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Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-11

Document type: Active Internet-Draft (ospf WG)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2014-11-10
Intended RFC status: Proposed Standard
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: Submitted to IESG for Publication
Consensus: Yes
Document shepherd: Vishwas Manral
Shepherd Write-Up: Last changed 2014-06-24

IESG State: IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
IANA Action State: None
(Has a DISCUSS. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved.)
Responsible AD: Alia Atlas
Send notices to: ospf-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying@tools.ietf.org, vishwas.ietf@gmail.com

OSPF Working Group                                             M. Bhatia
Internet-Draft                                            Ionos Networks
Updates: 2328, 5709                                           S. Hartman
(if approved)                                          Painless Security
Intended status: Standards Track                                D. Zhang
Expires: May 11, 2015                      Huawei Technologies co., LTD.
                                                          A. Lindem, Ed.
                                                                   Cisco
                                                        November 7, 2014

     Security Extension for OSPFv2 when using Manual Key Management
          draft-ietf-ospf-security-extension-manual-keying-11

Abstract

   The current OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as defined
   in RFC 2328 and RFC 5709 is vulnerable to both inter-session and
   intra-session replay attacks when using manual keying.  Additionally,
   the existing cryptographic authentication mechanism does not cover
   the IP header.  This omission can be exploited to carry out various
   types of attacks.

   This document defines changes to the authentication sequence number
   mechanism that will protect OSPFv2 from both inter-session and intra-
   session replay attacks when using manual keys for securing OSPFv2
   protocol packets.  Additionally, we also describe some changes in the
   cryptographic hash computation that will eliminate attacks resulting
   from OSPFv2 not protecting the IP header.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 11, 2015.

Copyright Notice

Bhatia, et al.            Expires May 11, 2015                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         OSPF Manual Key Management          November 2014

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Replay Protection using Extended Sequence Numbers  . . . . . .  4
   3.  OSPF Packet Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  OSPF Packet Key Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.1.  Key Selection for Unicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . . .  7
     4.2.  Key Selection for Multicast OSPF Packet Transmission . . .  8
     4.3.  Key Selection for OSPF Packet Reception  . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Securing the IP header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   6.  Mitigating Cross-Protocol Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bhatia, et al.            Expires May 11, 2015                  [Page 2]
Internet-Draft         OSPF Manual Key Management          November 2014

1.  Introduction

   The OSPFv2 cryptographic authentication mechanism as described in
   [RFC2328] uses per-packet sequence numbers to provide protection

[include full document text]