Endpoint Security Posture Assessment: Enterprise Use Cases
draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-10
Yes
(Kathleen Moriarty)
No Objection
(Alia Atlas)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Ben Campbell)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Jari Arkko)
(Joel Jaeggli)
(Terry Manderson)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 08 and is now closed.
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
(for -08)
Unknown
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2015-04-08 for -09)
Unknown
- general: there seems to be no mention or consideration at all of privacy which I think is a significant flaw in this document. However, so long as privacy issues are considered in later documents, that's not a problem. It would be a problem if privacy were similarly ignored later on. As an example of why this matters, enterprises will have to adhere to privacy legislation in various jurisdictions which would for example introduce a data controller as a relevant entity to be considered (and that is not considered here). Once one collects e.g. log information about authentication times and locations then I suspect you need a data controller and you might have to delete that data or anonymise it or do other privacy friendly things with or to such data. I think for now, adding a statement that later documents will have to consider the privacy issues associated with these use cases would be a good idea that would be sufficient to ensure that it's not forgotten. Note: I do think it would be preferable if someone had (or still would) spend time on an analysis of the possible privacy considerations of some of these use-cases. I suspect those aren't as bad as may be feared and could perhaps be relatively easily covered in a few paragraphs, once that work has been done. (If doing that, please do not only consider the typical US private enterprise network scenario - those in other parts of the world and in non-profit or public service can differ significantly in privacy terms.) - 2.2.5 - I've been to places like that for research purposes (as stipulated here) and this use-case seems unrealistic to me. - section 4: I think you might end up need to consider the confidentiality and origin authentication of some of the data at rest as well as in transit. That could get tricky, but OTOH, if you have any conception of provenance and of privacy then it's likely to be needed. I'd say just adding a sentence here to recognise that that can also be an issue would be enough. - The secdir review [1] noted a bunch of nits. I didn't check if those have been fixed or not, but seems like a good idea. [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05536.html
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(for -09)
Unknown