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Analysis of OSPF Security According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
RFC 6863

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                        S. Hartman
Request for Comments: 6863                             Painless Security
Category: Informational                                         D. Zhang
ISSN: 2070-1721                            Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
                                                              March 2013

               Analysis of OSPF Security According to the
  Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide

Abstract

   This document analyzes OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 according to the guidelines
   set forth in Section 4.2 of the "Keying and Authentication for
   Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines" (RFC 6518).  Key
   components of solutions to gaps identified in this document are
   already underway.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6863.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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RFC 6863                      OSPF Analysis                   March 2013

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2
     1.1.  Requirements to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Requirements Notation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Current State  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     2.1.  OSPFv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  OSPFv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Impacts of OSPF Replays  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Gap Analysis and Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Solution Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1.  Introduction

   This document analyzes the current state of OSPFv2 and OSPFv3
   according to the requirements of [RFC6518].  It builds on several
   previous analysis efforts regarding routing security.  The OPSEC
   working group put together an analysis of cryptographic issues with
   routing protocols [RFC6039].  Earlier, the RPSEC working group put
   together a detailed analysis of OSPF vulnerabilities [OSPF-SEC].
   Work on solutions to address gaps identified in this analysis is
   underway [OSPF-MANKEY] [RFC6506].

   OSPF meets many of the requirements expected from a manually keyed
   routing protocol.  Integrity protection is provided with modern
   cryptographic algorithms.  Algorithm agility is provided: the
   algorithm can be changed as part of rekeying an interface or peer.
   Intra-connection rekeying is provided by the specifications, although
   apparently some implementations have trouble with this in practice.
   OSPFv2 security does not interfere with prioritization of packets.

   However, some gaps remain between the current state and the
   requirements for manually keyed routing security expressed in
   [RFC6862].  This document explores these gaps and proposes directions
   for addressing the gaps.

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