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The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record
RFC 6493

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           R. Bush
Request for Comments: 6493                     Internet Initiative Japan
Category: Standards Track                                  February 2012
ISSN: 2070-1721

   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record

Abstract

   In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
   certificates completely obscure names or any other information that
   might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
   issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
   compromises, etc.  This document describes the RPKI Ghostbusters
   Record containing human contact information that may be verified
   (indirectly) by a Certification Authority (CA) certificate.  The data
   in the record are those of a severely profiled vCard.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 1]
RFC 6493                RPKI Ghostbusters Record           February 2012

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   4.  RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example  . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   5.  vCard Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   6.  CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   7.  Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.1.  OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.2.  File Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
     9.3.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     11.1. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     11.2. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1.  Introduction

   In the operational use of the RPKI, it can become necessary to
   contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-holding
   CA certificate, AKA the certificate's maintainer, be it the holder of
   the certificate's private key or an administrative person in the
   organization, a NOC, etc.  An important example is when the operator
   of a prefix described by a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a
   problem, or an impending problem, with a certificate or Certificate
   Revocation List (CRL) in the path between the ROA and a trust anchor.
   For example, a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to
   expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus
   placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by
   the ROA in jeopardy.

   As the names in RPKI certificates are not meaningful to humans, see
   [RFC6484], there is no way to use a certificate itself to lead to the
   worrisome certificate's or CRL's maintainer.  So, "Who you gonna
   call?"

   This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object
   verified via an end-entity (EE) certificate, issued under a CA
   certificate, the maintainer of which may be contacted using the
   payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.

   The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in [RFC6488].

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