Controlling Actuators with CoAP
draft-mattsson-core-coap-actuators-06
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | John Preuß Mattsson , John Fornehed , Göran Selander , Francesca Palombini , Christian Amsüss | ||
Last updated | 2019-03-25 (Latest revision 2018-09-17) | ||
Replaced by | draft-mattsson-core-coap-attacks | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-mattsson-core-coap-attacks | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Being able to trust information from sensors and to securely control actuators are essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. In this memo we show that just using COAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE is not enough. We describe several serious attacks any on-path attacker can do, and discusses tougher requirements and mechanisms to mitigate the attacks. While this document is focused on actuators, some of the attacks apply equally well to sensors.
Authors
John Preuß Mattsson
John Fornehed
Göran Selander
Francesca Palombini
Christian Amsüss
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)