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Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures
draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (bfd WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-07-31
Intended RFC status: Proposed Standard
Other versions: plain text, xml, pdf, html

IETF State: WG Document Jan 2015
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: I-D Exists
Responsible AD: (None)
Send notices to: No addresses provided

Network Working Group                                           D. Zhang
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                               M. Bhatia
Expires: November 25, 2014                                Alcatel-Lucent
                                                               V. Manral
                                                          Ionos Networks
                                                         M. Jethanandani
                                                       Ciena Corporation
                                                            May 24, 2014

             Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures
                       draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05

Abstract

   This document describes the mechanism to authenticate Bidirectional
   Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol packets using Hashed Message
   Authentication Mode (HMAC) with the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512
   algorithms.  The described mechanism uses the Generic Cryptographic
   Authentication and Generic Meticulous Cryptographic Authentication
   sections to carry the authentication data.  This document updates,
   but does not supersede, the cryptographic authentication mechanism
   specified in RFC 5880.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2014.

Zhang, et al.           Expires November 25, 2014               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                BFD HMAC-SHA                      May 2014

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Cryptographic Aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Preperation of the Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  First Hash  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Second Hash T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Result  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   The cryptographic authentication mechanisms specified in BFD
   [RFC5880] defines MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321] and Secure
   Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) algorithms to authenticate BFD packets.  The
   recent escalating series of attacks on MD5 and SHA-1 [SHA-1-attack1]
   [SHA-1-attack2] raise concerns about their remaining useful lifetime
   as outlined in Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-
   Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithm [RFC6151] and Security
   Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithm
   [RFC6194].

   These attacks may not necessarily result in direct vulnerabilities
   for Keyed-MD5 and Keyed-SHA-1 digests as message authentication codes

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