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The Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA) Asokan Attack Analysis
draft-ietf-nea-asokan-02

Yes

(Sean Turner)
(Stephen Farrell)

No Objection

(Barry Leiba)
(Benoît Claise)
(Brian Haberman)
(Gonzalo Camarillo)
(Ralph Droms)
(Robert Sparks)
(Ron Bonica)
(Russ Housley)
(Wesley Eddy)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 01 and is now closed.

Sean Turner Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -01) Unknown

                            
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -01) Unknown

                            
Adrian Farrel Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2012-09-26 for -01) Unknown
The third sentence of the Introduction is an apparent non sequitur. It
would be nice if some context was given to the statement.

---

Section 5

   1. Protocols should make use of cryptographic binding, however
     binding identities of the tunnel endpoints in the EMA may be
     useful.

This is hard to parse. Is there an "also" missing from the second 
clause?
Barry Leiba Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Brian Haberman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Gonzalo Camarillo Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Martin Stiemerling Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2012-09-25 for -01) Unknown
I have one point requiring clarification:

Section 2, paragraph 1:

>    The NEA Asokan Attack is a variation on an attack described in a
>    2002 paper written by Asokan, Niemi, and Nyberg [1]. Figure 1
>    depicts one version of the original Asokan attack. This attack
>    involves tricking an authorized user into authenticating to a decoy
>    AAA server, which forwards the authentication protocol from one
>    tunnel to another, tricking a AAA server into believing these
>    messages came from the attacker and granting access to him.

  Shouldn't it read that the 'believe that messages came from the user,
  but granting access to the attacker'?
Ralph Droms Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Robert Sparks Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown

                            
Stewart Bryant Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2012-09-25 for -01) Unknown
I had no idea what a Network Endpoint Assessment was, until I stumbled on the reference to RFC5209. It would be a good idea to move the reference up to the first line of the Introduction.

I kept meeting PT, but has no idea what that was until I found it in RFC5209. A sentence earlier in the text would be useful.
Wesley Eddy Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -01) Unknown