SAVI F.Shi
Internet Draft China Telecom
Intended status: Standard Tracks K.Xu, L.Zhu, G.Hu
Expires: Nov 2013 Tsinghua Univ.
May 7, 2013
SAVI Requirements and Solutions for ISP IPv6 Access Network
draft-shi-savi-access-03.txt
Abstract
Internet is always confronted with many security threats based on IP
address spoofing which can enable impersonation and malicious traffic
redirection. Unfortunately, the Internet architecture fails to
provide the defense mechanism. Source Address Validation Improvement
(SAVI) was developed to prevent IP source address spoofing.
Especially, the mechanism is essential for ISPs. However, due to the
diversity of address assignment methods, SAVI solution is also
different accordingly. This document describes five scenarios of
ISPs'IPv6 access network, and moreover, states its SAVI requirements
and tentative solutions accordingly.
Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on Nov 7, 2013.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Internet-Draft SAVI Access May 2013
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................. 3
2. Conventions used in this document ............................ 4
3. Terminology .................................................. 4
4. Scenarios for ISPs'IPv6 Access Network ....................... 4
4.1. Scenario 1: HRG acts as DHCPv6 proxy .................... 5
4.2. Scenario 2: STB gets IP address via DHCPv6 .............. 7
4.3. Scenario 3: PC gets IP address via PPPoE & RA ........... 8
4.4. Scenario 4: Laptop accesses Internet via WLAN ........... 9
4.5. Scenario 5: Laptop accesses Internet via C+W ........... 10
5. Conclusions ................................................. 12
6. References .................................................. 13
6.1. Normative References ................................... 13
7. Acknowledgments ............................................. 14
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1. Introduction
Spoofing of IP source addresses can jeopardize people's privacy,
enable malicious traffic redirection which causes the network
topology and traffic information to be leaked out. Further, it will
be difficult to trace the source host which has forged the packet.
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