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BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication
draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-05

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (bfd WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2013-10-24 (latest revision 2013-10-15)
Intended RFC status: Proposed Standard
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IETF State: WG Document Jan 2015
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IESG State: I-D Exists
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Network Working Group                                          M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft                                            Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track                               V. Manral
Expires: April 18, 2014                              Hewlett-Packard Co.
                                                                D. Zhang
                                                                  Huawei
                                                        October 15, 2013

                BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication
                 draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-05

Abstract

   This document proposes an extension to Bidirectional Forwarding
   Detection (BFD) to allow the use of arbitary cryptographic
   authentication algorithms in addition to the already-documented
   authentication schemes described in the base specification.  This
   document adds the basic infrastructure that is required for
   supporting algorithm and key agility for BFD.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 18, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Bhatia , et al.          Expires April 18, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         BFD Generic Authentication           October 2013

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  BFD Security Association  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Authentication Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Authentication Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Authentication Section Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Procedures at the Sending Side  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Procedure at the Receiving Side . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.5.  Key Selection for BFD Packet Transmission . . . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers . . . .   9
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The base specification of bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
   [RFC5880] defines five authentication schemes: Simple Password, Keyed
   MD5 , Meticulous Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, and Meticulous SHA-1.  In
   Simple Password, passwords are transferred in plaintext.  An attacker
   with physical access to the network can easily eavesdrop on the
   password and compromise the security of the BFD packet exchanges.  In
   Keyed MD5 and Meticulous Keyed MD5, the BFD devices on the both sides
   of a BFD session share a secret key which is used to generate a keyed
   MD5 digest for each packet, and a monotonically increasing sequence
   number scheme is used to prevent replay attacks.  Keyed SHA-1 and

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