Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.
( Thomas Narten ) Yes
( Margaret Wasserman ) Yes
( Harald Alvestrand ) No Objection
( Steven Bellovin ) (was Discuss) No Objection
( Bill Fenner ) No Objection
( Ned Freed ) No Objection
( Ted Hardie ) No Objection
( Russ Housley ) (was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2003-12-16 for -09)
1. Please pick one spelling and use it throughout the document: - either 'passthrough' or 'pass-through' - either 'ad-hoc' or 'ad-hoc' or 'ad hoc' 2. In section 1.2, please add the definition of supplicant and slightly revise the definition of EMSK as follows: supplicant The end of the link that responds to the authenticator in [IEEE-802.1X]. In this document, this end of the link is called the peer. Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Additional keying material derived between the EAP client and server that is exported by the EAP method. The EMSK is at least 64 octets in length. The EMSK is not shared with the authenticator or any other third party. The EMSK is reserved for future uses that are not defined yet. 3. In section 1.3, I find the last sentence of the 4th paragraph awkward. I propose the following rewording: As a result, it may be necessary for an authentication algorithm to add one or two additional messages (at most one roundtrip) between the client and authenticator in order to run over EAP. 4. In section 2.4, 1st paragraph, last sentence, the term 'authenticatees' is introduced. I think that 'peers' should be used instead. This leads to a problem because 'peers' is used elsewhere in the sentence. Proposal: Both ends of the link may act as authenticators and peers at the same time. 5. In section 3.2, 1st paragraph, 1st sentence: s/must/MUST/ 6. In section 4.2, 7th paragraph at the top of page 25, 1st sentence, I cannot figure out what the sentence means: A mutually authenticating method (such as EAP-TLS [RFC2716]) that provides authorization error messages provides protected result indications for the purpose of this specification. 7. In section 7.11, 2nd paragraph, last sentence: s/recommended/RECOMMENDED/
( Allison Mankin ) No Objection
Comment (2003-12-18 for -)
I think there are many virtues to this spec, but it needs more attention to the applicability description - this is one reason that SMB has his Discuss, and the problem is epitomized by comments such as: Where transport efficiency is a consideration, and IP transport is available, it may be preferable to expose an artificially high EAP MTU to EAP and allow fragmentation to take place in IP. Alternatively, it is possible to choose other security mechanisms such as TLS [RFC2246] or IKE [RFC2409] or an alternative authentication framework such as SASL [RFC2222] or GSS-API [RFC2743]. How could the same application use GSS-API or SASL if it intended to use EAP? They seem to have very different domains of applicability. It would be good to discuss the ways that EAP is very applicable and ways in which it can be kind of wedged into use, with results that may be only just satisfactory.