Security Requirements for IETF Standard
Protocols [RFC3365] (the so-called "Danvers Doctrine") states that
"we MUST implement strong security in all protocols to provide for
the all too frequent day when the protocol comes into widespread use
in the global Internet". The security mechanisms defined for use
with RTP allow these requirements to be met. However, since RTP is a
protocol framework that is suitable for a wide variety of use cases,
there is no single security mechanism that is suitable for every
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