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Optional Checksums in Intermediate System to Intermediate System (ISIS)
RFC 3358

Document type: RFC - Informational (August 2002; No errata)
Document stream: IETF
Last updated: 2013-03-02
Other versions: plain text, pdf, html

IETF State: (None)
Consensus: Unknown
Document shepherd: No shepherd assigned

IESG State: RFC 3358 (Informational)
Responsible AD: Bill Fenner
Send notices to: <tli@procket.com>, <prz@xebeo.com>

Network Working Group                                      T. Przygienda
Request for Comments: 3358                                         Xebeo
Category: Informational                                      August 2002

                         Optional Checksums in
           Intermediate System to Intermediate System (ISIS)

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This document describes an optional extension to the Intermediate
   System to Intermediate System (ISIS) protocol, used today by several
   Internet Service Proviers (ISPs) for routing within their clouds.
   ISIS is an interior gateway routing protocol developed originally by
   OSI and used with IP extensions as Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP).
   ISIS originally does not provide Complete Sequence Numbers Protocol
   Data (CSNP) and Partial Sequence Numbers Protocol Data Unit (PSNP)
   checksums, relying on the underlying layers to verify the integrity
   of information provided.  Experience with the protocol shows that
   this precondition does not always hold and scenarios can be imagined
   that impact protocol functionality.  This document introduces a new
   optional Type, Length and Value (TLV) providing checksums.

1.  Introduction

   ISIS [ISO90, Cal90a, Cal90b] CSNPs and PSNPs and IIHs can be
   corrupted in case of faulty implementations of L2 hardware or lack of
   checksuming on a specific network technology.  As a particularly ugly
   case, corruption of length and/or TLV length fields may lead to the
   generation of extensive numbers of "empty" LSPs in the receiving
   node.  Since we cannot rely on authentication as a checksum
   mechanism, this document proposes an optional TLV to add checksums to
   the elements.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [Bra97].

Przygienda                   Informational                      [Page 1]
RFC 3358                 SNP Checksums in ISIS               August 2002

2.  TLV Description

   This optional TLV MAY BE included in all CSNP, PSNP and IIH packets
   and an implementation that implements optional checksums MUST accept
   PDUs if they do NOT contain the optional checksum.  Implementations
   that receive an optional checksum TLV and support it MUST discard the
   PDU if the checksum is incorrect.  An implementation that does NOT
   implement optional checksums MUST accept a PDU that contains the
   checksum TLV.  An implementation that supports optional checksums and
   receives it within any other PDU than CSNP, PSNP or IIH MUST discard
   the PDU.  Such an implementation MUST discard the PDU as well if more
   than one optional checksum TLVs are included within it.
   Additionally, any implementation supporting optional checksums MUST
   accept PDUs with an optional checksum with the value 0 and consider
   such a checksum as correct.

3.  Checksum Computation

   The checksum is a fletcher checksum computed according to [ISO98],
   Annex C over the complete PDU.  To compute the correct checksum, an
   implementation MUST add the optional checksum TLV to the PDU with the
   initial checksum value of 0 and compute the checksum over such a PDU.

4.  Interaction with TLVs using PDU Data to Compute Signatures

   The implementation MUST either omit the optional checksum on an
   interface or send a 0 checksum value if it includes in the PDU
   signatures that provide equivalent or stronger functionality, such as
   HMAC or MD5.  Otherwise an implementation that handles such
   signatures but does not handle the optional checksums, may fail to
   compute the MD5 signature on the packet.  Such a failure would be
   caused by the fact that MD5 is computed with the checksum value set
   to 0 and only as a final step is the checksum value being filled in.

5.  TLV Format

   [Prz01] lists the according value of the TLV type and discusses
   issues surrounding the assignment of new TLV codepoints.

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | TLV Type =12  | TLV Length =2 |       Checksum (16 bits)      |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

Przygienda                   Informational                      [Page 2]

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