Network Working Group D. Zhang
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track M. Bhatia
Expires: October 20, 2013 Alcatel-Lucent
V. Manral
Hewlett-Packard Co.
April 18, 2013
Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures
draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-03
Abstract
This document describes the mechanism to authenticate Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol packets using Hashed Message
Authentication Mode (HMAC) with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
algorithms. The described mechanism uses the Generic Cryptographic
Authentication and Generic Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication
sections to carry the authentication data. This document updates,
but does not supercede, the cryptographic authentication mechanism
specified in RFC 5880.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 20, 2013.
Copyright Notice
Zhang, et al. Expires October 20, 2013 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft BFD HMAC-SHA April 2013
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Cryptographic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Procedures at the Sending Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Procedure at the Receiving Side . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The cryptographic authentication mechanisms specified in [RFC5880]
defines MD5 [RFC1321] and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms to
authenticate BFD packets. The recent escalating series of attacks on
MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1] [SHA-1-attack2] raise concerns about
their remaining useful lifetime [RFC6151] [RFC6194].
These attacks may not necessarily result in direct vulnerabilities
for Keyed-MD5 and Keyed-SHA-1 digests as message authentication codes
because the colliding message may not correspond to a syntactically
correct BFD protocol packet. Regardless, there is a need felt to
deprecate MD5 and SHA-1 as the basis for the HMAC algorithm in favor
of stronger digest algorithms.
This document adds support for Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) defined
in the US NIST Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which is defined by NIST
FIPS 180-2 [FIPS-180-2]. [FIPS-180-2] includes SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The HMAC authentication mode defined
datatracker.ietf.org