Using Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO) in SRTP
draft-mcgrew-srtp-aero-01
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
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|
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Authors | David McGrew , Dan Wing , John Foley | ||
Last updated | 2014-04-24 (Latest revision 2013-10-21) | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Authenticated Encryption with Replay prOtection (AERO) is a cryptographic technique that provides all of the security services that are used in the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP). This note describes how to use AERO in SRTP. AERO has minimal data expansion, avoids the need to manage implicit state, and provides strong misuse resistance. These properties make it an ideal cryptographic transform for SRTP, as it enables SRTP to easily handle multiple senders sharing the same key, multiple receivers with late- joiners in a session, decentralized conferences with minimal control, and mixers that selectively forward RTP traffic. RTP architectures that utilize AERO can use the normal SSRC collision detection mechanism, and can ignore problematic SRTP artifacts such as the Roll-Over Counter (ROC) and Initial Sequence Number.
Authors
David McGrew
Dan Wing
John Foley
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)