Network Working Group M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track V. Manral
Expires: October 20, 2013 Hewlett-Packard Co.
D. Zhang
Huawei
April 18, 2013
BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-04
Abstract
This document proposes an extension to Bidirectional Forwarding
Detection (BFD) to allow the use of arbitary cryptographic
authentication algorithms in addition to the already-documented
authentication schemes described in the base specification. This
document adds the basic infrastructure that is required for
supporting algorithm and key agility for BFD.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
Bhatia , et al. Expires October 20, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BFD Generic Authentication April 2013
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. BFD Security Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Authentication Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Authentication Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Authentication Section Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Procedures at the Sending Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Procedure at the Receiving Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Key Selection for BFD Packet Transmission . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers . . . . 9
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
The base specification of bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
[RFC5880] defines five authentication schemes: Simple Password, Keyed
MD5 , Meticulous Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, and Meticulous SHA-1. In
Simple Password, passwords are transferred in plaintext. An attacker
with physical access to the network can easily eavesdrop on the
password and compromise the security of the BFD packet exchanges. In
Keyed MD5 and Meticulous Keyed MD5, the BFD devices on the both sides
of a BFD session share a secret key which is used to generate a keyed
MD5 digest for each packet, and a monotonically increasing sequence
number scheme is used to prevent replay attacks. Keyed SHA-1 and
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