datatracker.ietf.org
Sign in
Version 5.6.2.p2, 2014-07-24
Report a bug

Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-08

OSPF Working Group                                             M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft                                            Alcatel-Lucent
Intended status: Standards Track                              S. Hartman
Expires: November 20, 2014                             Painless Security
                                                                D. Zhang
                                           Huawei Technologies co., LTD.
                                                               A. Lindem
                                                                Ericsson
                                                            May 19, 2014

     Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
          draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-08

Abstract

   The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined
   in RFC 2328 and RFC 5709 is vulnerable to both inter-session and
   intra-session replay attacks when using manual keying.  Additionally,
   the existing cryptographic authentication mechanism does not cover
   the IP header.  This omission can be exploited to carry out various
   types of attacks.

   This draft proposes changes to the authentication sequence number
   mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra-
   session replay attacks when using manual keys for securing OSPFv2
   protocol packets.  Additionally, we also describe some changes in the
   cryptographic hash computation that will eliminate attacks resulting
   from OSPFv2 not protecting the IP header.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 20, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Bhatia, et al.          Expires November 20, 2014               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         OSPF Manual Key Management               May 2014

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers  . . . . . .  4
   3.  OSPF Packet Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  OSPF Packet Key Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Key Selection for Unicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . . .  7
     4.2.  Key Selection for Multicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . .  8
     4.3.  Key Selection for OSPF Packet Reception  . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Securing the IP header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Mitigating Cross-Protocol Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     9.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bhatia, et al.          Expires November 20, 2014               [Page 2]
Internet-Draft         OSPF Manual Key Management               May 2014

1.  Introduction

   The OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as described in
   [RFC2328] uses per-packet sequence numbers to provide protection
   against replay attacks.  The sequence numbers increase monotonically

[include full document text]