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The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Holder-of-the-Key Token Usage
draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk-03

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Last updated: 2014-01-13
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Network Working Group                                         J. Bradley
Internet-Draft                                             Ping Identity
Intended status: Standards Track                                 P. Hunt
Expires: July 18, 2014                                Oracle Corporation
                                                              T. Nadalin
                                                               Microsoft
                                                           H. Tschofenig

                                                        January 14, 2014

  The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Holder-of-the-Key Token Usage
                   draft-tschofenig-oauth-hotk-03.txt

Abstract

   OAuth 2.0 deployments currently rely on bearer tokens for securing
   access to protected resources.  Bearer tokens require Transport Layer
   Security to be used between an OAuth client and the resource server
   when presenting the access token.  The security model is based on
   proof-of-possession: access token storage and transfer has to be done
   with care to prevent leakage.

   There are, however, use cases that require a more active involvement
   of the OAuth client for an increased level of security, particularly
   to secure against token leakage.  This document specifies an OAuth
   security framework using the holder-of-the-key concept, which
   requires the OAuth client when presenting an OAuth access token to
   also demonstrate knowledge of keying material that is bound to the
   token.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on July 18, 2014.

Bradley, et al.           Expires July 18, 2014                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         OAuth 2.0 HOTK Token Usage           January 2014

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Binding a Key to an Access Token  . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Symmetric Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.2.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Accessing a Protected Resource  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.1.  Symmetric Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.2.2.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Security Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  Summary of Recommendations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.1.  OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  The 'hotk' JSON Web Token Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  The 'hotk' OAuth Access Token Type  . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.4.  Profile Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

1.  Introduction

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