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Abstract

The IPv4 main header contained a 16-bit IP Identification (IPID) field used for fragmentation and reassembly. In practice, this field was commonly used by network diagnosticians for tracking packets. In IPv6, the IPID has been moved to the Fragment header, and would only be used when fragmentation is required. Thus, the IPID field in IPv6, is no longer able to be utilized in the valuable role it played in IPv4, relative to diagnostics and problem resolution. This causes great concern in particular for end users and large enterprises, for whom Network/Application availability and performance can directly and profoundly affect bottom line financials. Several viable solutions to this situation exist.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	4
2. Conventions used in this document	5
3. Applicability	6
6. Security Considerations	7
7. IANA Considerations	7
10. References	7
10.1. Normative References	8
11. Acknowledgments	8

1. Introduction

In IPv4, the 16 bit IP Identification (IPID) field is located at an offset of 4 bytes into the IPv4 header and is described in RFC791 [RFC791]. In IPv6, the IPID field is a 32 bit field contained in the Fragment Header defined by section 4.5 of RFC2460 [RFC2460]. Unfortunately, unless fragmentation is being done by the source node, the packet will not contain this Fragment Header, and therefore will have no Identification field.

The intended purpose of the IPID field is to enable fragmentation and reassembly, and as currently specified is required to be unique within the maximum segment lifetime (MSL) on all datagrams. The MSL is often 2 minutes.

In Large Enterprise Networks, the IPID field is used for more than fragmentation. During network diagnostics, packet traces may be taken at multiple places along the path, or at the source and destination. Then, packets can be matched by looking at the IPID.

Obviously, the time at each device will differ according to the clock on that device; so another metric is required. This method of taking multiple traces along the path is of special use on large multi-tier networks to see where the packet loss or packet corruption is happening. Multi-tier networks are those which have multiple routers or switches on the path between the sender and the receiver.

The inclusion of the IPID makes it easier for a device(s) in the middle of the network, or on the receiving end of the network, to identify flows belonging to a single node, even if that node might have a different IP address. For example, if the sending node is a mobile laptop with a wireless connection to the Internet.

For its de-facto diagnostic mode usage, the IPID field needs to be available whether or not fragmentation occurs. It also needs to be unique in the context of the entire session, and across all the connections controlled by the stack.

This document will present information that demonstrates how valuable and useful the IPID field has been (in IPv4) for diagnostics and problem resolution, and how not having it available (in IPv6), could be a major detriment to new IPv6 deployments and contribute to protracted downtimes in existing IPv6 operations.

As network technology has evolved, the uses to which fields are put can change as well. De-facto use is powerful, and should not be lightly ignored. In fact, it is a testament to the power and pervasiveness of the protocol that users create new uses for the original technology.

For example, the use of the IPID goes beyond the vision of the original authors. This sort of thing has happened with numerous other technologies. It is similar to the ways in which cell phones have evolved to be more than just a means of vocal communication, including Internet communications, photo-sharing, stock exchange transactions, etc. Or the way that the bicycle, originally intended merely as a means of fashionable transportation for a single individual, developed into a replacement for the horse in hauling materials. Or the way that the automobile went from being a means of transport for people to a truck, for transport of materials on a large scale. Indeed, the Internet itself has evolved, from a small network for researchers and the military to share files into the pervasive global information superhighway that it is today.

2. Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [RFC2119].

3. Applicability

The ability to utilize the IPID has enhanced problem diagnosis efforts and significantly reduced problem resolution time.

Several actual use case examples are shown below. These demonstrate how use of the IPID has reduced problem resolution time in very valuable production networks of Large Enterprises/End Users. In general, if a problem or performance issue with an application or network component can be fixed in minutes, as opposed to hours, this can mean significant dollar savings to large enterprises. The IPID can be used extensively when debugging involves traces or packet captures. Its absence in IPv6 may lead to protracted problem diagnosis and extended problem resolution time.

This value/perspective may be unique to tech support organizations of large enterprises. Other functional areas may not share this concern/perspective, as packets could continue to flow, but service levels may not be acceptable to end users during the extended problem resolution time.

Although very situation dependent, the use cases below clearly illustrate the value of network availability, and the need to keep problem resolution time to an absolute minimum.

Another benefit of using the IPID to expedite problem resolution is reducing the cost of associated resources being consumed during extended problem resolution, such as storage, CPU and staff time.

Will IPID be critical in most problem resolutions? NO! But if it even helps in a few per year, significant money and/or lost business could be saved.

A facility such as IPID, that has proven field value, should not be eliminated as an effective diagnosis tool!

USE CASE EXAMPLEs:

USE CASE #1 --- Large Insurance Company

- (estimated time saved by use of IPID: 7 hours)

PERFORMANCE TOOL PRODUCES EXTRANEEOUS PACKETS?

- Issue was whether a performance tool was accurately replicating session flow during performance testing?
- Trace IPIDs showed more unique packets within same flow from performance tool compared to IE Browser.
- Having the clear IPID sequence numbers also showed where and why the extra packets were being generated.
- Solution: Problem rectified in subsequent version of performance tool.
- Without IPID, it was not clear if there was an issue at all.

USE CASE #2 --- Large Bank

- (estimated time saved by use of IPID: 4 hours)

BATCH TRANSFER DURATION INCREASES 12X

- A 30 minute data transfer started taking 6-8 hours to complete.
- Possible packet loss? All vendors said no.
- Other Apps were working OK.
- 4 trace points used, and then IPIDs compared.
- Showed 7% packet loss.
- Solution: WAN hardware was replaced and problem fixed.
- Without IPID, no one would agree a problem existed

USE CASE #3 --- Large Bank

- (estimated time saved by use of IPID: 6 hours)

VERY SLOW INTERACTIVE PERFORMANCE.

- All network links looked good.
- Traces showed duplicated small packets (which can be OK).
- Saw that IPID was equal but TTL was always + 1.
- Network device was "Splitting" small packets only.(2 interfaces).
- The small packets were control info, telling other side to slow down.
- Erroneously looked like network congestion.
- Solution: Network Device replaced and good interactive performance restored.
- Without IPID, flows would have appeared OK.

USE CASE #4 --- Large Government Agency

- (estimated time saved by use of IPID: 9 hours)

VPN DROPS

- Cell phone connections to law enforcement were being dropped. Going through a VPN.
- All parties (both sides of VPN connection, application, etc.) said it was not their problem. Problem went on for weeks.
- Finally, when we were called in as consultants, we took a trace which showed packet with IPID and TTL that did not match others in the flow AT ALL was coming from router nearest application server end of VPN.
- Solution: Provider for VPN for application server changed. Problem resolved.
- Without IPID, much harder to diagnose problem.
- (Same case also happened with large corporation. Again, all parties saying not their fault until proven via packet trace.)

The IPID is very valuable to large enterprises and Data Center Operators (EDCO) in trace analysis, specifically in reducing problem diagnosis and resolution time. As such, IPID or something equivalent, should be part of IPv6 for all situations where it can provide value. (As it is IPv4.) Not just where fragmentation is required.

6. Security Considerations

There are no security considerations.

7. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

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Extending an IPv6 /64 Prefix from a 3GPP Mobile Interface to a LAN link
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Abstract

This document describes requirements for extending an IPv6 /64 prefix from a User Equipment 3GPP radio interface to a LAN link as well as two implementation examples.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.2 Special Language	3
2. The Challenge of Providing IPv6 Addresses to a LAN link via a 3GPP UE	4
3. Requirements for Extending the 3GPP Interface /64 IPv6 Prefix to a LAN link	4
4. Example Methods for Extending the 3GPP Interface /64 IPv6 Prefix to a LAN link	5
4.1 General Behavior for All Example Scenarios	5
4.2 Example Scenario 1: Global Address Only Assigned to LAN link	5
4.3 Example Scenario 2: A Single Global Address Assigned to 3GPP Radio and LAN link	6
5. Security Considerations	7
6. IANA Considerations	8
7. Acknowledgments	8
8. Informative References	8
Authors' Addresses	9

1. Introduction

3GPP mobile cellular networks such as GSM, UMTS, and LTE have architectural support for IPv6 [RFC6459], but only 3GPP Release-10 and onwards of the 3GPP specification [TS.23401] supports DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation [RFC3633] for delegating IPv6 prefixes to a single LAN link.

To facilitate the use of IPv6 in a LAN prior to the deployment of DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation in 3GPP networks and in User Equipment (UE), this document describes requirements and provides examples on how the 3GPP UE radio interface assigned global /64 prefix may be extended from the 3GPP radio interface to a LAN link.

There are two scenarios where this might be done. The first is where the 3GPP node sets up and manages its own LAN (e.g., an IEEE 802.11 SSID) and provides single-homed service to hosts that connect to this LAN. A second scenario is where the 3GPP node connects to an existing LAN and acts as a router in order to provide redundant or multi-homed IPv6 service.

This document is intended to address the first scenario, and is not applicable to the second scenario, because the operational complexities of the second scenario are not addressed.

This can be achieved by receiving the Router Advertisement (RA) [RFC4861] announced globally unique /64 IPv6 prefix from the 3GPP radio interface by the UE and then advertising the same IPv6 prefix to the LAN link with RA. For all of the cases in the scope of this document, the UE may be any device that functions as an IPv6 router between the 3GPP network and a LAN.

This document describes requirements for achieving IPv6 prefix extension from a 3GPP radio interface to a LAN link including two practical implementation examples:

- 1) The 3GPP UE only has a global scope address on the LAN link
- 2) The 3GPP UE maintains the same consistent 128 bit global scope IPv6 anycast address [RFC4291] on the 3GPP radio interface and the LAN link. The LAN link is configured as a /64 and the 3GPP radio interface is configured as a /128.

Section 3 describes the characteristics of each of the two example approaches.

1.2 Special Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",

"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

NOTE WELL: This document is not a standard, and conformance with it is not required in order to claim conformance with IETF standards for IPv6.

This document uses the normative keywords only for precision.

2. The Challenge of Providing IPv6 Addresses to a LAN link via a 3GPP UE

As described in [RFC6459], 3GPP networks assign a /64 global scope prefix to each UE using RA. DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation is an optional part of 3GPP Release-10 and is not covered by any earlier releases. Neighbor Discovery Proxy (ND Proxy) [RFC4389] functionality has been suggested as an option for extending the assigned /64 from the 3GPP radio interface to the LAN link, but ND Proxy is an experimental protocol and has some limitations with loop-avoidance.

DHCPv6 is the best way to delegate a prefix to a LAN link. The methods described in this document SHOULD only be applied when deploying DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation is not achievable in the 3GPP network and the UE. The methods described in this document are at various stages of implementation and deployment planning. The goal of this memo is to document the available methods which may be used prior to DHCPv6 deployment.

3. Requirements for Extending the 3GPP Interface /64 IPv6 Prefix to a LAN link

R-1: The 3GPP network provided /64 prefix MUST be made available on the LAN link.

LAN attached devices shall be able to use the 3GPP network assigned IPv6 prefix (e.g. using IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration - SLAAC [RFC4862]).

R-2: The UE MUST defend all its IPv6 addresses on the LAN link.

In case a LAN attached node will e.g. autoconfigure the same global IPv6 address as used on the 3GPP interface, the UE must fail the Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] process run by the LAN node.

R-3: The LAN link configuration MUST be tightly coupled with the 3GPP link state.

R-4: The UE MUST decrement the TTL when passing packets between IPv6

links across the UE.

4. Example Methods for Extending the 3GPP Interface /64 IPv6 Prefix to a LAN link

4.1 General Behavior for All Example Scenarios

As [RFC6459] describes, the 3GPP network assigned /64 is completely dedicated to the UE and the gateway does not consume any of the /64 addresses. The gateway routes the entire /64 to the UE and does not perform ND or Network Unreachability Detection (NUD) [RFC4861]. Communication between the UE and the gateway is only done using link-local addresses and the link is point-to-point. This allows for the UE to reliably manipulate the /64 from the 3GPP radio interface without negatively impacting the point-to-point 3GPP radio link interface. The LAN link Router Advertisement (RA) configuration must be tightly coupled with the 3GPP link state. If the 3GPP link goes down or changes the IPv6 prefix, that state should be reflected in the LAN link IPv6 configuration. Just as in a standard IPv6 router, the packet TTL will be decremented when passing packets between IPv6 links across the UE. The UE is employing the weak host model [RFC1122]. The RA function on the UE is exclusively run on the LAN link.

The LAN link originated RA message carries a copy of the following 3GPP radio link received RA message option fields:

- o MTU (if not provided by the 3GPP network, the UE will provide its 3GPP link MTU size)
- o Prefix Information

4.2 Example Scenario 1: Global Address Only Assigned to LAN link

For this case, the UE receives the RA from the 3GPP network but does not use a global address on the 3GPP interface. The 3GPP interface received RA /64 prefix information is used to configure NDP on the LAN. The UE assigns itself an IPv6 address on the LAN link from the 3GPP interface received RA. The LAN link uses RA to announce the prefix to the LAN. The UE LAN link interface defends its LAN IPv6 address with DAD. The UE shall not run SLAAC to assign a global address on the 3GPP radio interface while routing is enabled.

This method allows the UE to originate and terminate IPv6 communications as a host while acting as an IPv6 router. The movement of the IPv6 prefix from the 3GPP radio interface to the LAN link may result in long-lived data connections being terminated during the transition from a host-only mode to router-and-host mode.

Connections which are likely to be affected are ones that have been specifically bound to the 3GPP radio interface. This method is appropriate if the UE or software on the UE cannot support multiple interfaces with the same anycast IPv6 address and the UE requires global connectivity while acting as a router.

Below is the general procedure for this scenario:

1. The user activates router functionality for a LAN on the UE.
 2. The UE checks to make sure the 3GPP interface is active and has an IPv6 address. If the interface does not have an IPv6 address, an attempt will be made to acquire one, or else the procedure will terminate.
 3. In this example, the UE finds the 3GPP interface has the IPv6 address 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9 assigned and active.
 4. The UE moves the address 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9 as a /64 from the 3GPP interfaces to the LAN link interface, disables the IPv6 SLAAC feature on the 3GPP radio interface to avoid address autoconfiguration, and begins announcing the prefix 2001:db8:ac10:f002::/64 via RA to the LAN. For this example, the LAN has 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9/64 and the 3GPP radio only has a link-local address.
 5. The UE directly processes all packets destined to itself at 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9.
 6. The UE, acting as a router running NDP on the LAN, will route packets to and from the LAN. IPv6 packets passing between interfaces will have the TTL decremented.
 7. On the LAN link interface, there is no chance of address conflict since the address is defended using DAD. The 3GPP radio interface only has a link-local address.
- 4.3 Example Scenario 2: A Single Global Address Assigned to 3GPP Radio and LAN link

In this method, the UE assigns itself one address from the 3GPP network RA announced /64. This one address is configured as anycast [RFC4291] on both the 3GPP radio link as a /128 and on the LAN link as a /64. This allows the UE to maintain long lived data connections since the 3GPP radio interface address does not change when the router function is activated. This method may cause complications for certain software that may not support multiple interfaces with the same anycast IPv6 address, or are sensitive to prefix length

changes. This method also creates complications for ensuring uniqueness for Privacy Extensions [RFC4941]. When Privacy Extensions are in use all temporary addresses will be copied from the 3GPP radio interface to the LAN link. The preferred and valid lifetimes will be synchronized, such that the temporary anycast addresses on both interfaces expire simultaneously.

There might also be more complex scenarios in which the prefix length is not changed and privacy extensions are supported by having the subnet span multiple interfaces, as ND Proxy does [RFC4389]. Further elaboration is out of scope of the present document.

Below is the general procedure for this scenario:

1. The user activates router functionality for a LAN on the UE.
2. The UE checks to make sure the 3GPP interface is active and has an IPv6 address. If the interface does not have an IPv6 address, an attempt will be made to acquire one, or else the procedure will terminate.
3. In this example, the UE finds the 3GPP interface has the IPv6 address 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9 assigned and active.
4. The UE moves the address 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9 as an anycast /64 from the 3GPP interface to the LAN interface and begins announcing the prefix 2001:db8:ac10:f002::/64 via RA to the LAN. The 3GPP interface maintains the same IPv6 anycast address with a /128. For this example, the LAN has 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9/64 and the 3GPP radio interface has 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9/128.
5. The UE directly processes all packets destined to itself at 2001:db8:ac10:f002:1234:4567:0:9.
6. On the LAN interface, there is no chance of address conflict since the address is defended using DAD. The 3GPP radio interface only has a /128 and no other systems on the 3GPP radio point-to-point link may use the global /64.

5. Security Considerations

Since the UE will be switched from an IPv6 host mode to an IPv6 router-and-host mode, a basic IPv6 CPE security functions [RFC6092] SHOULD be applied.

Despite the use of temporary IPv6 addresses, the mobile network

provided /64 prefix is common to all the LAN attached devices potentially concerning privacy. A nomadic device (e.g. a smartphone) provided IPv6 prefix is not a long lived one due to re-attaches caused by a device reload, traveling through loosely covered areas, etc. The network will provide a new IPv6 prefix after a successful re-attach.

3GPP mobile network capable CPEs (e.g. a router) are likely to keep the mobile network data connection up for a longer time. Some mobile networks may be re-setting the mobile network connection regularly (e.g. every 24 hours) others may not. Privacy concerned users shall take appropriate measures to not to keep their IPv6 prefixes long-lived.

6. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any action from IANA.

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Routing-Related Design Choices for IPv6 Networks
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Abstract

This document presents advice on certain routing-related design choices that arise when designing IPv6 networks (both dual-stack and IPv6-only). The intended audience is someone designing an IPv6 network who is knowledgeable about best current practices around IPv4 network design, and wishes to learn the corresponding practices for IPv6.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Design Choices	3
2.1. Addresses	3
2.1.1. Where to Use Addresses	4
2.1.2. Which Addresses to Use	6
2.2. Interfaces	7
2.2.1. Mix IPv4 and IPv6 on the Same Layer-3 Interface?	7
2.3. Static Routes	8
2.3.1. Link-Local Next-Hop in a Static Route?	8
2.4. IGPs	9
2.4.1. IGP Choice	9
2.4.2. IS-IS Topology Mode	12
2.4.3. RIP / RIPng	13
2.5. BGP	14
2.5.1. Which Transport for Which Routes?	14
2.5.1.1. BGP Sessions for Unlabeled Routes	16
2.5.1.2. BGP sessions for Labeled or VPN Routes	17
2.5.2. eBGP Endpoints: Global or Link-Local Addresses?	18
3. General Observations	19
3.1. Use of Link-Local Addresses	19
3.2. Separation of IPv4 and IPv6	20
4. IANA Considerations	20
5. Security Considerations	20
6. Acknowledgements	21
7. Informative References	21
Authors' Addresses	25

1. Introduction

This document discusses routing-related design choices that arise when designing an IPv6-only or dual-stack network. The focus is on choices that do not come up when designing an IPv4-only network. The document presents each choice and the alternatives, and then discusses the pros and cons of the alternatives in detail. Where consensus currently exists around the best practice, this is documented; otherwise the document simply summarizes the current state of the discussion. Thus this document serves to both document the reasoning behind best current practices for IPv6, and to allow a designer to make an informed choice where no such consensus exists.

The design choices presented apply to both Service Provider and Enterprise network environments. Where choices have selection criteria which differ between the Service Provider and the Enterprise

environment, this is noted. The designer is encouraged to ensure that they familiarize themselves with any of the discussed technologies to ensure the best selection is made for their environment.

This document does not present advice on strategies for adding IPv6 to a network, nor does it discuss transition in these areas, see [RFC6180] for general advice, [RFC6782] for wireline service providers, [RFC6342] for mobile network providers, [RFC5963] for exchange point operators, [RFC6883] for content providers, and both [RFC4852] and [RFC7381] for enterprises. Nor does this document discuss the particulars of creating an IPv6 addressing plan; for advice in this area, see [RFC5375] or [v6-addressing-plan]. The document focuses on unicast routing design only and does not cover multicast or the issues involved in running MPLS over IPv6 transport

Section 2 presents and discusses a number of design choices. Section 3 discusses some general themes that run through these choices.

2. Design Choices

Each subsection below presents a design choice and discusses the pros and cons of the various options. If there is consensus in the industry for a particular option, then the consensus position is noted.

2.1. Addresses

This section discusses the choice of addresses for router loopbacks and links between routers. It does not cover the choice of addresses for end hosts.

In IPv6, an interface is always assigned a Link-Local Address (LLA) [RFC4291]. The link-local address can only be used for communicating with devices that are on-link, so often one or more additional addresses are assigned which are able to communicate off-link. This additional address or addresses can be one of three types:

- o Provider-Independent Global Unicast Address (PI GUA): IPv6 address allocated by a regional address registry [RFC4291]
- o Provider-Aggregatable Global Unicast Address (PA GUA): IPv6 Address allocated by your upstream service provider
- o Unique Local Address (ULA): IPv6 address locally assigned [RFC4193]

This document uses the term "multi-hop address" to collectively refer to these three types of addresses.

PI GUAs are, for many situations, the most flexible of these choices. Their main disadvantages are that a regional address registry will only allocate them to organizations that meet certain qualifications, and one must pay an annual fee. These disadvantages mean that many smaller organization may not qualify or be willing to pay for these addresses.

PA GUAs have the advantage that they are usually provided at no extra charge when you contract with an upstream provider. However, they have the disadvantage that, when switching upstream providers, one must give back the old addresses and get new addresses from the new provider ("renumbering"). Though IPv6 has mechanisms to make renumbering easier than IPv4, these techniques are not generally applicable to routers and renumbering is still fairly hard [RFC5887] [RFC6879] [RFC7010] . PA GUAs also have the disadvantage that it is not easy to have multiple upstream providers ("multi-homing") if they are used (see "Ingress Filtering Problem" in [RFC5220]).

ULAs have the advantage that they are extremely easy to obtain and cost nothing. However, they have the disadvantage that they cannot be routed on the Internet, so must be used only within a limited scope. In many situations, this is not a problem, but in certain situations this can be problematic. Though there is currently no document that describes these situations, many of them are similar to those described in [RFC6752]. See also [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ula-usage-recommendations].

Not discussed in this document is the possibility of using the technology described in [RFC6296] to work around some of the limitations of PA GUAs and ULAs.

2.1.1. Where to Use Addresses

As mentioned above, all interfaces in IPv6 always have a link-local address. This section addresses the question of when and where to assign multi-hop addresses in addition to the LLA. We consider four options:

- a. Use only link-local addresses on all router interfaces.
- b. Assign multi-hop addresses to all link interfaces on each router, and use only a link-local address on the loopback interfaces.
- c. Assign multi-hop addresses to the loopback interface on each router, and use only a link-local address on all link interfaces.

- d. Assign multi-hop addresses to both link and loopback interfaces on each router.

Option (a) means that the router cannot be reached (ping, management, etc.) from farther than one-hop away. The authors are not aware of anyone using this option.

Option (b) means that the loopback interfaces are effectively useless, since link-local addresses cannot be used for the purposes that loopback interfaces are usually used for. So option (b) degenerates into option (d).

Thus the real choice comes down to option (c) vs. option (d).

Option (c) has two advantages over option (d). The first advantage is ease of configuration. In a network with a large number of links, the operator can just assign one multi-hop address to each router and then enable the IGP, without going through the tedious process of assigning and tracking the addresses on each link. The second advantage is security. Since packets with link-local addresses cannot be should not be routed, it is very difficult to attack the associated nodes from an off-link device. This implies less effort around maintaining security ACLs.

Countering these advantages are various disadvantages to option (c) compared with option (d):

- o It is not possible to ping a link-local-only interface from a device that is not directly attached to the link. Thus, to troubleshoot, one must typically log into a device that is directly attached to the device in question, and execute the ping from there.
- o A traceroute passing over the link-local-only interface will return the loopback address of the router, rather than the address of the interface itself.
- o In cases of parallel point to point links it is difficult to determine which of the parallel links was taken when attempting to troubleshoot unless one sends packets directly between the two attached link-locals on the specific interfaces. Since many network problems behave differently for traffic to/from a router than for traffic through the router(s) in question, this can pose a significant hurdle to some troubleshooting scenarios.
- o On some routers, by default the link-layer address of the interface is derived from the MAC address assigned to interface. When this is done, swapping out the interface hardware (e.g.

interface card) will cause the link-layer address to change. In some cases (peering config, ACLs, etc) this may require additional changes. However, many devices allow the link-layer address of an interface to be explicitly configured, which avoids this issue. This problem should fade away over time as more and more routers select interface identifiers according to the rules in [RFC7217].

- o The practice of naming router interfaces using DNS names is difficult and not recommended when using link-locals only. More generally, it is not recommended to put link-local addresses into DNS; see [RFC4472].
- o It is often not possible to identify the interface or link (in a database, email, etc) by giving just its address without also specifying the link in some manner.

It should be noted that it is quite possible for the same link-local address to be assigned to multiple interfaces. This can happen because the MAC address is duplicated (due to manufacturing process defaults or the use of virtualization), because a device deliberately re-uses automatically-assigned link-local addresses on different links, or because an operator manually assigns the same easy-to-type link-local address to multiple interfaces. All these are allowed in IPv6 as long as the addresses are used on different links.

For more discussion on the pros and cons, see [RFC7404]. See also [RFC5375] for IPv6 unicast address assignment considerations.

Today, most operators use option (d).

2.1.2. Which Addresses to Use

Having considered above whether or not to use a "multi-hop address", we now consider which of the addresses to use.

When selecting between these three "multi-hop address" types, one needs to consider exactly how they will be used. An important consideration is how Internet traffic is carried across the core of the network. There are two main options: (1) the classic approach where Internet traffic is carried as unlabeled traffic hop-by-hop across the network, and (2) the more recent approach where Internet traffic is carried inside an MPLS LSP (typically as part of a L3 VPN).

Under the classic approach:

- o PI GUAs are a very reasonable choice, if they are available.

- o PA GUAs suffer from the "must renumber" and "difficult to multi-home" problems mentioned above.
- o ULAs suffer from the "may be problematic" issues described above.

Under the MPLS approach:

- o PA GUAs are a reasonable choice, if they are available.
- o PA GUAs suffer from the "must renumber" problem, but the "difficult to multi-home" problem does not apply.
- o ULAs are a reasonable choice, since (unlike in the classic approach) these addresses are not visible to the Internet, so the problematic cases do not occur.

2.2. Interfaces

2.2.1. Mix IPv4 and IPv6 on the Same Layer-3 Interface?

If a network is going to carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, as many networks do today, then a question arises: Should an operator mix IPv4 and IPv6 traffic or keep them separated? More specifically, should the design:

- a. Mix IPv4 and IPv6 traffic on the same layer-3 interface, OR
- b. Separate IPv4 and IPv6 by using separate interfaces (e.g., two physical links or two VLANs on the same link)?

Option (a) implies a single layer-3 interface at each end of the connection with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses; while option (b) implies two layer-3 interfaces at each end, one for IPv4 addresses and one with IPv6 addresses.

The advantages of option (a) include:

- o Requires only half as many layer 3 interfaces as option (b), thus providing better scaling;
- o May require fewer physical ports, thus saving money and simplifying operations;
- o Can make the QoS implementation much easier (for example, rate-limiting the combined IPv4 and IPv6 traffic to or from a customer);

- o Works well in practice, as any increase in IPv6 traffic is usually counter-balanced by a corresponding decrease in IPv4 traffic to or from the same host (ignoring the common pattern of an overall increase in Internet usage);
- o And is generally conceptually simpler.

For these reasons, there is a relatively strong consensus in the operator community that option (a) is the preferred way to go. Most networks today use option (a) wherever possible.

However, there can be times when option (b) is the pragmatic choice. Most commonly, option (b) is used to work around limitations in network equipment. One big example is the generally poor level of support today for individual statistics on IPv4 traffic vs IPv6 traffic when option (a) is used. Other, device-specific, limitations exist as well. It is expected that these limitations will go away as support for IPv6 matures, making option (b) less and less attractive until the day that IPv4 is finally turned off.

2.3. Static Routes

2.3.1. Link-Local Next-Hop in a Static Route?

For the most part, the use of static routes in IPv6 parallels their use in IPv4. There is, however, one exception, which revolves around the choice of next-hop address in the static route. Specifically, should an operator:

- a. Use the far-end's link-local address as the next-hop address, OR
- b. Use the far-end's GUA/ULA address as the next-hop address?

Recall that the IPv6 specs for OSPF [RFC5340] and ISIS [RFC5308] dictate that they always use link-locals for next-hop addresses. For static routes, [RFC4861] section 8 says:

A router MUST be able to determine the link-local address for each of its neighboring routers in order to ensure that the target address in a Redirect message identifies the neighbor router by its link-local address. For static routing, this requirement implies that the next-hop router's address should be specified using the link-local address of the router.

This implies that using a GUA or ULA as the next hop will prevent a router from sending Redirect messages for packets that "hit" this static route. All this argues for using a link-local as the next-hop address in a static route.

However, there are two cases where using a link-local address as the next-hop clearly does not work. One is when the static route is an indirect (or multi-hop) static route. The second is when the static route is redistributed into another routing protocol. In these cases, the above text from RFC 4861 notwithstanding, either a GUA or ULA must be used.

Furthermore, many network operators are concerned about the dependency of the default link-local address on an underlying MAC address, as described in the previous section.

Today most operators use GUAs as next-hop addresses.

2.4. IGPs

2.4.1. IGP Choice

One of the main decisions for a network operator looking to deploy IPv6 is the choice of IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) within the network. The main options are OSPF, IS-IS and EIGRP. RIPng is another option, but very few networks run RIP in the core these days, so it is covered in a separate section below.

OSPF [RFC2328] [RFC5340] and IS-IS [RFC5120][RFC5120] are both standardized link-state protocols. Both protocols are widely supported by vendors, and both are widely deployed. By contrast, EIGRP [RFC7868] is a Cisco proprietary distance-vector protocol. EIGRP is rarely deployed in service-provider networks, but is quite common in enterprise networks, which is why it is discussed here.

It is out of scope for this document to describe all the differences between the three protocols; the interested reader can find books and websites that go into the differences in quite a bit of detail. Rather, this document simply highlights a few differences that can be important to consider when designing IPv6 or dual-stack networks.

Versions: There are two versions of OSPF: OSPFv2 and OSPFv3. The two versions share many concepts, are configured in a similar manner and seem very similar to most casual users, but have very different packet formats and other "under the hood" differences. The most important difference is that OSPFv2 will only route IPv4, while OSPFv3 will route both IPv4 and IPv6 (see [RFC5838]). OSPFv2 was by far the most widely deployed version of OSPF when this document was published. By contrast, both IS-IS and EIGRP have just a single version, which can route both IPv4 and IPv6.

Transport. IS-IS runs over layer 2 (e.g. Ethernet). This means that the functioning of IS-IS has no dependencies on the IP layer: if

there is a problem at the IP layer (e.g. bad addresses), two routers can still exchange IS-IS packets. By contrast, OSPF and EIGRP both run over the IP layer. This means that the IP layer must be configured and working OSPF or EIGRP packets to be exchanged between routers. For EIGRP, the dependency on the IP layer is simple: EIGRP for IPv4 runs over IPv4, while EIGRP for IPv6 runs over IPv6. For OSPF, the story is more complex: OSPFv2 runs over IPv4, but OSPFv3 can run over either IPv4 or IPv6. Thus it is possible to route both IPv4 and IPv6 with OSPFv3 running over IPv6 or with OSPFv3 running over IPv4. This means that there are number of choices for how to run OSPF in a dual-stack network:

- o Use OSPFv2 for routing IPv4 , and OSPFv3 running over IPv6 for routing IPv6, OR
- o Use OSPFv3 running over IPv6 for routing both IPv4 and IPv6, OR
- o Use OSPFv3 running over IPv4 for routing both IPv4 and IPv6.

Summarization and MPLS: For most casual users, the three protocols are fairly similar in what they can do, with two glaring exceptions: summarization and MPLS. For summarization, both OSPF and IS-IS have the concept of summarization between areas, but the two area concepts are quite different, and an area design that works for one protocol will usually not work for the other. EIGRP has no area concept, but has the ability to summarize at any router. Thus a large network will typically have a very different OSPF, IS-IS and EIGRP designs, which is important to keep in mind if you are planning on using one protocol to route IPv4 and a different protocol for IPv6. The other difference is that OSPF and IS-IS both support RSVP-TE, a widely-used MPLS signaling protocol, while EIGRP does not: this is due to OSPF and IS-IS both being link-state protocols while EIGRP is a distance-vector protocol.

The table below sets out possible combinations of protocols to route both IPv4 and IPv6, and makes some observations on each combination. Here "EIGRP-v4" means "EIGRP for IPv4" and similarly for "EIGRP-v6". For OSPFv3, it is possible to run it over either IPv4 or IPv6; this is not indicated in the table.

IGP for IPv4	IGP for IPv6	Protocol separation	Similar configuration possible	Multiple Known Deployments
OSPFv2	OSPFv3	YES	YES	YES (8)
OSPFv2	IS-IS	YES	-	YES (3)
OSPFv2	EIGRP-v6	YES	-	-
OSPFv3	OSPFv3	NO	YES	-
OSPFv3	IS-IS	YES	-	-
OSPFv3	EIGRP-v6	YES	-	-
IS-IS	OSPFv3	YES	-	YES (2)
IS-IS	IS-IS	-	YES	YES (12)
IS-IS	EIGRP-v6	YES	-	-
EIGRP-v4	OSPFv3	YES	-	? (1)
EIGRP-v4	IS-IS	YES	-	-
EIGRP-v4	EIGRP-v6	-	YES	? (2)

In the column "Multiple Known Deployments", a YES indicates that a significant number of production networks run this combination, with the number of such networks indicated in parentheses following, while a "?" indicates that the authors are only aware of one or two small networks that run this combination. Data for this column was gathered from an informal poll of operators on a number of mailing lists. This poll was not intended to be a thorough scientific study of IGP choices, but to provide a snapshot of known operator choices at the time of writing (Mid-2015) for successful production dual stack network deployments. There were twenty six (26) network implementations represented by 17 respondents. Some respondents provided information on more than one network or network deployment. Due to privacy considerations, the networks' represented and respondents are not listed in this document.

A number of combinations are marked as offering "Protocol separation". These options use a different IGP protocol for IPv4 vs IPv6. With these options, a problem with routing IPv6 is unlikely to affect IPv4 or visa-versa. Some operator may consider this as a benefit when first introducing dual stack capabilities or for ongoing technical reasons.

Three combinations are marked "Similar configuration possible". This means it is possible (but not required) to use very similar IGP configuration for IPv4 and IPv6: for example, the same area boundaries, area numbering, link costing, etc. If you are happy with your IPv4 IGP design, then this will likely be a consideration. By contrast, the options that use, for example, IS-IS for one IP version and OSPF for the other version will require considerably different configuration, and will also require the operations staff to become familiar with the difference between the two protocols.

It should be noted that a number of ISPs have run OSPF as their IPv4 IGP for quite a few years, but have selected IS-IS as their IPv6 IGP. However, there are very few (none?) that have made the reverse choice. This is, in part, because routers generally support more nodes in an IS-IS area than in the corresponding OSPF area, and because IS-IS is seen as more secure because it runs at layer 2.

2.4.2. IS-IS Topology Mode

When IS-IS is used to route both IPv4 and IPv6, then there is an additional choice of whether to run IS-IS in single-topology or multi-topology mode.

With single-topology mode (also known as Native mode) [RFC5308]:

- o IS-IS keeps a single link-state database for both IPv4 and IPv6.
- o There is a single set of link costs which apply to both IPv4 and IPv6.
- o All links in the network must support both IPv4 and IPv6, as the calculation of routes does not take this into account. If some links do not support IPv6 (or IPv4), then packets may get routed across links where support is lacking and get dropped. This can cause problems if some network devices do not support IPv6 (or IPv4).
- o It is also important to keep the previous point in mind when adding or removing support for either IPv4 or IPv6.

With multi-topology mode [RFC5120]:

- o IS-IS keeps two link-state databases, one for IPv4 and one for IPv6.
- o IPv4 and IPv6 can have separate link metrics. Note that most implementations today require separate link metrics: a number of operators have rudely discovered that they have forgotten to configure the IPv6 metric until sometime after deploying IPv6 in multi-topology mode!
- o Some links can be IPv4-only, some IPv6-only, and some dual-stack. Routes to IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are computed separately and may take different paths even if the addresses are located on the same remote device.
- o The previous point may help when adding or removing support for either IPv4 or IPv6.

In the informal poll of operators, out of 12 production networks that ran IS-IS for both IPv4 and IPv6, 6 used single topology mode, 4 used multi-topology mode, and 2 did not specify. One motivation often cited by then operators for using Single Topology mode was because some device did not support multi-topology mode.

When asked, many people feel multi-topology mode is superior to single-topology mode because it provides greater flexibility at minimal extra cost. Never-the-less, as shown by the poll results, a number of operators have used single-topology mode successfully.

Note that this issue does not come up with OSPF, since there is nothing that corresponds to IS-IS single-topology mode with OSPF.

2.4.3. RIP / RIPng

A protocol option not described in the table above is RIP for IPv4 and RIPng for IPv6 [RFC2080]. These are distance vector protocols that are almost universally considered to be inferior to OSPF, IS-IS, or EIGRP for general use.

However, there is one specialized use where RIP/RIPng is still considered to be appropriate: in star topology networks where a single core device has lots and lots of links to edge devices and each edge device has only a single path back to the core. In such networks, the single path means that the limitations of RIP/RIPng are mostly not relevant and the very light-weight nature of RIP/RIPng gives it an advantage over the other protocols mentioned above. One concrete example of this scenario is the use of RIP/RIPng between cable modems and the CMTS.

2.5. BGP

2.5.1. Which Transport for Which Routes?

BGP these days is multi-protocol. It can carry routes of many different types, or more precisely, many different AFI/SAFI combinations. It can also carry routes when the BGP session, or more accurately the underlying TCP connection, runs over either IPv4 or IPv6 (here referred to as either "IPv4 transport" or "IPv6 transport"). Given this flexibility, one of the biggest questions when deploying BGP in a dual-stack network is the question of which route types should be carried over sessions using IPv4 transport and which should be carried over sessions using IPv6 transport.

This section discusses this question for the three most-commonly-used SAFI values: unlabeled (SAFI 1), labeled (SAFI 4) and VPN (SAFI 128). Though we do not explicitly discuss other SAFI values, many of the comments here can be applied to the other values.

Consider the following table:

Route Family	Transport	Comments
Unlabeled IPv4	IPv4	Works well
Unlabeled IPv4	IPv6	Next-hop
Unlabeled IPv6	IPv4	Next-hop
Unlabeled IPv6	IPv6	Works well
Labeled IPv4	IPv4	Works well
Labeled IPv4	IPv6	Next-hop
Labeled IPv6	IPv4	(6PE) Works well
Labeled IPv6	IPv6	Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6
VPN IPv4	IPv4	Works well
VPN IPv4	IPv6	Next-hop
VPN IPv6	IPv4	(6VPE) Works well
VPN IPv6	IPv6	Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6

The first column in this table lists various route families, where "unlabeled" means SAFI 1, "labeled" means the routes carry an MPLS label (SAFI 4, see [RFC3107]), and "VPN" means the routes are normally associated with a layer-3 VPN (SAFI 128, see [RFC4364]). The second column lists the protocol used to transport the BGP session, frequently specified by giving either an IPv4 or IPv6 address in the "neighbor" statement.

The third column comments on the combination in the first two columns:

- o For combinations marked "Works well", these combinations are standardized, widely supported and widely deployed.

- o For combinations marked "Next-hop", these combinations are not standardized and are less-widely supported. These combinations all have the "next-hop mismatch" problem: the transported route needs a next-hop address from the other address family than the transport address (for example, an IPv4 route needs an IPv4 next-hop, even when transported over IPv6). Some vendors have implemented ways to solve this problem for specific combinations, but for combinations marked "next-hop", these solutions have not been standardized (cf. 6PE and 6VPE, where the solution has been standardized).
- o For combinations marked as "Next-hop or MPLS over IPv6", these combinations either require a non-standard solution to the next-hop problem, or require MPLS over IPv6. At the time of writing, MPLS over IPv6 is not widely supported or deployed.

Also, it is important to note that changing the set of address families being carried over a BGP session requires the BGP session to be reset (unless something like [I-D.ietf-idr-dynamic-cap] or [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-multisession] is in use). This is generally more of an issue with eBGP sessions than iBGP sessions: for iBGP sessions it is common practice for a router to have two iBGP sessions, one to each member of a route reflector pair, so one can change the set of address families on first one of the sessions and then the other.

The following subsections discuss specific combinations in more detail.

2.5.1.1. BGP Sessions for Unlabeled Routes

Unlabeled routes are commonly carried on eBGP sessions, as well as on iBGP sessions in networks where Internet traffic is carried unlabeled across the network.

In these scenarios, there are three reasonable choices:

- a. Carry unlabeled IPv4 and IPv6 routes over IPv4, OR
- b. Carry unlabeled IPv4 and IPv6 routes over IPv6, OR
- c. Carry unlabeled IPv4 routes over IPv4, and unlabeled IPv6 routes over IPv6

Options (a) and (b) have the advantage that one BGP session is required between pairs of routers. However, option (c) is widely considered to be the best choice. There are several reasons for this :

- o It gives a clean separation between IPv4 and IPv6. This can be especially useful when first deploying IPv6 and troubleshooting resulting problems.
- o This avoids the next-hop problem described above.
- o The status of the routes follows the status of the underlying transport. If, for example, the IPv6 data path between the two BGP speakers fails, then the IPv6 session between the two speakers will fail and the IPv6 routes will be withdrawn, which will allow the traffic to be re-routed elsewhere. By contrast, if the IPv6 routes were transported over IPv4, then the failure of the IPv6 data path might leave a working IPv4 data path, so the BGP session would remain up and the IPv6 routes would not be withdrawn, and thus the IPv6 traffic would be sent into a black hole.
- o It avoids resetting the BGP session when adding IPv6 to an existing session, or when removing IPv4 from an existing session.

Rarely, there are situations where option (c) is not practical. In those cases today, most operators use option (a), carrying both route types over a single BGP session.

2.5.1.2. BGP sessions for Labeled or VPN Routes

When carrying labeled or VPN routes, the only widely-supported solution at time of writing is to carry both route types over IPv4. This may change in as MPLS over IPv6 becomes more widely implemented.

There are two options when carrying both over IPv4:

- a. Carry all routes over a single BGP session, OR
- b. Carry the routes over multiple BGP sessions (e.g. one for VPN IPv4 routes and one for VPN IPv6 routes)

Using a single session is usually simplest for an iBGP session going to a route reflector handling both route families. Using a single session here usually means that the BGP session will reset when changing the set of address families, but as noted above, this is usually not a problem when redundant route reflectors are involved.

In eBGP situations, two sessions are usually more appropriate.
[JUSTIFICATION?]

2.5.2. eBGP Endpoints: Global or Link-Local Addresses?

When running eBGP over IPv6, there are two options for the addresses to use at each end of the eBGP session (or more properly, the underlying TCP session):

- a. Use link-local addresses for the eBGP session, OR
- b. Use global addresses for the eBGP session.

Note that the choice here is the addresses to use for the eBGP sessions, and not whether the link itself has global (or unique-local) addresses. In particular, it is quite possible for the eBGP session to use link-local addresses even when the link has global addresses.

The big attraction for option (a) is security: an eBGP session using link-local addresses is extremely difficult to attack from a device that is off-link. This provides very strong protection against TCP RST and similar attacks. Though there are other ways to get an equivalent level of security (e.g. GTSM [RFC5082], MD5 [RFC5925], or ACLs), these other ways require additional configuration which can be forgotten or potentially mis-configured.

However, there are a number of small disadvantages to using link-local addresses:

- o Using link-local addresses only works for single-hop eBGP sessions; it does not work for multi-hop sessions.
- o One must use "next-hop self" at both endpoints, otherwise re-advertising routes learned via eBGP into iBGP will not work. (Some products enable "next-hop self" in this situation automatically).
- o Operators and their tools are used to referring to eBGP sessions by address only, something that is not possible with link-local addresses.
- o If one is configuring parallel eBGP sessions for IPv4 and IPv6 routes, then using link-local addresses for the IPv6 session introduces extra operational differences between the two sessions which could otherwise be avoided.
- o On some products, an eBGP session using a link-local address is more complex to configure than a session that uses a global address.

- o If hardware or other issues cause one to move the cable to a different local interface, then reconfiguration is required at both ends: at the local end because the interface has changed (and with link-local addresses, the interface must always be specified along with the address), and at the remote end because the link-local address has likely changed. (Contrast this with using global addresses, where less re-configuration is required at the local end, and no reconfiguration is required at the remote end).
- o Finally, a strict application of [RFC2545] forbids running eBGP between link-local addresses, as [RFC2545] requires the BGP next-hop field to contain at least a global address.

For these reasons, most operators today choose to have their eBGP sessions use global addresses.

3. General Observations

There are two themes that run through many of the design choices in this document. This section presents some general discussion on these two themes.

3.1. Use of Link-Local Addresses

The proper use of link-local addresses is a common theme in the IPv6 network design choices. Link-layer addresses are, of course, always present in an IPv6 network, but current network design practice mostly ignores them, despite efforts such as [RFC7404].

There are three main reasons for this current practice:

- o Network operators are concerned about the volatility of link-local addresses based on MAC addresses, despite the fact that this concern can be overcome by manually-configuring link-local addresses;
- o It is very difficult to impossible to ping a link-local address from a device that is not on the same subnet. This is a troubleshooting disadvantage, though it can also be viewed as a security advantage.
- o Most operators are currently running networks that carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic, and wish to harmonize their IPv4 and IPv6 design and operational practices where possible.

3.2. Separation of IPv4 and IPv6

Currently, most operators are running or planning to run networks that carry both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. Hence the question: To what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 be kept separate? As can be seen above, this breaks into two sub-questions: To what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 traffic be kept separate, and to what degree should IPv4 and IPv6 routing information be kept separate?

The general consensus around the first question is that IPv4 and IPv6 traffic should generally be mixed together. This recommendation is driven by the operational simplicity of mixing the traffic, plus the general observation that the service being offered to the end user is Internet connectivity and most users do not know or care about the differences between IPv4 and IPv6. Thus it is very desirable to mix IPv4 and IPv6 on the same link to the end user. On other links, separation is possible but more operationally complex, though it does occasionally allow the operator to work around limitations on network devices. The situation here is roughly comparable to IP and MPLS traffic: many networks mix the two traffic types on the same links without issues.

By contrast, there is more of an argument for carrying IPv6 routing information over IPv6 transport, while leaving IPv4 routing information on IPv4 transport. By doing this, one gets fate-sharing between the control and data plane for each IP protocol version: if the data plane fails for some reason, then often the control plane will too.

4. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.

5. Security Considerations

This document introduces no new security considerations that are not already documented elsewhere.

The following is a brief list of pointers to documents related to the topics covered above that the reader may wish to review for security considerations.

For general IPv6 security, [RFC4942] provides guidance on security considerations around IPv6 transition and coexistence.

For OSPFv3, the base protocol specification [RFC5340] has a short security considerations section which notes that the fundamental

mechanism for protecting OSPFv3 from attacks is the mechanism described in [RFC4552].

For IS-IS, [RFC5308] notes that ISIS for IPv6 raises no new security considerations over ISIS for IPv4 over those documented in [ISO10589] and [RFC5304].

For BGP, [RFC2545] notes that BGP for IPv6 raises no new security considerations over those present in BGP for IPv4. However, there has been much discussion of BGP security recently, and the interested reader is referred to the documents of the IETF's SIDR working group.

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Enterprise IPv6 Deployment Guidelines
draft-ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6-06

Abstract

Enterprise network administrators worldwide are in various stages of preparing for or deploying IPv6 into their networks. The administrators face different challenges than operators of Internet access providers, and have reasons for different priorities. The overall problem for many administrators will be to offer Internet-facing services over IPv6, while continuing to support IPv4, and while introducing IPv6 access within the enterprise IT network. The overall transition will take most networks from an IPv4-only environment to a dual stack network environment and eventually an IPv6-only operating mode. This document helps provide a framework for enterprise network architects or administrators who may be faced with many of these challenges as they consider their IPv6 support strategies.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1. Enterprise Assumptions	4
1.2. IPv4-only Considerations	4
1.3. Reasons for a Phased Approach	5
2. Preparation and Assessment Phase	6
2.1. Program Planning	6
2.2. Inventory Phase	7
2.2.1. Network infrastructure readiness assessment	7
2.2.2. Applications readiness assessment	8
2.2.3. Importance of readiness validation and testing	8
2.3. Training	9
2.4. Security Policy	9
2.4.1. IPv6 is no more secure than IPv4	9
2.4.2. Similarities between IPv6 and IPv4 security	10
2.4.3. Specific Security Issues for IPv6	10
2.5. Routing	12
2.6. Address Plan	13
2.7. Tools Assessment	15
3. External Phase	16
3.1. Connectivity	16
3.2. Security	17
3.3. Monitoring	19
3.4. Servers and Applications	19
3.5. Network Prefix Translation for IPv6	20
4. Internal Phase	20
4.1. Security	21
4.2. Network Infrastructure	21
4.3. End user devices	22
4.4. Corporate Systems	23

5. IPv6-only	23
6. Considerations For Specific Enterprises	25
6.1. Content Delivery Networks	25
6.2. Data Center Virtualization	25
6.3. University Campus Networks	25
7. Security Considerations	27
8. Acknowledgements	27
9. IANA Considerations	27
10. Informative References	27
Authors' Addresses	32

1. Introduction

An Enterprise Network is defined in [RFC4057] as a network that has multiple internal links, one or more router connections to one or more Providers, and is actively managed by a network operations entity (the "administrator", whether a single person or department of administrators). Administrators generally support an internal network, consisting of users' workstations, personal computers, mobile devices, other computing devices and related peripherals, a server network, consisting of accounting and business application servers, and an external network, consisting of Internet-accessible services such as web servers, email servers, VPN systems, and customer applications. This document is intended as guidance for enterprise network architects and administrators in planning their IPv6 deployments.

The business reasons for spending time, effort, and money on IPv6 will be unique to each enterprise. The most common drivers are due to the fact that when Internet service providers, including mobile wireless carriers, run out of IPv4 addresses, they will provide native IPv6 and non-native IPv4. The non-native IPv4 service may be NAT64, NAT444, Dual-stack Lite, MAP-T, MAP-E, or other transition technologies. Compared to tunneled or translated service, native traffic typically performs better and more reliably than non-native. For example, for client networks trying to reach enterprise networks, the IPv6 experience will be better than the transitional IPv4 if the enterprise deploys IPv6 in its public-facing services. The native IPv6 network path should also be simpler to manage and, if necessary, troubleshoot. Further, enterprises doing business in growing parts of the world may find IPv6 growing faster there, where again potential new customers, employees and partners are using IPv6. It is thus in the enterprise's interests to deploy native IPv6, at the very least in its public-facing services, but ultimately across the majority or all of its scope.

The text in this document provides specific guidance for enterprise networks, and complements other related work in the IETF, including [I-D.ietf-v6ops-design-choices] and [RFC5375].

1.1. Enterprise Assumptions

For the purpose of this document, we assume:

- o The administrator is considering deploying IPv6 (but see Section 1.2 below).
- o The administrator has existing IPv4 networks and devices which will continue to operate and be supported.
- o The administrator will want to minimize the level of disruption to the users and services by minimizing number of technologies and functions that are needed to mediate any given application. In other words: provide native IP wherever possible.

Based on these assumptions, an administrator will want to use technologies which minimize the number of flows being tunnelled, translated or intercepted at any given time. The administrator will choose transition technologies or strategies which allow most traffic to be native, and will manage non-native traffic. This will allow the administrator to minimize the cost of IPv6 transition technologies, by containing the number and scale of transition systems.

Tunnels used for IPv6/IPv4 transition are expected as near/mid- term mechanisms, while IPv6 tunneling will be used for many long-term operational purposes such as security, routing control, mobility, multi-homing, traffic engineering, etc. We refer to the former class of tunnels as "transition tunnels"

1.2. IPv4-only Considerations

As described in [RFC6302] administrators should take certain steps even if they are not considering IPv6. Specifically, Internet-facing servers should log the source port number, timestamp (from a reliable source), and the transport protocol. This will allow investigation of malefactors behind address-sharing technologies such as NAT444, MAP, or Dual-stack Lite. Such logs should be protected for integrity, safeguarded for privacy and periodically purged within applicable regulations for log retention.

Other IPv6 considerations may impact ostensibly IPv4-only networks, e.g. [RFC6104] describes the rogue IPv6 RA problem, which may cause problems in IPv4-only networks where IPv6 is enabled in end systems

on that network. Further discussion of the security implications of IPv6 in IPv4-only networks can be found in [RFC7123]).

1.3. Reasons for a Phased Approach

Given the challenges of transitioning user workstations, corporate systems, and Internet-facing servers, a phased approach allows incremental deployment of IPv6, based on the administrator's own determination of priorities. This document outlines suggested phases: a Preparation and Assessment Phase, an Internal Phase, and an External Phase. The Preparation Phase is highly recommended to all administrators, as it will save errors and complexity in later phases. Each administrator must decide whether to begin with an External Phase (enabling IPv6 for Internet-facing systems, as recommended in [RFC5211]) or an Internal Phase (enabling IPv6 for internal interconnections first).

Each scenario is likely to be different to some extent, but we can highlight some considerations:

- o In many cases, customers outside the network will have IPv6 before the internal enterprise network. For these customers, IPv6 may well perform better, especially for certain applications, than translated or tunneled IPv4, so the administrator may want to prioritize the External Phase such that those customers have the simplest and most robust connectivity to the enterprise, or at least its external-facing elements.
- o Employees who access internal systems by VPN may find that their ISPs provide translated IPv4, which does not support the required VPN protocols. In these cases, the administrator may want to prioritize the External Phase, and any other remotely-accessible internal systems. It is worth noting that a number of emerging VPN solutions provide dual-stack connectivity; thus a VPN service may be useful for employees in IPv4-only access networks to access IPv6 resources in the enterprise network (much like many public tunnel broker services, but specifically for the enterprise). Some security considerations are described in [I-D.ietf-opsec-vpn-leakages].
- o Internet-facing servers cannot be managed over IPv6 unless the management systems are IPv6-capable. These might be Network Management Systems (NMS), monitoring systems, or just remote management desktops. Thus in some cases, the Internet-facing systems are dependent on IPv6-capable internal networks. However, dual-stack Internet-facing systems can still be managed over IPv4.

- o Virtual machines may enable a faster rollout once initial system deployment is complete. Management of VMs over IPv6 is still dependent on the management software supporting IPv6.
- o IPv6 is enabled by default on all modern operating systems, so it may be more urgent to manage and have visibility on the internal traffic. It is important to manage IPv6 for security purposes, even in an ostensibly IPv4-only network, as described in [RFC7123].
- o In many cases, the corporate accounting, payroll, human resource, and other internal systems may only need to be reachable from the internal network, so they may be a lower priority. As enterprises require their vendors to support IPv6, more internal applications will support IPv6 by default and it can be expected that eventually new applications will only support IPv6. The inventory, as described in Section 2.2, will help determine the systems' readiness, as well as the readiness of the supporting network elements and security, which will be a consideration in prioritization of these corporate systems.
- o Some large organizations (even when using private IPv4 addresses[RFC1918]) are facing IPv4 address exhaustion because of the internal network growth (for example the vast number of virtual machines) or because of the acquisition of other companies that often raise private IPv4 address overlapping issues.
- o IPv6 restores end to end transparency even for internal applications (of course security policies must still be enforced). When two organizations or networks merge [RFC6879], the unique addressing of IPv6 can make the merger much easier and faster. A merger may, therefore, prioritize IPv6 for the affected systems.

These considerations are in conflict; each administrator must prioritize according to their company's conditions. It is worth noting that the reasons given in one "Large Corporate User's View of IPng", described in [RFC1687], for reluctance to deploy have largely been satisfied or overcome in the intervening years.

2. Preparation and Assessment Phase

2.1. Program Planning

Since enabling IPv6 is a change to the most fundamental Internet Protocol, and since there are so many interdependencies, having a professional project manager organize the work is highly recommended. In addition, an executive sponsor should be involved in determining

the goals of enabling IPv6 (which will establish the order of the phases), and should receive regular updates.

It may be necessary to complete the Preparation Phase before determining whether to prioritize the Internal or External Phase, since needs and readiness assessments are part of that phase. For a large enterprise, it may take several iterations to really understand the level of effort required. Depending on the required schedule, it may be useful to roll IPv6 projects into other architectural upgrades--this can be an excellent way to improve the network and reduce costs. However, by increasing the scope of projects, the schedule is often affected. For instance, a major systems upgrade may take a year to complete, where just patching existing systems may take only a few months.

The deployment of IPv6 will not generally stop all other technology work. Once IPv6 has been identified as an important initiative, all projects, both new and in-progress, will need to be reviewed to ensure IPv6 support.

It is normal for assessments to continue in some areas while execution of the project begins in other areas. This is fine, as long as recommendations in other parts of this document are considered, especially regarding security (for instance, one should not deploy IPv6 on a system before security has been evaluated).

2.2. Inventory Phase

To comprehend the scope of the inventory phase we recommend dividing the problem space in two: network infrastructure readiness and applications readiness.

2.2.1. Network infrastructure readiness assessment

The goal of this assessment is to identify the level of IPv6 readiness of network equipment. This will identify the effort required to move to an infrastructure that supports IPv6 with the same functional service capabilities as the existing IPv4 network. This may also require a feature comparison and gap analysis between IPv4 and IPv6 functionality on the network equipment and software. IPv6 support will require testing; features often work differently in vendors' labs than production networks. Some devices and software will require IPv4 support for IPv6 to work.

The inventory will show which network devices are already capable, which devices can be made IPv6 ready with a code/firmware upgrade, and which devices will need to be replaced. The data collection consists of a network discovery to gain an understanding of the

topology and inventory network infrastructure equipment and code versions with information gathered from static files and IP address management, DNS and DHCP tools.

Since IPv6 might already be present in the environment, through default configurations or VPNs, an infrastructure assessment (at minimum) is essential to evaluate potential security risks.

2.2.2. Applications readiness assessment

Just like network equipment, application software needs to support IPv6. This includes OS, firmware, middleware and applications (including internally developed applications). Vendors will typically handle IPv6 enablement of off-the-shelf products, but often enterprises need to request this support from vendors. For internally developed applications it is the responsibility of the enterprise to enable them for IPv6. Analyzing how a given application communicates over the network will dictate the steps required to support IPv6. Applications should avoid instructions specific to a given IP address family. Any applications that use APIs, such as the C language, that expose the IP version specifically, need to be modified to also work with IPv6.

There are two ways to IPv6-enable applications. The first approach is to have separate logic for IPv4 and IPv6, thus leaving the IPv4 code path mainly untouched. This approach causes the least disruption to the existing IPv4 logic flow, but introduces more complexity, since the application now has to deal with two logic loops with complex race conditions and error recovery mechanisms between these two logic loops. The second approach is to create a combined IPv4/IPv6 logic, which ensures operation regardless of the IP version used on the network. Knowing whether a given implementation will use IPv4 or IPv6 in a given deployment is a matter of some art; see Source Address Selection [RFC6724] and Happy Eyeballs [RFC6555]. It is generally recommended that the application developer use industry IPv6-porting tools to locate the code that needs to be updated. Some discussion of IPv6 application porting issues can be found in [RFC4038].

2.2.3. Importance of readiness validation and testing

Lastly IPv6 introduces a completely new way of addressing endpoints, which can have ramifications at the network layer all the way up to the applications. So to minimize disruption during the transition phase we recommend complete functionality, scalability and security testing to understand how IPv6 impacts the services and networking infrastructure.

2.3. Training

Many organizations falter in IPv6 deployment because of a perceived training gap. Training is important for those who work with addresses regularly, as with anyone whose work is changing. Better knowledge of the reasons IPv6 is being deployed will help inform the assessment of who needs training, and what training they need.

2.4. Security Policy

It is obvious that IPv6 networks should be deployed in a secure way. The industry has learnt a lot about network security with IPv4, so, network operators should leverage this knowledge and expertise when deploying IPv6. IPv6 is not so different than IPv4: it is a connectionless network protocol using the same lower layer service and delivering the same service to the upper layer. Therefore, the security issues and mitigation techniques are mostly identical with same exceptions that are described further.

2.4.1. IPv6 is no more secure than IPv4

Some people believe that IPv6 is inherently more secure than IPv4 because it is new. Nothing can be more wrong. Indeed, being a new protocol means that bugs in the implementations have yet to be discovered and fixed and that few people have the operational security expertise needed to operate securely an IPv6 network. This lack of operational expertise is the biggest threat when deploying IPv6: the importance of training is to be stressed again.

One security myth is that thanks to its huge address space, a network cannot be scanned by enumerating all IPv6 address in a /64 LAN hence a malevolent person cannot find a victim. [RFC5157] describes some alternate techniques to find potential targets on a network, for example enumerating all DNS names in a zone. Additional advice in this area is also given in [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning].

Another security myth is that IPv6 is more secure because it mandates the use of IPsec everywhere. While the original IPv6 specifications may have implied this, [RFC6434] clearly states that IPsec support is not mandatory. Moreover, if all the intra-enterprise traffic is encrypted, both malefactors and security tools that rely on payload inspection (IPS, firewall, ACL, IPFIX ([RFC7011] and [RFC7012]), etc) will be thwarted. Therefore, IPsec is as useful in IPv6 as in IPv4 (for example to establish a VPN overlay over a non-trusted network or reserved for some specific applications).

The last security myth is that amplification attacks (such as [SMURF]) do not exist in IPv6 because there is no more broadcast.

Alas, this is not true as ICMP error (in some cases) or information messages can be generated by routers and hosts when forwarding or receiving a multicast message (see Section 2.4 of [RFC4443]). Therefore, the generation and the forwarding rate of ICMPv6 messages must be limited as in IPv4.

It should be noted that in a dual-stack network the security implementation for both IPv4 and IPv6 needs to be considered, in addition to security considerations related to the interaction of (and transition between) the two, while they coexist.

2.4.2. Similarities between IPv6 and IPv4 security

As mentioned earlier, IPv6 is quite similar to IPv4, therefore several attacks apply for both protocol families, including:

- o Application layer attacks: such as cross-site scripting or SQL injection
- o Rogue device: such as a rogue Wi-Fi Access Point
- o Flooding and all traffic-based denial of services (including the use of control plane policing for IPv6 traffic see [RFC6192])

A specific case of congruence is IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193] and IPv4 private addressing [RFC1918], which do not provide any security by 'magic'. In both cases, the edge router must apply strict filters to block those private addresses from entering and, just as importantly, leaving the network. This filtering can be done by the enterprise or by the ISP, but the cautious administrator will prefer to do it in the enterprise.

IPv6 addresses can be spoofed as easily as IPv4 addresses and there are packets with bogon IPv6 addresses (see [CYMRU]). Anti-bogon filtering must be done in the data and routing planes. It can be done by the enterprise or by the ISP, or both, but again the cautious administrator will prefer to do it in the enterprise.

2.4.3. Specific Security Issues for IPv6

Even if IPv6 is similar to IPv4, there are some differences that create some IPv6-only vulnerabilities or issues. We give examples of such differences in this section.

Privacy extension addresses [RFC4941] are usually used to protect individual privacy by periodically changing the interface identifier part of the IPv6 address to avoid tracking a host by its otherwise always identical and unique MAC-based EUI-64. While this presents a

real advantage on the Internet, moderated by the fact that the prefix part remains the same, it complicates the task of following an audit trail when a security officer or network operator wants to trace back a log entry to a host in their network, because when the tracing is done the searched IPv6 address could have disappeared from the network. Therefore, the use of privacy extension addresses usually requires additional monitoring and logging of the binding of the IPv6 address to a data-link layer address (see also the monitoring section of [I-D.ietf-opsec-v6]). Some early enterprise deployments have taken the approach of using tools that harvest IP/MAC address mappings from switch and router devices to provide address accountability; this approach has been shown to work, though it can involve gathering significantly more address data than in equivalent IPv4 networks. An alternative is to try to prevent the use of privacy extension addresses by enforcing the use of DHCPv6, such that hosts only get addresses assigned by a DHCPv6 server. This can be done by configuring routers to set the M-bit in Router Advertisements, combined with all advertised prefixes being included without the A-bit set (to prevent the use of stateless auto-configuration). This technique of course requires that all hosts support stateful DHCPv6. It is important to note that not all operating systems exhibit the same behavior when processing RAs with the M-Bit set. The varying OS behavior is related to the lack of prescriptive definition around the A, M and O-bits within the ND protocol. [I-D.liu-bonica-dhcpv6-slaac-problem] provides a much more detailed analysis on the interaction of the M-Bit and DHCPv6.

Extension headers complicate the task of stateless packet filters such as ACLs. If ACLs are used to enforce a security policy, then the enterprise must verify whether its ACL (but also stateful firewalls) are able to process extension headers (this means understand them enough to parse them to find the upper layers payloads) and to block unwanted extension headers (e.g., to implement [RFC5095]). This topic is discussed further in [RFC7045].

Fragmentation is different in IPv6 because it is done only by source host and never during a forwarding operation. This means that ICMPv6 packet-too-big messages must be allowed to pass through the network and not be filtered [RFC4890]. Fragments can also be used to evade some security mechanisms such as RA-guard [RFC6105]. See also [RFC5722], and [RFC7113].

One of the biggest differences between IPv4 and IPv6 is the introduction of the Neighbor Discovery Protocol [RFC4861], which includes a variety of important IPv6 protocol functions, including those provided in IPv4 by ARP [RFC0826]. NDP runs over ICMPv6 (which as stated above means that security policies must allow some ICMPv6 messages to pass, as described in RFC 4890), but has the same lack of

security as, for example, ARP, in that there is no inherent message authentication. While Secure Neighbour Discovery (SeND) [RFC3971] and CGA [RFC3972] have been defined, they are not widely implemented). The threat model for Router Advertisements within the NDP suite is similar to that of DHCPv4 (and DHCPv6), in that a rogue host could be either a rogue router or a rogue DHCP server. An IPv4 network can be made more secure with the help of DHCPv4 snooping in edge switches, and likewise RA snooping can improve IPv6 network security (in IPv4-only networks as well). Thus enterprises using such techniques for IPv4 should use the equivalent techniques for IPv6, including RA-guard [RFC6105] and all work in progress from the SAVI WG, e.g. [RFC6959], which is similar to the protection given by dynamic ARP monitoring in IPv4. Other DoS vulnerabilities are related to NDP cache exhaustion, and mitigation techniques can be found in ([RFC6583]).

As stated previously, running a dual-stack network doubles the attack exposure as a malevolent person has now two attack vectors: IPv4 and IPv6. This simply means that all routers and hosts operating in a dual-stack environment with both protocol families enabled (even if by default) must have a congruent security policy for both protocol versions. For example, permit TCP ports 80 and 443 to all web servers and deny all other ports to the same servers must be implemented both for IPv4 and IPv6. It is thus important that the tools available to administrators readily support such behaviour.

2.5. Routing

An important design choice to be made is what IGP to use inside the network. A variety of IGPs (IS-IS, OSPFv3 and RIPng) support IPv6 today and picking one over the other is a design choice that will be dictated mostly by existing operational policies in an enterprise network. As mentioned earlier, it would be beneficial to maintain operational parity between IPv4 and IPv6 and therefore it might make sense to continue using the same protocol family that is being used for IPv4. For example, in a network using OSPFv2 for IPv4, it might make sense to use OSPFv3 for IPv6. It is important to note that although OSPFv3 is similar to OSPFv2, they are not the same. On the other hand, some organizations may chose to run different routing protocols for different IP versions. For example, one may chose to run OSPFv2 for IPv4 and IS-IS for IPv6. An important design question to consider here is whether to support one IGP or two different IGPs in the longer term. [I-D.ietf-v6ops-design-choices] presents advice on the design choices that arise when considering IGPs and discusses the advantages and disadvantages to different approaches in detail.

2.6. Address Plan

The most common problem encountered in IPv6 networking is in applying the same principles of conservation that are so important in IPv4. IPv6 addresses do not need to be assigned conservatively. In fact, a single larger allocation is considered more conservative than multiple non-contiguous small blocks, because a single block occupies only a single entry in a routing table. The advice in [RFC5375] is still sound, and is recommended to the reader. If considering ULAs, give careful thought to how well it is supported, especially in multiple address and multicast scenarios, and assess the strength of the requirement for ULA. [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ula-usage-recommendations] provides much more detailed analysis and recommendations on the usage of ULAs.

The enterprise administrator will want to evaluate whether the enterprise will request address space from a LIR (Local Internet Registry, such as an ISP), a RIR (Regional Internet Registry, such as AfriNIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, or RIPE-NCC) or a NIR (National Internet Registry, operated in some countries). The normal allocation is Provider Aggregatable (PA) address space from the enterprise's ISP, but use of PA space implies renumbering when changing provider. Instead, an enterprise may request Provider Independent (PI) space; this may involve an additional fee, but the enterprise may then be better able to be multihomed using that prefix, and will avoid a renumbering process when changing ISPs (though it should be noted that renumbering caused by outgrowing the space, merger, or other internal reason would still not be avoided with PI space).

The type of address selected (PI vs. PA) should be congruent with the routing needs of the enterprise. The selection of address type will determine if an operator will need to apply new routing techniques and may limit future flexibility. There is no right answer, but the needs of the external phase may affect what address type is selected.

Each network location or site will need a prefix assignment. Depending on the type of site/location, various prefix sizes may be used. In general, historical guidance suggests that each site should get at least a /48, as documented in RFC 5375 and [RFC6177]. In addition to allowing for simple planning, this can allow a site to use its prefix for local connectivity, should the need arise, and if the local ISP supports it.

When assigning addresses to end systems, the enterprise may use manually-configured addresses (common on servers) or SLAAC or DHCPv6 for client systems. Early IPv6 enterprise deployments have used SLAAC, both for its simplicity but also due to the time DHCPv6 has

taken to mature. However, DHCPv6 is now very mature, and thus workstations managed by an enterprise may use stateful DHCPv6 for addressing on corporate LAN segments. DHCPv6 allows for the additional configuration options often employed by enterprise administrators, and by using stateful DHCPv6, administrators correlating system logs know which system had which address at any given time. Such an accountability model is familiar from IPv4 management, though for DHCPv6 hosts are identified by DUID rather than MAC address. For equivalent accountability with SLAAC (and potentially privacy addresses), a monitoring system that harvests IP/MAC mappings from switch and router equipment could be used.

A common deployment consideration for any enterprise network is how to get host DNS records updated. Commonly, either the host will send DNS updates or the DHCP server will update records. If there is sufficient trust between the hosts and the DNS server, the hosts may update (and the enterprise may use SLAAC for addressing). Otherwise, the DHCPv6 server can be configured to update the DNS server. Note that an enterprise network with this more controlled environment will need to disable SLAAC on network segments and force end hosts to use DHCPv6 only.

In the data center or server room, assume a /64 per VLAN. This applies even if each individual system is on a separate VLAN. In a /48 assignment, typical for a site, there are then still 65,535 /64 blocks. Some administrators reserve a /64 but configure a small subnet, such as /112, /126, or /127, to prevent rogue devices from attaching and getting numbers; an alternative is to monitor traffic for surprising addresses or ND tables for new entries. Addresses are either configured manually on the server, or reserved on a DHCPv6 server, which may also synchronize forward and reverse DNS (though see [RFC6866] for considerations on static addressing). SLAAC is not recommended for servers, because of the need to synchronize RA timers with DNS TTLs so that the DNS entry expires at the same time as the address.

All user access networks should be a /64. Point-to-point links where Neighbor Discovery Protocol is not used may also utilize a /127 (see [RFC6164]).

Plan to aggregate at every layer of network hierarchy. There is no need for VLSM [RFC1817] in IPv6, and addressing plans based on conservation of addresses are short-sighted. Use of prefixes longer than /64 on network segments will break common IPv6 functions such as SLAAC[RFC4862]. Where multiple VLANs or other layer two domains converge, allow some room for expansion. Renumbering due to outgrowing the network plan is a nuisance, so allow room within it. Generally, plan to grow to about twice the current size that can be

accommodated; where rapid growth is planned, allow for twice that growth. Also, if DNS (or reverse DNS) authority may be delegated to others in the enterprise, assignments need to be on nibble boundaries (that is, on a multiple of 4 bits, such as /64, /60, /56, ..., /48, /44), to ensure that delegated zones align with assigned prefixes.

If using ULAs, it is important to note that AAAA and PTR records for ULA are not recommended to be installed in the global DNS. Similarly, reverse (address-to-name) queries for ULA must not be sent to name servers outside of the organization, due to the load that such queries would create for the authoritative name servers for the ip6.arpa zone. For more details please refer to section 4.4 of [RFC4193].

Enterprise networks more and more include virtual networks where a single physical node may host many virtualized addressable devices. It is imperative that the addressing plans assigned to these virtual networks and devices be consistent and non-overlapping with the addresses assigned to real networks and nodes. For example, a virtual network established within an isolated lab environment may at a later time become attached to the production enterprise network.

2.7. Tools Assessment

Enterprises will often have a number of operational tools and support systems which are used to provision, monitor, manage and diagnose the network and systems within their environment. These tools and systems will need to be assessed for compatibility with IPv6. The compatibility may be related to the addressing and connectivity of various devices as well as IPv6 awareness of the tools and processing logic.

The tools within the organization fall into two general categories, those which focus on managing the network, and those which are focused on managing systems and applications on the network. In either instance, the tools will run on platforms which may or may not be capable of operating in an IPv6 network. This lack in functionality may be related to Operating System version, or based on some hardware constraint. Those systems which are found to be incapable of utilizing an IPv6 connection, or which are dependent on an IPv4 stack, may need to be replaced or upgraded.

In addition to devices working on an IPv6 network natively, or via a transition tunnel, many tools and support systems may require additional software updates to be IPv6 aware, or even a hardware upgrade (usually for additional memory: IPv6 addresses are larger and for a while, IPv4 and IPv6 addresses will coexist in the tool). This awareness may include the ability to manage IPv6 elements and/or

applications in addition to the ability to store and utilize IPv6 addresses.

Considerations when assessing the tools and support systems may include the fact that IPv6 addresses are significantly larger than IPv4, requiring data stores to support the increased size. Such issues are among those discussed in [RFC5952]. Many organizations may also run dual-stack networks, therefore the tools need to not only support IPv6 operation, but may also need to support the monitoring, management and intersection with both IPv6 and IPv4 simultaneously. It is important to note that managing IPv6 is not just constrained to using large IPv6 addresses, but also that IPv6 interfaces and nodes are likely to use two or more addresses as part of normal operation. Updating management systems to deal with these additional nuances will likely consume time and considerable effort.

For networking systems, like node management systems, it is not always necessary to support local IPv6 addressing and connectivity. Operations such as SNMP MIB polling can occur over IPv4 transport while seeking responses related to IPv6 information. Where this may seem advantageous to some, it should be noted that without local IPv6 connectivity, the management system may not be able to perform all expected functions - such as reachability and service checks.

Organizations should be aware that changes to older IPv4-only SNMP MIB specifications have been made by the IETF related to legacy operation in [RFC2096] and [RFC2011]. Updated specifications are now available in [RFC4292] and [RFC4293] which modified the older MIB framework to be IP protocol agnostic, supporting both IPv4 and IPv6. Polling systems will need to be upgraded to support these updates as well as the end stations which are polled.

3. External Phase

The external phase for enterprise IPv6 adoption covers topics which deal with how an organization connects its infrastructure to the external world. These external connections may be toward the Internet at large, or to other networks. The external phase covers connectivity, security and monitoring of various elements and outward facing or accessible services.

3.1. Connectivity

The enterprise will need to work with one or more Service Providers to gain connectivity to the Internet or transport service infrastructure such as a BGP/MPLS IP VPN as described in [RFC4364] and [RFC4659]. One significant factor that will guide how an organization may need to communicate with the outside world will

involve the use of PI (Provider Independent) and/or PA (Provider Aggregatable) IPv6 space.

Enterprises should be aware that depending on which address type they selected (PI vs. PA) in their planning phase, they may need to implement new routing functions and/or behaviours to support their connectivity to the ISP. In the case of PI, the upstream ISP may offer options to route the prefix (typically a /48) on the enterprise's behalf and update the relevant routing databases. Otherwise, the enterprise may need to perform this task on their own and use BGP to inject the prefix into the global BGP system.

Note that the rules set by the RIRs for an enterprise acquiring PI address space have changed over time. For example, in the European region the RIPE-NCC no longer requires an enterprise to be multihomed to be eligible for an IPv6 PI allocation. Requests can be made directly or via a LIR. It is possible that the rules may change again, and may vary between RIRs.

When seeking IPv6 connectivity to a Service Provider, Native IPv6 connectivity is preferred since it provides the most robust and efficient form of connectivity. If native IPv6 connectivity is not possible due to technical or business limitations, the enterprise may utilize readily available transition tunnel IPv6 connectivity. There are IPv6 transit providers which provide robust tunnelled IPv6 connectivity which can operate over IPv4 networks. It is important to understand the transition tunnel mechanism used, and to consider that it will have higher latency than native IPv4 or IPv6, and may have other problems, e.g. related to MTUs.

It is important to evaluate MTU considerations when adding IPv6 to an existing IPv4 network. It is generally desirable to have the IPv6 and IPv4 MTU congruent to simplify operations (so the two address families behave similarly, that is, as expected). If the enterprise uses transition tunnels inside or externally for IPv6 connectivity, then modification of the MTU on hosts/routers may be needed as mid-stream fragmentation is no longer supported in IPv6. It is preferred that pMTUD is used to optimize the MTU, so erroneous filtering of the related ICMPv6 message types should be monitored. Adjusting the MTU may be the only option if undesirable upstream ICMPv6 filtering cannot be removed.

3.2. Security

The most important part of security for external IPv6 deployment is filtering and monitoring. Filtering can be done by stateless ACLs or a stateful firewall. The security policies must be consistent for IPv4 and IPv6 (else the attacker will use the less protected protocol

stack), except that certain ICMPv6 messages must be allowed through and to the filtering device (see [RFC4890]):

- o Packet Too Big: essential to allow Path MTU discovery to work
- o Parameter Problem
- o Time Exceeded

In addition, Neighbor Discovery Protocol messages (including Neighbor Solicitation, Router Advertisements, etc.) are required for local hosts.

It could also be safer to block all fragments where the transport layer header is not in the first fragment to avoid attacks as described in [RFC5722]. Some filtering devices allow this filtering. Ingress filters and firewalls should follow [RFC5095] in handling routing extension header type 0, dropping the packet and sending ICMPv6 Parameter Problem, unless Segments Left = 0 (in which case, ignore the header).

If an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is used for IPv4 traffic, then an IPS should also be used for IPv6 traffic. In general, make sure IPv6 security is at least as good as IPv4. This also includes all email content protection (anti-spam, content filtering, data leakage prevention, etc.).

The edge router must also implement anti-spoofing techniques based on [RFC2827] (also known as BCP 38).

In order to protect the networking devices, it is advised to implement control plane policing as per [RFC6192].

The potential NDP cache exhaustion attack (see [RFC6583]) can be mitigated by two techniques:

- o Good NDP implementation with memory utilization limits as well as rate-limiters and prioritization of requests.
- o Or, as the external deployment usually involves just a couple of exposed statically configured IPv6 addresses (virtual addresses of web, email, and DNS servers), then it is straightforward to build an ingress ACL allowing traffic for those addresses and denying traffic to any other addresses. This actually prevents the attack as a packet for a random destination will be dropped and will never trigger a neighbor resolution.

3.3. Monitoring

Monitoring the use of the Internet connectivity should be done for IPv6 as it is done for IPv4. This includes the use of IP Flow Information eXport (IPFIX) [RFC7012] to report abnormal traffic patterns (such as port scanning, SYN-flooding, related IP source addresses) from monitoring tools and evaluating data read from SNMP MIBs [RFC4293] (some of which also enable the detection of abnormal bandwidth utilization) and syslogs (finding server and system errors). Where Netflow is used, version 9 is required for IPv6 support. Monitoring systems should be able to examine IPv6 traffic, use IPv6 for connectivity, record IPv6 address, and any log parsing tools and reporting need to support IPv6. Some of this data can be sensitive (including personally identifiable information) and care in securing it should be taken, with periodic purges. Integrity protection on logs and sources of log data is also important to detect unusual behavior (misconfigurations or attacks). Logs may be used in investigations, which depend on trustworthy data sources (tamper resistant).

In addition, monitoring of external services (such as web sites) should be made address-specific, so that people are notified when either the IPv4 or IPv6 version of a site fails.

3.4. Servers and Applications

The path to the servers accessed from the Internet usually involves security devices (firewall, IPS), server load balancing (SLB) and real physical servers. The latter stage is also multi-tiered for scalability and security between presentation and data storage. The ideal transition is to enable native dual-stack on all devices; but as part of the phased approach, operators have used the following techniques with success:

- o Use a network device to apply NAT64 and basically translate an inbound TCP connection (or any other transport protocol) over IPv6 into a TCP connection over IPv4. This is the easiest to deploy as the path is mostly unchanged but it hides all IPv6 remote users behind a single IPv4 address which leads to several audit trail and security issues (see [RFC6302]).
- o Use the server load balancer which acts as an application proxy to do this translation. Compared to the NAT64, it has the potential benefit of going through the security devices as native IPv6 (so more audit and trace abilities) and is also able to insert a HTTP X-Forward-For header which contains the remote IPv6 address. The latter feature allows for logging, and rate-limiting on the real

servers based on the IPV6 address even if those servers run only IPv4.

In either of these cases, care should be taken to secure logs for privacy reasons, and to periodically purge them.

3.5. Network Prefix Translation for IPv6

Network Prefix Translation for IPv6, or NPTv6 as described in [RFC6296] provides a framework to utilize prefix ranges within the internal network which are separate (address-independent) from the assigned prefix from the upstream provider or registry. As mentioned above, while NPTv6 has potential use-cases in IPv6 networks, the implications of its deployment need to be fully understood, particularly where any applications might embed IPv6 addresses in their payloads.

Use of NPTv6 can be chosen independently from how addresses are assigned and routed within the internal network, how prefixes are routed towards the Internet, or whether PA or PI addresses are used.

4. Internal Phase

This phase deals with the delivery of IPv6 to the internal user-facing side of the IT infrastructure, which comprises various components such as network devices (routers, switches, etc.), end user devices and peripherals (workstations, printers, etc.), and internal corporate systems.

An important design paradigm to consider during this phase is "dual-stack when you can, tunnel when you must". Dual-stacking allows a more robust, production-quality IPv6 network than is typically facilitated by internal use of transition tunnels that are harder to troubleshoot and support, and that may introduce scalability and performance issues. Tunnels may of course still be used in production networks, but their use needs to be carefully considered, e.g. where the transition tunnel may be run through a security or filtering device. Tunnels do also provide a means to experiment with IPv6 and gain some operational experience with the protocol. [RFC4213] describes various transition mechanisms in more detail. [RFC6964] suggests operational guidance when using ISATAP tunnels [RFC5214], though we would recommend use of dual-stack wherever possible.

4.1. Security

IPv6 must be deployed in a secure way. This means that all existing IPv4 security policies must be extended to support IPv6; IPv6 security policies will be the IPv6 equivalent of the existing IPv4 ones (taking into account the difference for ICMPv6 [RFC4890]). As in IPv4, security policies for IPv6 will be enforced by firewalls, ACL, IPS, VPN, and so on.

Privacy extension addresses [RFC4941] raise a challenge for an audit trail as explained in section Section 2.4.3. The enterprise may choose to attempt to enforce use of DHCPv6, or deploy monitoring tools that harvest accountability data from switches and routers (thus making the assumption that devices may use any addresses inside the network).

One major issue is threats against Neighbor Discovery. This means, for example, that the internal network at the access layer (where hosts connect to the network over wired or wireless) should implement RA-guard [RFC6105] and the techniques being specified by SAVI WG [RFC6959]; see also Section 2.4.3 for more information.

4.2. Network Infrastructure

The typical enterprise network infrastructure comprises a combination of the following network elements - wired access switches, wireless access points, and routers (although it is fairly common to find hardware that collapses switching and routing functionality into a single device). Basic wired access switches and access points operate only at the physical and link layers, and don't really have any special IPv6 considerations other than being able to support IPv6 addresses themselves for management purposes. In many instances, these devices possess a lot more intelligence than simply switching packets. For example, some of these devices help assist with link layer security by incorporating features such as ARP inspection and DHCP Snooping, or they may help limit where multicast floods by using IGMP (or, in the case of IPv6, MLD) snooping.

Another important consideration in enterprise networks is first hop router redundancy. This directly ties into network reachability from an end host's point of view. IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND), [RFC4861], provides a node with the capability to maintain a list of available routers on the link, in order to be able to switch to a backup path should the primary be unreachable. By default, ND will detect a router failure in 38 seconds and cycle onto the next default router listed in its cache. While this feature provides a basic level of first hop router redundancy, most enterprise IPv4 networks are designed to fail over much faster. Although this delay can be

improved by adjusting the default timers, care must be taken to protect against transient failures and to account for increased traffic on the link. Another option to provide robust first hop redundancy is to use the Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol for IPv6 (VRRPv3), [RFC5798]. This protocol provides a much faster switchover to an alternate default router than default ND parameters. Using VRRPv3, a backup router can take over for a failed default router in around three seconds (using VRRPv3 default parameters). This is done without any interaction with the hosts and a minimum amount of VRRP traffic.

Last but not the least, one of the most important design choices to make while deploying IPv6 on the internal network is whether to use Stateless Automatic Address Configuration (SLAAC), [RFC4862], or Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), [RFC3315], or a combination thereof. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, and the choice will ultimately depend on the operational policies that guide each enterprise's network design. For example, if an enterprise is looking for ease of use, rapid deployment, and less administrative overhead, then SLAAC makes more sense for workstations. Manual or DHCPv6 assignments are still needed for servers, as described in the External Phase and Address Plan sections of this document. However, if the operational policies call for precise control over IP address assignment for auditing then DHCPv6 may be preferred. DHCPv6 also allows you to tie into DNS systems for host entry updates and gives you the ability to send other options and information to clients. It is worth noting that in general operation RAs are still needed in DHCPv6 networks, as there is no DHCPv6 Default Gateway option. Similarly, DHCPv6 is needed in RA networks for other configuration information, e.g. NTP servers or, in the absence of support for DNS resolvers in RAs [RFC6106], DNS resolver information.

4.3. End user devices

Most operating systems (OSes) that are loaded on workstations and laptops in a typical enterprise support IPv6 today. However, there are various out-of-the-box nuances that one should be mindful about. For example, the default behavior of OSes vary; some may have IPv6 turned off by default, some may only have certain features such as privacy extensions to IPv6 addresses (RFC 4941) turned off while others have IPv6 fully enabled. Further, even when IPv6 is enabled, the choice of which address is used may be subject to Source Address Selection (RFC 6724) and Happy Eyeballs (RFC 6555). Therefore, it is advised that enterprises investigate the default behavior of their installed OS base and account for it during the Inventory phases of their IPv6 preparations. Furthermore, some OSes may have some transition tunneling mechanisms turned on by default and in such

cases it is recommended to administratively shut down such interfaces unless required.

It is important to note that it is recommended that IPv6 be deployed at the network and system infrastructure level before it is rolled out to end user devices; ensure IPv6 is running and routed on the wire, and secure and correctly monitored, before exposing IPv6 to end users.

Smartphones and tablets are significant IPv6-capable platforms, depending on the support of the carrier's data network.

IPv6 support for peripherals varies. Much like servers, printers are generally configured with a static address (or DHCP reservation) so clients can discover them reliably.

4.4. Corporate Systems

No IPv6 deployment will be successful without ensuring that all the corporate systems that an enterprise uses as part of its IT infrastructure support IPv6. Examples of such systems include, but are not limited to, email, video conferencing, telephony (VoIP), DNS, RADIUS, etc. All these systems must have their own detailed IPv6 rollout plan in conjunction with the network IPv6 rollout. It is important to note that DNS is one of the main anchors in an enterprise deployment, since most end hosts decide whether or not to use IPv6 depending on the presence of IPv6 AAAA records in a reply to a DNS query. It is recommended that system administrators selectively turn on AAAA records for various systems as and when they are IPv6 enabled; care must be taken though to ensure all services running on that host name are IPv6-enabled before adding the AAAA record. Care with web proxies is advised; a mismatch in the level of IPv6 support between the client, proxy, and server can cause communication problems. All monitoring and reporting tools across the enterprise will need to be modified to support IPv6.

5. IPv6-only

Early IPv6 enterprise deployments have generally taken a dual-stack approach to enabling IPv6, i.e. the existing IPv4 services have not been turned off. Although IPv4 and IPv6 networks will coexist for a long time, the long term enterprise network roadmap should include steps to simplify engineering and operations by deprecating IPv4 from the dual-stack network. In some extreme cases, deploying dual-stack networks may not even be a viable option for very large enterprises due to the RFC 1918 address space not being large enough to support the network's growth. In such cases, deploying IPv6-only networks might be the only choice available to sustain network growth. In

other cases, there may be elements of an otherwise dual-stack network that may be run IPv6-only.

If nodes in the network don't need to talk to an IPv4-only node, then deploying IPv6-only networks should be straightforward. However, most nodes will need to communicate with some IPv4-only nodes; an IPv6-only node may therefore require a translation mechanism. As [RFC6144] points out, it is important to look at address translation as a transition strategy towards running an IPv6-only network.

There are various stateless and stateful IPv4/IPv6 translation methods available today that help IPv6 to IPv4 communication. RFC 6144 provides a framework for IPv4/IPv6 translation and describes in detail various scenarios in which such translation mechanisms could be used. [RFC6145] describes stateless address translation. In this mode, a specific IPv6 address range will represent IPv4 systems (IPv4-converted addresses), and the IPv6 systems have addresses (IPv4-translatable addresses) that can be algorithmically mapped to a subset of the service provider's IPv4 addresses. [RFC6146], NAT64, describes stateful address translation. As the name suggests, the translation state is maintained between IPv4 address/port pairs and IPv6 address/port pairs, enabling IPv6 systems to open sessions with IPv4 systems. [RFC6147], DNS64, describes a mechanism for synthesizing AAAA resource records (RRs) from A RRs. Together, RFCs 6146 and RFC 6147 provide a viable method for an IPv6-only client to initiate communications to an IPv4-only server. As described in the assumptions section, the administrator will usually want most traffic or flows to be native, and only translate as needed.

The address translation mechanisms for the stateless and stateful translations are defined in [RFC6052]. It is important to note that both of these mechanisms have limitations as to which protocols they support. For example, RFC 6146 only defines how stateful NAT64 translates unicast packets carrying TCP, UDP, and ICMP traffic only. The classic problems of IPv4 NAT also apply, e.g. handling IP literals in application payloads. The ultimate choice of which translation mechanism to choose will be dictated mostly by existing operational policies pertaining to application support, logging requirements, etc.

There is additional work being done in the area of address translation to enhance and/or optimize current mechanisms. For example, [I-D.xli-behave-divi] describes limitations with the current stateless translation, such as IPv4 address sharing and application layer gateway (ALG) problems, and presents the concept and implementation of dual-stateless IPv4/IPv6 translation (dIVI) to address those issues.

It is worth noting that for IPv6-only access networks that use technologies such as NAT64, the more content providers (and enterprises) that make their content available over IPv6, the less the requirement to apply NAT64 to traffic leaving the access network. This particular point is important for enterprises which may start their IPv6 deployment well into the global IPv6 transition. As time progresses, and given the current growth in availability of IPv6 content, IPv6-only operation using NAT64 to manage some flows will become less expensive to run versus the traditional NAT44 deployments since only IPv6 to IPv4 flows need translation. [RFC6883] provides guidance and suggestions for Internet Content Providers and Application Service Providers in this context.

Enterprises should also be aware that networks may be subject to future convergence with other networks (i.e. mergers, acquisitions, etc). An enterprise considering IPv6-only operation may need to be aware that additional transition technologies and/or connectivity strategies may be required depending on the level of IPv6 readiness and deployment in the merging networking.

6. Considerations For Specific Enterprises

6.1. Content Delivery Networks

Some guidance for Internet Content and Application Service Providers can be found in [RFC6883], which includes a dedicated section on Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). An enterprise that relies on a CDN to deliver a 'better' e-commerce experience needs to ensure that their CDN provider also supports IPv4/IPv6 traffic selection so that they can ensure 'best' access to the content. A CDN could enable external IPv6 content delivery even if the enterprise provides that content over IPv4.

6.2. Data Center Virtualization

IPv6 Data Center considerations are described in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-dc-ipv6].

6.3. University Campus Networks

A number of campus networks around the world have made some initial IPv6 deployment. This has been encouraged by their National Research and Education Network (NREN) backbones having made IPv6 available natively since the early 2000's. Universities are a natural place for IPv6 deployment to be considered at an early stage, perhaps compared to other enterprises, as they are involved by their very nature in research and education.

Campus networks can deploy IPv6 at their own pace; there is no need to deploy IPv6 across the entire enterprise from day one, rather specific projects can be identified for an initial deployment, that are both deep enough to give the university experience, but small enough to be a realistic first step. There are generally three areas in which such deployments are currently made.

In particular those initial areas commonly approached are:

- o External-facing services. Typically the campus web presence and commonly also external-facing DNS and MX services. This ensures early IPv6-only adopters elsewhere can access the campus services as simply and as robustly as possible.
- o Computer science department. This is where IPv6-related research and/or teaching is most likely to occur, and where many of the next generation of network engineers are studying, so enabling some or all of the campus computer science department network is a sensible first step.
- o The eduroam wireless network. Eduroam [I-D.wierenga-ietf-eduroam] is the de facto wireless roaming system for academic networks, and uses 802.1X-based authentication, which is agnostic to the IP version used (unlike web-redirection gateway systems). Making a campus' eduroam network dual-stack is a very viable early step.

The general IPv6 deployment model in a campus enterprise will still follow the general principles described in this document. While the above early stage projects are commonly followed, these still require the campus to acquire IPv6 connectivity and address space from their NREN (or other provider in some parts of the world), and to enable IPv6 on the wire on at least part of the core of the campus network. This implies a requirement to have an initial address plan, and to ensure appropriate monitoring and security measures are in place, as described elsewhere in this document.

Campuses which have deployed to date do not use ULAs, nor do they use NPTv6. In general, campuses have very stable PA-based address allocations from their NRENs (or their equivalent). However, campus enterprises may consider applying for IPv6 PI; some have already done so. The discussions earlier in this text about PA vs. PI still apply.

Finally, campuses may be more likely than many other enterprises to run multicast applications, such as IP TV or live lecture or seminar streaming, so may wish to consider support for specific IPv6 multicast functionality, e.g. Embedded-RP [RFC3956] in routers and MLDv1 and MLDv2 snooping in switches.

7. Security Considerations

This document has multiple security sections detailing how to securely deploy an IPv6 network within an enterprise network.

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9. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations or implications that arise from this document.

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An Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Profile for 3GPP Mobile Devices
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Abstract

This document defines a profile that is a superset of that of the connection to IPv6 cellular networks defined in the IPv6 for Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Cellular Hosts document. This document defines an IPv6 profile that a number of operators recommend in order to connect 3GPP mobile devices to an IPv6-only or dual-stack wireless network (including 3GPP cellular network) with a special focus on IPv4 service continuity features.

Both mobile hosts and mobile devices with capability to share their 3GPP mobile connectivity are in scope.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
1.1. Terminology	4
1.2. Scope	4
2. Connectivity Recommendations	6
3. Recommendations for Cellular Devices with LAN Capabilities .	10
4. Advanced Recommendations	12
5. Security Considerations	14
6. IANA Considerations	15
7. Acknowledgements	15
8. References	15
8.1. Normative References	15
8.2. Informative References	17
Authors' Addresses	20

1. Introduction

IPv6 deployment in Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) mobile networks is the only viable solution to the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses in those networks. Several mobile operators have already deployed IPv6 [RFC2460] or are in the pre-deployment phase. One of the major hurdles as perceived by some mobile operators is the lack of availability of working IPv6 implementation in mobile devices (e.g., Section 3.3 of [OECD]).

[RFC7066] lists a set of features to be supported by cellular hosts to connect to 3GPP mobile networks. In the light of recent IPv6

production deployments, additional features to facilitate IPv6-only deployments while accessing IPv4-only services should be considered. This document fills this void. Concretely, this document lists means to ensure IPv4 service over an IPv6-only connectivity given the adoption rate of this model by mobile operators. Those operators require that no service degradation is experienced by customers serviced with an IPv6-only model compared to the level of service of customers with legacy IPv4-only devices.

This document defines an IPv6 profile for mobile devices listing specifications produced by various Standards Developing Organizations (including 3GPP, IETF, and GSMA). The objectives of this effort are:

1. List in one single document a comprehensive list of IPv6 features for a mobile device, including both IPv6-only and dual-stack mobile deployment contexts. These features cover various packet core architectures such as GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) or EPC (Evolved Packet Core).
2. Help Operators with the detailed device requirement list preparation (to be exchanged with device suppliers). This is also a contribution to harmonize Operators' requirements towards device vendors.
3. Vendors to be aware of a set of features to allow for IPv6 connectivity and IPv4 service continuity (over an IPv6-only transport).

The recommendations do not include 3GPP release details. For more information on the 3GPP releases detail, the reader may refer to Section 6.2 of [RFC6459]. More details can be found at [R3GPP].

Some of the features listed in this profile document could require to activate dedicated functions at the network side. It is out of scope of this document to list these network-side functions.

A detailed overview of IPv6 support in 3GPP architectures is provided in [RFC6459]. IPv6-only considerations in mobile networks are further discussed in [RFC6342].

This document is organized as follows:

- o Section 2 lists generic recommendations including functionalities to provide IPv4 service over an IPv6-only connectivity.
- o Section 3 enumerates a set of recommendations for cellular devices with Local Area Network (LAN) capabilities (e.g., CE routers

(Customer Edge routers) with cellular access link, dongles with tethering features).

- o Section 4 identifies a set of advanced recommendations to fulfill requirements of critical services such as VoLTE (Voice over Long Term Evolution (LTE)).

1.1. Terminology

This document makes use of the terms defined in [RFC6459]. In addition, the following terms are used:

- o 3GPP cellular host (or cellular host for short): denotes a 3GPP device which can be connected to 3GPP mobile networks.
- o 3GPP cellular device (or cellular device for short): refers to a cellular host which supports the capability to share its 3GPP mobile connectivity.
- o IPv4 service continuity: denotes the features used to provide access to IPv4-only services to customers serviced with an IPv6-only connectivity. A typical example of IPv4 service continuity technique is NAT64 (Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers, [RFC6146]).

PREFIX64 denotes an IPv6 prefix used to build IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses [RFC6052].

1.2. Scope

A 3GPP mobile network can be used to connect various user equipments such as a mobile telephone or a CE router. Because of this diversity of terminals, it is necessary to define a set of IPv6 functionalities valid for any node directly connecting to a 3GPP mobile network. This document describes these functionalities.

Machine-to-machine (M2M) devices profile is out of scope.

This document is structured to provide the generic IPv6 recommendations which are valid for all nodes, whatever their function (e.g., host or CE router) or service (e.g., Session Initiation Protocol (SIP, [RFC3261])) capability. The document also contains sections covering specific functionalities for devices providing some LAN functions (e.g., mobile CE router or broadband dongles).

The recommendations listed below are valid for both 3GPP GPRS and 3GPP EPS (Evolved Packet System). For EPS, PDN-Connection term is

used instead of PDP-Context. Other non-3GPP accesses [TS.23402] are out of scope of this document.

This profile is a superset of that of the IPv6 profile for 3GPP Cellular Hosts [RFC7066], which is in turn a superset of IPv6 Node Requirements [RFC6434]. It targets cellular nodes, including GPRS and EPC (Evolved Packet Core), that require features to ensure IPv4 service delivery over an IPv6-only transport in addition to the base IPv6 service. Moreover, this profile also covers cellular CE routers that are used in various mobile broadband deployments. Recommendations inspired from real deployment experiences (e.g., roaming) are included in this profile. Also, this profile sketches recommendations for the sake of deterministic behaviors of cellular devices when the same configuration information is received over several channels.

For conflicting recommendations in [RFC7066] and [RFC6434] (e.g., Neighbor Discovery Protocol), this profile adheres to [RFC7066]. Indeed, the support of Neighbor Discovery Protocol is mandatory in 3GPP cellular environment as it is the only way to convey IPv6 prefix towards the 3GPP cellular device. In particular, MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) communication via Router Advertisement must be supported since many 3GPP networks do not have a standard MTU setting.

This profile uses a stronger language for the support of Prefix Delegation compared to [RFC7066]. The main motivation is that cellular networks are more and more perceived as an alternative to fixed networks for home IP-based services delivery; especially with the advent of smartphones and 3GPP data dongles. There is a need for an efficient mechanism to assign larger prefixes to cellular hosts so that each LAN segment can get its own /64 prefix and multi-link subnet issues to be avoided. The support of this functionality in both cellular and fixed networks is key for fixed-mobile convergence.

The use of address family dependent Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or hard-coded IPv4 address literals may lead to broken applications when IPv6 connectivity is in use. As such, means to minimize broken applications when the cellular host is attached to an IPv6-only network should be encouraged. Particularly, (1) name resolution libraries (e.g., [RFC3596]) must support both IPv4 and IPv6; (2) applications must be independent of the underlying IP address family; (3) and applications relying upon Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) must follow [RFC3986] and its updates. Note, some IETF specifications (e.g., SIP [RFC3261]) contains broken IPv6 Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) and rules to compare URIs with embedded IPv6 addresses; fixes (e.g., [RFC5954]) must be used instead.

The recommendations included in each section are listed in a priority order.

This document is not a standard, and conformance with it is not required in order to claim conformance with IETF standards for IPv6. Compliance with this profile does not require the support of all enclosed items. Obviously, the support of the full set of features may not be required in some deployment contexts. However, the authors believe that not supporting relevant features included in this profile (e.g., Customer Side Translator (CLAT, [RFC6877])) may lead to a degraded level of service.

2. Connectivity Recommendations

This section identifies the main connectivity recommendations to be followed by a cellular host to attach to a network using IPv6 in addition to what is defined in [RFC6434] and [RFC7066]. Both dual-stack and IPv6-only deployment models are considered. IPv4 service continuity features are listed in this section because these are critical for Operators with an IPv6-only deployment model. These recommendations apply also for cellular devices (see Section 3).

C_REC#1: In order to allow each operator to select their own strategy regarding IPv6 introduction, the cellular host must support both IPv6 and IPv4v6 PDP-Contexts [TS.23060].

IPv4, IPv6 or IPv4v6 PDP-Context request acceptance depends on the cellular network configuration.

C_REC#2: The cellular host must comply with the behavior defined in [TS.23060] [TS.23401] [TS.24008] for requesting a PDP-Context type.

In particular, the cellular host must request by default an IPv6 PDP-Context if the cellular host is IPv6-only and request an IPv4v6 PDP-Context if the cellular host is dual-stack or when the cellular host is not aware of connectivity types requested by devices connected to it (e.g., cellular host with LAN capabilities as discussed in Section 3):

- * If the requested IPv4v6 PDP-Context is not supported by the network, but IPv4 and IPv6 PDP types are allowed, then the cellular host will be configured with an IPv4 address or an IPv6 prefix by the network. It must initiate another PDP-Context activation of the other address family in addition to the one already activated for a given APN (Access Point Name). The purpose of

initiating a second PDP-Context is to achieve dual-stack connectivity by means of two PDP-Contexts.

- * If the subscription data or network configuration allows only one IP address family (IPv4 or IPv6), the cellular host must not request a second PDP-Context to the same APN for the other IP address family.

The network informs the cellular host about allowed PDP types by means of Session Management (SM) cause codes. In particular, the following cause codes can be returned:

- * cause #50 "PDP type IPv4 only allowed". This cause code is used by the network to indicate that only PDP type IPv4 is allowed for the requested PDN connectivity.
- * cause #51 "PDP type IPv6 only allowed". This cause code is used by the network to indicate that only PDP type IPv6 is allowed for the requested PDN connectivity.
- * cause #52 "single address bearers only allowed". This cause code is used by the network to indicate that the requested PDN connectivity is accepted with the restriction that only single IP version bearers are allowed.

The text above focuses on the specification (excerpt from [TS.23060] [TS.23401] [TS.24008]) which explains the behavior for requesting IPv6-related PDP-Context(s).

C_REC#3: The cellular host must support the PCO (Protocol Configuration Options) [TS.24008] to retrieve the IPv6 address(es) of the Recursive DNS server(s).

The 3GPP network communicates parameters by means of the protocol configuration options information element when activating, modifying or deactivating a PDP-Context. PCO is a convenient method to inform the cellular host about various services, including DNS server information. It does not require additional protocol to be supported by the cellular host and it is already deployed in IPv4 cellular networks to convey such DNS information.

C_REC#4: The cellular host must support IPv6 aware Traffic Flow Templates (TFT) [TS.24008].

Traffic Flow Templates are employing a packet filter to couple an IP traffic with a PDP-Context. Thus a dedicated PDP-Context and radio resources can be provided by the cellular network for certain IP traffic.

C_REC#5: If the cellular host receives the DNS information in several channels for the same interface, the following preference order must be followed:

1. PCO
2. RA
3. DHCPv6

The purpose of this recommendation is to guarantee for a deterministic behavior to be followed by all cellular hosts when the DNS information is received in various channels.

C_REC#6: Because of potential operational deficiencies to be experienced in some roaming situations, the cellular host must be able to be configured with a home PDP-Context type(s) and a roaming PDP-Context type(s). The purpose of the roaming profile is to limit the PDP type(s) requested by the cellular host when out of the home network. Note that distinct PDP type(s) and APN(s) can be configured for home and roaming cases.

A detailed analysis of roaming failure cases is included in [RFC7445].

The configuration can be either local to the device or be managed dynamically using, for example, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) management. The support of dynamic means is encouraged.

C_REC#7: In order to ensure IPv4 service continuity in an IPv6-only deployment context, the cellular host should support a method to learn PREFIX64(s).

In the context of NAT64, IPv6-enabled applications relying on address referrals will fail because an IPv6-only client will not be able to make use of an IPv4 address received in a referral. This feature allows to solve the referral problem (because an IPv6-enabled application can construct IPv4-embedded IPv6 addresses [RFC6052]) and, also, to distinguish between IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses and native IPv6 addresses.

In other words, this feature contributes to offload both CLAT module and NAT64 devices. Refer to Section 3 of [RFC7051] for an inventory of the issues related to the discovery of PREFIX64(s).

In PCP-based environments, cellular hosts should follow [RFC7225] to learn the IPv6 Prefix used by an upstream PCP-controlled NAT64 device. If PCP is not enabled, the cellular host should implement the method specified in [RFC7050] to retrieve the PREFIX64.

C_REC#8: In order to ensure IPv4 service continuity in an IPv6-only deployment context, the cellular host should implement the Customer Side Translator (CLAT, [RFC6877]) function in compliance with [RFC6052][RFC6145][RFC6146].

CLAT function in the cellular host allows for IPv4-only application and IPv4-referrals to work on an IPv6-only connectivity. The more applications are address family independent, the less CLAT function is solicited. CLAT function requires a NAT64 capability [RFC6146] in the network.

The cellular host should only invoke the CLAT in the absence of the IPv4 connectivity on the cellular side, i.e., when the network does not assign an IPv4 address on the cellular interface. Note, NAT64 assumes an IPv6-only mode [RFC6146].

The IPv4 Service Continuity Prefix used by CLAT is defined in [RFC7335].

CLAT and/or NAT64 do not interfere with native IPv6 communications.

CLAT may not be required in some contexts, e.g., if other solutions such as Bump-in-the-Host (BIH, [RFC6535]) are supported.

The cellular device can act as a CE router connecting various IP hosts on a LAN segment; it is also the case with the use of WLAN (Wireless LAN) tethering or WLAN hotspot from the cellular device. Some of these IP hosts can be dual-stack, others are IPv6-only or IPv4-only. IPv6-only connectivity on the cellular device does not allow IPv4-only sessions to be established for hosts connected on the LAN segment of the cellular device. IPv4 session establishment

initiated from hosts located on LAN segment side and destined for IPv4 nodes must be maintained. A solution is to integrate the CLAT function to the LAN segment in the cellular device.

- C_REC#9: The cellular host may be able to be configured to limit PDP type(s) for a given APN. The default mode is to allow all supported PDP types. Note, C_REC#2 discusses the default behavior for requesting PDP-Context type(s).

This feature is useful to drive the behavior of the UE to be aligned with: (1) service-specific constraints such as the use of IPv6-only for VoLTE (Voice over LTE), (2) network conditions with regards to the support of specific PDP types (e.g., IPv4v6 PDP-Context is not supported), (3) IPv4 sunset objectives, (4) subscription data, etc.

Note, a cellular host changing its connection between an IPv6-specific APN and an IPv4-specific APN will interrupt related network connections. This may be considered as a brokenness situation by some applications.

The configuration can be either local to the device or be managed dynamically using, for example, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) management. The support of dynamic means is encouraged.

3. Recommendations for Cellular Devices with LAN Capabilities

This section focuses on cellular devices (e.g., CE router, smartphones or dongles with tethering features) which provide IP connectivity to other devices connected to them. In such case, all connected devices are sharing the same 2G, 3G or LTE connection. In addition to the generic recommendations listed in Section 2, these cellular devices have to meet the recommendations listed below.

- L_REC#1: For deployments requiring to share the same /64 prefix, the cellular device should support [RFC7278] to enable sharing a /64 prefix between the 3GPP interface towards the GGSN/PGW (WAN interface) and the LAN interfaces.

Prefix Delegation (refer to L_REC#2) is the target solution for distributing prefixes in the LAN side but, because the device may attach to earlier 3GPP release networks, a mean to share a /64 prefix is also recommended [RFC7278].

[RFC7278] must be invoked only if Prefix Delegation is not in use.

- L_REC#2: The cellular device must support Prefix Delegation capabilities [RFC3633] and must support Prefix Exclude Option for DHCPv6-based Prefix Delegation as defined in [RFC6603]. Particularly, it must behave as a Requesting Router.

Cellular networks are more and more perceived as an alternative to fixed broadband networks for home IP-based services delivery; especially with the advent of smartphones and 3GPP data dongles. There is a need for an efficient mechanism to assign larger prefixes (other than /64s) to cellular hosts so that each LAN segment can get its own /64 prefix and multi-link subnet issues to be avoided.

In case a prefix is delegated to a cellular host using DHCPv6, the cellular device will be configured with two prefixes:

- (1) one for 3GPP link allocated using stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC) mechanism and
- (2) another one delegated for LANs acquired during Prefix Delegation operation.

Note that the 3GPP network architecture requires both the WAN (Wide Area Network) and the delegated prefix to be aggregatable, so the subscriber can be identified using a single prefix.

Without the Prefix Exclude Option, the delegating router (GGSN/PGW) will have to ensure [RFC3633] compliancy (e.g., halving the delegated prefix and assigning the WAN prefix out of the 1st half and the prefix to be delegated to the terminal from the 2nd half).

Because Prefix Delegation capabilities may not be available in some attached networks, L_REC#1 is strongly recommended to accommodate early deployments.

- L_REC#3: The cellular CE router must be compliant with the requirements specified in [RFC7084].

There are several deployments, particularly in emerging countries, that relies on mobile networks to provide

broadband services (e.g., customers are provided with mobile CE routers).

Note, this profile does not require IPv4 service continuity techniques listed in Section 4.4 of [RFC7084] because those are specific to fixed networks. IPv4 service continuity techniques specific to the mobile networks are included in this profile.

This recommendation does not apply to handsets with tethering capabilities; it is specific to cellular CE routers in order to ensure the same IPv6 functional parity for both fixed and cellular CE routers. Note, modern CE routers are designed with advanced functions such as link aggregation that consists in optimizing the network usage by aggregating the connectivity resources offered via various interfaces (e.g., Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), LTE, WLAN, etc.) or offloading the traffic via a subset of interfaces. Ensuring IPv6 features parity among these interface types is important for the sake of specification efficiency, service design simplification and validation effort optimization.

L_REC#4: If a RA MTU is advertised from the 3GPP network, the cellular device should send RAs to the downstream attached LAN devices with the same MTU as seen on the mobile interface.

Receiving and relaying RA MTU values facilitates a more harmonious functioning of the mobile core network where end nodes transmit packets that do not exceed the MTU size of the mobile network's GTP (GPRS Tunnelling Protocol) tunnels.

[TS.23060] indicates providing a link MTU value of 1358 octets to the 3GPP cellular device will prevent the IP layer fragmentation within the transport network between the cellular device and the GGSN/PGW. More details about link MTU considerations can be found in Annex C of [TS.23060].

4. Advanced Recommendations

This section identifies a set of advanced recommendations to fulfill requirements of critical services such as VoLTE. These recommendations apply for mobile hosts, including mobile devices.

A_REC#1: The cellular host must support ROHC RTP Profile (0x0001) and ROHC UDP Profile (0x0002) for IPv6 ([RFC5795]). Other ROHC profiles may be supported.

Bandwidth in cellular networks must be optimized as much as possible. ROHC provides a solution to reduce bandwidth consumption and to reduce the impact of having bigger packet headers in IPv6 compared to IPv4.

"RTP/UDP/IP" ROHC profile (0x0001) to compress RTP packets and "UDP/IP" ROHC profile (0x0002) to compress RTCP packets are required for Voice over LTE (VoLTE) by IR.92.4.0 section 4.1 [IR92]. Note, [IR92] indicates that the host must be able to apply the compression to packets that are carried over the voice media dedicated radio bearer.

A_REC#2: The cellular host should support PCP [RFC6887].

The support of PCP is seen as a driver to save battery consumption exacerbated by keepalive messages. PCP also gives the possibility of enabling incoming connections to the cellular device. Indeed, because several stateful devices may be deployed in wireless networks (e.g., NAT64 and/or IPv6 Firewalls), PCP can be used by the cellular host to control network-based NAT64 and IPv6 Firewall functions which will reduce per-application signaling and save battery consumption.

According to [Power], the consumption of a cellular device with a keep-alive interval equal to 20 seconds (that is the default value in [RFC3948] for example) is 29 mA (2G)/34 mA (3G). This consumption is reduced to 16 mA (2G)/24 mA (3G) when the interval is increased to 40 seconds, to 9.1 mA (2G)/16 mA (3G) if the interval is equal to 150 seconds, and to 7.3 mA (2G)/14 mA (3G) if the interval is equal to 180 seconds. When no keep-alive is issued, the consumption would be 5.2 mA (2G)/6.1 mA (3G). The impact of keepalive messages would be more severe if multiple applications are issuing those messages (e.g., SIP, IPsec, etc.).

PCP allows to avoid embedding ALGs (Application Level Gateways) at the network side (e.g., NAT64) to manage protocols which convey IP addresses and/or port numbers (see Section 2.2 of [RFC6889]). Avoiding soliciting ALGs allows for more easiness to make evolve a service independently of the underlying transport network.

A_REC#3: In order for host-based validation of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) to continue to function in an IPv6-only connectivity with NAT64 deployment context, the cellular host should embed a DNS64 function ([RFC6147]).

This is called "DNS64 in stub-resolver mode" in [RFC6147].

As discussed in Section 5.5 of [RFC6147], a security-aware and validating host has to perform the DNS64 function locally.

Because synthetic AAAA records cannot be successfully validated in a host, learning the PREFIX64 used to construct IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses allows the use of DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034], [RFC4035]. Means to configure or discover a PREFIX64 are required on the cellular device as discussed in C_REC#7.

[RFC7051] discusses why a security-aware and validating host has to perform the DNS64 function locally and why it has to be able to learn the proper PREFIX64(s).

A_REC#4: When the cellular host is dual-stack connected (i.e., configured with an IPv4 address and IPv6 prefix), it should support means to prefer native IPv6 connection over connection established through translation devices (e.g., NAT44 and NAT64).

When both IPv4 and IPv6 DNS servers are configured, a dual-stack host must contact first its IPv6 DNS server. This preference allows to offload IPv4-only DNS servers.

Cellular hosts should follow the procedure specified in [RFC6724] for source address selection.

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations identified in [RFC7066] and [RFC6459] are to be taken into account.

In the case of cellular CE routers, compliance with L_REC#3 entails compliance with [RFC7084], which in turn recommends compliance with Recommended Simple Security Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service [RFC6092]. Therefore, the security considerations in Section 6 of [RFC6092] are relevant. In particular, it bears repeating here that the true impact of stateful filtering may be a reduction in security,

and that IETF make no statement, expressed or implied, as to whether using the capabilities described in any of these documents ultimately improves security for any individual users or for the Internet community as a whole.

The cellular host must be able to generate IPv6 addresses which preserve privacy. The activation of privacy extension (e.g., using [RFC7217]) makes it more difficult to track a host over time when compared to using a permanent Interface Identifier. Tracking a host is still possible based on the first 64 bits of the IPv6 address. Means to prevent against such tracking issues may be enabled in the network side. Note, privacy extensions are required by regulatory bodies in some countries.

Host-based validation of DNSSEC is discussed in A_REC#3 (see Section 4).

6. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any action from IANA.

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NAT64 Deployment Options and Experience
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Abstract

This document summarizes NAT64 function deployment scenarios and operational experience. Both NAT64 Carrier Grade NAT (NAT64-CGN) and NAT64 server Front End (NAT64-FE) are considered in this document.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Terminology	3
3. NAT64 Networking Experience	4
3.1. NAT64-CGN Consideration	4
3.1.1. NAT64-CGN Usages	4
3.1.2. DNS64 Deployment	4
3.1.3. NAT64 Placement	5
3.1.4. Co-existence of NAT64 and NAT44	5
3.2. NAT64-FE Consideration	6
4. High Availability	7
4.1. Redundancy Design	7
4.2. Load Balancing	9
5. Source Address Transparency	9
5.1. Traceability	9
5.2. Geo-location	10
6. Quality of Experience	11
6.1. Service Reachability	11
6.2. Resource Reservation	12
7. MTU Considerations	13
8. ULA Usages	14
9. Security Considerations	15
10. IANA Considerations	15
11. Acknowledgements	15
12. Additional Author List	16
13. References	16
13.1. Normative References	16
13.2. Informative References	18
Appendix A. Testing Results of Application Behavior	20
Authors' Addresses	21

1. Introduction

IPv6 is the only sustainable solution for numbering nodes on Internet due to the IPv4 depletion. Network operators have to deploy IPv6-only networks in order to meet the needs of the expanding internet without available IPv4 addresses.

Single-stack IPv6 network deployment can simplify networks provisioning, some justification was provided in 464xlat [RFC6877]. IPv6-only connectivity confers some benefits to mobile operators as an example. In the mobile context, IPv6-only usage enables the use of a single IPv6 Packet Data Protocol(PDP) context or Evolved Packet System (EPS) bearer on Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks. This

eliminates significant network costs caused by employing two PDP contexts in some cases, and the need for IPv4 addresses to be assigned to customers. In broadband networks overall, it can allow for the scaling of edge-network growth to be decoupled from IPv4 numbering limitations.

In transition scenarios, some existing networks are likely to be IPv4-only for quite a long time. IPv6 networks and hosts IPv6-only hosts will need to coexist with IPv4 numbered resources. Widespread dual-stack deployments have not materialized at the anticipated rate over the last 10 years, one possible conclusion being that legacy networks will not make the jump quickly. The Internet will include nodes that are dual-stack, nodes that remain IPv4-only, and nodes that can be deployed as IPv6-only nodes. A translation mechanism based on a NAT64[RFC6146] [RFC6145]function is likely to be a key element of Internet connectivity for IPv6-IPv4 interoperability.

[RFC6036] reports at least 30% of operators plan to run some kind of translator (presumably NAT64/DNS64). Advice on NAT64 deployment and operations are therefore of some importance. [RFC6586] documents the implications for IPv6 only networks. This document intends to be specific to NAT64 network planning.

2. Terminology

Regarding IPv4/IPv6 translation, [RFC6144] has described a framework for enabling networks to make interworking possible between IPv4 and IPv6 networks. This document has further categorized different NAT64 functions, locations and use-cases. The principle distinction of location is whether the NAT64 is located in a Carrier Grade NAT or server Front End. The terms of NAT-CGN/FE are understood to be a topological distinction indicating different features employed in a NAT64 deployment.

NAT64 Carrier Grade NAT (NAT64-CGN): A NAT64-CGN is placed in an ISP network. IPv6 enabled subscribers leverage the NAT64-CGN to access existing IPv4 internet services. The ISP as an administrative entity takes full control of the IPv6 side, but has limited or no control on the IPv4 internet side. NAT64-CGN deployments may have to consider the IPv4 Internet environment and services, and make appropriate configuration choices accordingly.

NAT64 server Front End (NAT64-FE): A NAT64-FE is generally a device with NAT64 functionality in a content provider or data center network. It could be for example a traffic load balancer or a firewall. The operator of the NAT64-FE has full control over the IPv4 network within the data center, but only limited influence or control over the external Internet IPv6 network.

3. NAT64 Networking Experience

3.1. NAT64-CGN Consideration

3.1.1. NAT64-CGN Usages

Fixed network operators and mobile operators may locate NAT64 translators in access networks or in mobile core networks. It can be built into various devices, including routers, gateways or firewalls in order to connect IPv6 users to the IPv4 Internet. With regard to the numbers of users and the shortage of public IPv4 addresses, stateful NAT64[RFC6146] is more suited to maximize sharing of public IPv4 addresses. The usage of stateless NAT64 can provide better transparency features [I-D.ietf-softwire-stateless-4v6-motivation], but has to be coordinated with A+P[RFC6346] processes as specified in [I-D.ietf-softwire-map-t] in order to address an IPv4 address shortage.

3.1.2. DNS64 Deployment

DNS64[RFC6147] is recommended for use in combination with stateful NAT64, and will likely be an essential part of an IPv6 single-stack network that couples to the IPv4 Internet. 464xlat[RFC6877] can enable access of IPv4 only applications or applications that call IPv4 literal addresses. Using DNS64 will help 464xlat to automatically discover NAT64 prefix through [RFC7050]. Berkeley Internet Name Daemon (BIND) software supports the function. It's important to note that DNS64 generates the synthetic AAAA reply when services only provide A records. Operators should not expect to access IPv4 parts of a dual-stack server using NAT64/DNS64. The traffic is forwarded on IPv6 paths if dual-stack servers are targeted. IPv6 traffic may be routed around rather than going through NAT64. Only the traffic going to IPv4-only service would traverse the NAT64 translator. In some sense, it encourages IPv6 usage and limits NAT translation compared to employing NAT44, where all traffic flows have to be translated. In some cases, NAT64-CGNs may serve double roles, i.e. as a translator and IPv6 forwarder. In mobile networks, NAT64 may be deployed as the default gateway serving all the IPv6 traffic. The traffic heading to a dual-stack server is only forwarded on the NAT64. Therefore, both IPv6 and IPv4 are suggested to be configured on the Internet faced interfaces of NAT64. We tested on Top100 websites (referring to [Alexa] statistics). 43% of websites are connected and forwarded on the NAT64 since those websites have both AAAA and A records. With expansion of IPv6 support, the translation process on NAT64 will likely become less-important over time. It should be noted the DNS64-DNSSEC Interaction[RFC6147] may impact validation of Resource Records retrieved from the the DNS64 process. In particular, DNSSEC

validation will fail when DNS64 synthesizes AAAA records where there is a DNS query with the "DNSSEC OK" (DO) bit set and the "Checking Disabled" (CD) bit set received.

3.1.3. NAT64 Placement

All connections to IPv4 services from IPv6-only clients must traverse the NAT64-CGN. It can be advantageous from the vantage-point of troubleshooting and traffic engineering to carry the IPv6 traffic natively for as long as possible within an access network and translate packets only at or near the network egress. NAT64 may be a feature of the Autonomous System (AS) border in fixed networks. It may be deployed in an IP node beyond the Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) or Public Data Network- Gateway (PDN-GW) in mobile networks or directly as part of the gateway itself in some situations. This allows consistent attribution and traceability within the service provider network. It has been observed that the process of correlating log information is problematic from multiple-vendor's equipment due to inconsistent formats of log records. Placing NAT64 in a centralized location may reduce diversity of log format and simplify the network provisioning. Moreover, since NAT64 is only targeted at serving traffic flows from IPv6 to IPv4-only services, the user traffic volume should not be as high as in a NAT44 scenario, and therefore, the gateway's capacity in such location may be less of a concern or a hurdle to deployment. On the other-hand, placement in a centralized fashion would require more strict high availability (HA) design. It would also make geo-location based on IPv4 addresses rather inaccurate as is currently the case for NAT44 CGN already deployed in ISP networks. More considerations or workarounds on HA and traceability could be found at Section 4 and Section 5.

3.1.4. Co-existence of NAT64 and NAT44

NAT64 will likely co-exist with NAT44 in a dual-stack network where IPv4 private addresses are allocated to customers. The coexistence has already been observed in mobile networks, in which dual stack mobile phones normally initiate some dual-stack PDN/PDP Type[RFC6459] to query both IPv4/IPv6 address and IPv4 allocated addresses are very often private ones. [RFC6724] always prioritizes IPv6 connections regardless of whether the end-to-end path is native IPv6 or IPv6 translated to IPv4 via NAT64/DNS64. Conversely, Happy Eyeballs[RFC6555] will direct some IP flows across IPv4 paths. The selection of IPv4/IPv6 paths may depend on particular implementation choices or settings on a host-by-host basis, and may differ from an operator's deterministic scheme. Our tests verified that hosts may find themselves switching between IPv4 and IPv6 paths as they access identical service, but at different times [I-D.kaliwoda-sunset4-dual-ipv6-coexist]. Since the topology on each

path is potentially different, it may cause unstable user experience and some degradation of Quality of Experience (QoE) when falling back to the other protocol. It's also difficult for operators to find a solution to make a stable network with optimal resource utilization. In general, it's desirable to figure out the solution that will introduce IPv6/IPv4 translation service to IPv6-only hosts connecting to IPv4 servers while making sure dual-stack hosts to have at least one address family accessible via native service if possible. With the end-to-end native IPv6 environment available, hosts should be upgraded aggressively to migrate in favor of IPv6-only. There are ongoing efforts to detect host connectivity and propose a new DHCPv6 option[I-D.wing-dhc-dns-reconfigure] to convey appropriate configuration information to the hosts.

3.2. NAT64-FE Consideration

Some Internet Content Providers (ICPs) may locate NAT64 in front of an Internet Data Center (IDC), for example co-located with a load-balancing function. Load-balancers are employed to connect different IP family domains, and distribute workloads across multiple domains or internal servers. In some cases, IPv4 addresses exhaustion may not be a problem in some IDC's internal networks. IPv6 support for some applications may require some investments and workloads so IPv6 support may not be a priority. The use of NAT64 may be served to support widespread IPv6 adoption on the Internet while maintaining IPv4-only applications access.

Different strategy has been described in [RFC6883] referred to as "inside out" and "outside in". An IDC operator may implement the following practices in the NAT64-FE networking scenario.

- o Some ICPs who already have satisfactory operational experience might adopt single stack IPv6 operation in building data-center networks, servers and applications, as it allows new services delivery without having to integrate consideration of IPv4 NAT and address limitations of IPv4 networks. Stateless NAT64[RFC6145] can be used to provide services for IPv4-only enabled customers. [I-D.anderson-siit-dc] has provided further descriptions and guidelines.
- o ICPs who attempt to offer customers IPv6 support in their application farms at an early stage may likely run proxies load-balancers or translators, which are configured to handle incoming IPv6 flows and proxy them to IPv4 back-end systems. Many load balancers integrate proxy functionality. IPv4 addresses configured in the proxy may be multiplexed like a stateful NAT64 translator. A similar challenge exists once increasingly numerous users in IPv6 Internet access an IPv4 network. High loads on

load-balancers may be apt to cause additional latency, IPv4 pool exhaustion, etc. Therefore, this approach is only reasonable at an early stage. ICPs may employ dual-stack or IPv6 single stack in a further stage, since the native IPv6 is frequently more desirable than any of the transition solutions.

[RFC6144] recommends that AAAA records of load-balancers or application servers can be directly registered in the authoritative DNS servers. In this case, there is no need to deploy DNS64 name-servers. Those AAAA records can point to natively assigned IPv6 addresses or IPv4-converted IPv6 addresses[RFC6052]. Hosts are not aware of the NAT64 translator on communication path. For the testing purpose, operators could employ an independent sub domain e.g. ipv6exp.example.com to identify experimental ipv6 services to users. How to design the FQDN for the IPv6 service is out-of-scope of this document.

4. High Availability

4.1. Redundancy Design

High Availability (HA) is a major requirement for every service and network services. The deployment of redundancy mechanisms is an essential approach to avoid failure and significantly increase the network reliability. It's not only useful to stateful NAT64 cases, but also to stateless NAT64 gateways.

Three redundancy modes are mainly used: cold standby, warm standby and hot standby.

- o Cold standby HA devices do not replicate the NAT64 states from the primary equipment to the backup. Administrators switch on the backup NAT64 only if the primary NAT64 fails. As a result, all existing established sessions through a failed translator will be disconnected. The translated flows will need to be recreated by end-systems. Since the backup NAT64 is manually configured to switch over to active NAT64, it may have unpredictable impacts to the ongoing services.
- o Warm standby is a flavor of the cold standby mode. Backup NAT64 would keep running once the primary NAT64 is working. This makes warm standby less time consuming during the traffic failover. Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP)[RFC5798] can be a solution to enable automatic handover in the warm standby. It was tested that the handover takes as maximum as 1 minute if the backup NAT64 needs to take over routing and re-construct the Binding Information Bases (BIBs) for 30 million sessions. In

deployment phase, operators could balance loads on distinct NAT64s devices. Those NAT64s make a warm backup of each other.

- o Hot standby must synchronize the BIBs between the primary NAT64 and backup. When the primary NAT64 fails, backup NAT64 would take over and maintain the state of all existing sessions. The internal hosts don't have to re-connect the external hosts. The handover time has been extremely reduced. Employing Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [RFC5880] combined with VRRP, a delay of only 35ms for 30 million sessions handover was observed during testing. Under ideal conditions hotstandby deployments could guarantee the session continuity for every service. In order to timely transmit session states, operators may have to deploy extra transport links between primary NAT64 and distant backup. The scale of synchronization data instance is depending on the particular deployment. For example, If a NAT64-CGN is served for 200,000 users, the average amount of 800, 000 sessions per second is roughly estimated for new created and expired sessions. A physical 10Gbps transport link may have to be deployed for the sync data transmission considering the amount of sync sessions at the peak and capacity redundancy

In general, cold-standby and warm-standby is simpler and less resource intensive, but it requires clients to re-establish sessions when a fail-over occurs. Hot standby increases resource consumption in order to synchronize state, but potentially achieves seamless handover. For stateless NAT64 considerations are simple, because state synchronization is unnecessary. Regarding stateful NAT64, it may be useful to investigate performance tolerance of applications and the traffic characteristics in a particular network. Some testing results are shown in the Appendix A.

Our statistics in a mobile network shown that almost 91.21% of of traffic is accounted by http/https services. These services generally don't require session continuity. Hot-standby does not offer much benefit for those sessions on this point. In fixed networks, HTTP streaming, p2p and online games would be the major traffic beneficiaries of hot-standby replication[Cisco-VNI]. Consideration should be given to the importance of maintaining bindings for those sessions across failover. Operators may also consider the Average Revenue Per User (ARPU) factors to deploy suitable redundancy mode. Warm standby may still be adopted to cover most services while hot standby could be used to upgrade Quality of Experience (QoE) using DNS64 to generate different synthetic responses for limited traffic or destinations. Further considerations are discussed at Section 6.

4.2. Load Balancing

Load balancing is used to accompany redundancy design so that better scalability and resiliency could be achieved. Stateless NAT64s allow asymmetric routing while anycast-based solutions are recommended in [I-D.ietf-softwire-map-deployment]. The deployment of load balancing may make more sense to stateful NAT64s for the sake of single-point failure avoidance. Since the NAT64-CGN and NAT64-FE have distinct facilities, the following lists the considerations for each case.

- o NAT64-CGN equipment doesn't typically implement load-balancing functions onboard. Therefore, the gateways have to resort to DNS64 or internal host's behavior. Once DNS64 is deployed, the load balancing can be performed by synthesizing AAAA response with different IPv6 prefixes. For the applications not requiring DNS resolver, internal hosts could learn multiple IPv6 prefixes through the approaches defined in[RFC7050] and then select one based on a given prefix selection policy.
- o A dedicated Load Balancer could be deployed at front of a NAT64-FE farm. Load Balancer uses proxy mode to redirect the flows to the appropriate NAT64 instance. Stateful NAT64s require a deterministic pattern to arrange the traffic in order to ensure outbound/inbound flows traverse the identical NAT64. Therefore, static scheduling algorithms, for example source-address based policy, is preferred. A dynamic algorithm, for example Round-Robin, may have impacts on applications seeking session continuity, which described in the Table 1.

5. Source Address Transparency

5.1. Traceability

Traceability is required in many cases such as identifying malicious attacks sources and accounting requirements. Operators are asked to record the NAT64 log information for specific periods of time. In our lab testing, the log information from 200,000 subscribers have been collected from a stateful NAT64 gateway for 60 days. Syslog[RFC5424] has been adopted to transmit log message from NAT64 to a log station. Each log message contains transport protocol, source IPv6 address:port, translated IPv4 address: port and timestamp. It takes almost 125 bytes in ASCII format. It has been verified that the rate of traffic flow is around 72 thousand flows per second and the volume of recorded information reaches up to 42.5 terabytes in the raw format. The volume is 29.07 terabytes in a compact format. At scale, operators have to build up dedicated transport links, storage system and servers for the purpose of managing such logging.

There are also several improvements that can be made to mitigate the issue. For example, stateful NAT64 could configure with bulk port allocation method. Once a subscriber creates the first session, a number of ports are pre-allocated. A bulk allocation message is logged indicating this allocation. Subsequent session creations will use one of the pre-allocated port and hence does not require logging. The log volume in this case may be only one thousandth of dynamic port allocation. Some implementations may adopt static port-range allocations [I-D.donley-behave-deterministic-cgn] which eliminates the need for per-subscriber logging. As a side effect, the IPv4 multiplexing efficiency is decreased regarding to those methods. For example, the utilization ratio of public IPv4 address is dropped approximately to 75% when NAT64 gateway is configured with bulk port allocation (The lab testing allocates each subscriber with 400 ports). In addition, port-range based allocation should also consider port randomization described in [RFC6056]. A trade-off among address multiplexing efficiency, logging storage compression and port allocation complexity should be considered. More discussions could be found in [I-D.chen-sunset4-cgn-port-allocation]. The decision can balance usable IPv4 resources against investments in log systems.

5.2. Geo-location

IP addresses are usually used as inputs to geo-location services. The use of address sharing prevents these systems from resolving the location of a host based on IP address alone. Applications that assume such geographic information may not work as intended. The possible solutions listed in [RFC6967] are intended to bridge the gap. However, those solutions can only provide a sub-optimal substitution to solve the problem of host identification, in particular it may not today solve problems with source identification through translation. The following lists current practices to mitigate the issue.

- o Operators who adopt NAT64-FE may leverage the application layer proxies, e.g. X-Forwarded-For (XFF) [I-D.ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded], to convey the IPv6 source address in HTTP headers. Those messages would be passed on to web-servers. The log parsing tools are required to be able to support IPv6 and may lookup Radius servers for the target subscribers based on IPv6 addresses included in XFF HTTP headers. XFF is the de facto standard which has been integrated in most Load Balancers. Therefore, it may be superior to use in a NAT-FE environment. In the downsides, XFF is specific to HTTP. It restricts the usages so that the solution can't be applied to requests made over HTTPs. This makes geo-location problematic for HTTPs based services.

- o The NAT64-CGN equipment may not implement XFF. Geo-location based on shared IPv4 address is rather inaccurate in that case. Operators could subdivide the outside IPv4 address pool so an IPv6 address can be translated depending on their geographical locations. As consequence, location information can be identified from a certain IPv4 address range. [RFC6967] also enumerates several options to reveal the host identifier. Each solution likely has their-own specific usage. For the geo-location systems relying on a Radius database[RFC5580], we have investigated to deliver NAT64 BIBs and Session Table Entries (STEs) to a Radius server[I-D.chen-behave-nat64-radius-extension]. This method could provide geo-location system with an internal IPv6 address to identify each user. It can get along with [RFC5580] to convey original source address through same message bus.

6. Quality of Experience

6.1. Service Reachability

NAT64 is providing a translation capability between IPv6 and IPv4 end-nodes. In order to provide the reachability between two IP address families, NAT64-CGN has to implement appropriate application aware functions, i.e. Application Layer Gateway (ALG), where address translation is not itself sufficient and security mechanisms do not render it infeasible. Most NAT64-CGNs mainly provide FTP-ALG[RFC6384]. NAT64-FEs may have functional richness on Load Balancer, for example HTTP-ALG, HTTPS-ALG, RTSP-ALG and SMTP-ALG have been supported. Those application protocols exchange IP address and port parameters within control session, for example the "Via" field in a HTTP header, "Transport" field in a RTSP SETUP message and "Received: " header in a SMTP message. ALG functions will detect those fields and make IP address translations. It should be noted that ALGs may impact the performance on a NAT64 box to some extent. ISPs as well as content providers might choose to avoid situations where the imposition of an ALG might be required. At the same time, it is also important to remind customers and application developers that IPv6 end-to-end usage does not require ALG imposition and therefore results in a better overall user experience.

The service reachability is also subject to the IPv6 support in the client side. We tested several kinds of applications as shown in the below table to verify the IPv6 supports. The experiences of some applications are still align with [RFC6586]. For example, we have tested P2P file sharing and streaming applications including eMule v0.50a, Thunder v7.9 and PPS TV v3.2.0. It has been found there are some software issues to support IPv6 at this time. The application software would benefit from 464xlat[RFC6877] until the software adds IPv6 support.. A SIP based voice call has been tested in LTE mobile

environment as specified in [IR.92]. The voice call is failed due to the lack of NAT64 traversal when an IPv6 SIP user agent communicates with an IPv4 SIP user agent. In order to address the failure, Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) described in [RFC5245] is recommended to be supported for the SIP IPv6 transition. [RFC6157] describes both signaling and media layer process, which should be followed. In addition, it may be worth to notice that ICE is not only useful for NAT traversal, but also firewall[RFC6092] traversal in native IPv6 deployment.

Different IPsec modes for VPN services have been tested, including IPsec-AH and IPsec-ESP. It has been testified IPsec-AH can't survive since the destination host detects the IP header changes and invalidate the packets. IPsec-ESP failed in our testing because the NAT64 does not translate IPsec ESP (i.e. protocol 50) packets. It has been suggested that IPsec ESP should succeed if the IPsec client supports NAT-Traversal in the IKE[RFC3947] and uses IPsec ESP over UDP[RFC3948].

Table 1: The tested applications

APPs	Results and Found Issues
Webservice	Mostly pass, some failure cases due to IPv4 Literals
Instant Message	Mostly fail, software can't support IPv6
Games	Mostly pass for web-based games; mostly fail for standalone games due to the lack of IPv6 support in software
SIP-VoIP	Fail, due to the lack of NAT64 traversal
IPsec-VPN	Fail, the translated IPsec packets are invalidated
P2P file sharing and streaming	Mostly fail, software can't support IPv6, e.g. eMule Thunder and PPS TV
FTP	Pass
Email	Pass

6.2. Resource Reservation

Session status normally is managed by a static timer. For example, the value of the "established connection idle-timeout" for TCP sessions must not be less than 2 hours 4 minutes[RFC5382] and 5

minutes for UDP sessions[RFC4787]. In some cases, NAT resource maybe significantly consumed by largely inactive users. The NAT translator and other customers would suffer from service degradation due to port consummation by other subscribers using the same NAT64 device. A flexible NAT session control is desirable to resolve the issues. PCP[RFC6887] could be a candidate to provide such capability. A NAT64-CGN should integrate with a PCP server, to allocate available IPv4 address/port resources. Resources could be assigned to PCP clients through PCP MAP/PEER mode. Such ability can be considered to upgrade user experiences, for example assigning different sizes of port ranges for different subscribers. Those mechanisms are also helpful to minimize terminal battery consumption and reduce the number of keep-alive messages to be sent by mobile terminal devices.

Subscribers can also benefit from network reliability. It has been discussed that hot-standby offers satisfactory experience once outage of primary NAT64 is occurred. Operators may rightly be concerned about the considerable investment required for NAT64 equipment relative to low ARPU income. For example, transport links may cost much, because primary NAT64 and backup are normally located at different locations, separated by a relatively large distance. Additional cost has to be assumed to ensure the connectivity quality. However, that may be necessary to some applications, which are delay-sensitive and seek session continuity, for example on-line games and live-streaming. Operators may be able to get added-values from those services by offering first-class services. It can be pre-configured on the gateway to hot-standby modes depending on subscriber's profile. The rest of other sessions can be covered by cold/warm standby.

7. MTU Considerations

IPv6 requires that every link in the internet have an Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of 1280 octets or greater[RFC2460]. However, in case of NAT64 translation deployment, some IPv4 MTU constrained link will be used in some communication path and originating IPv6 nodes may therefore receive an ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) message, reporting a Next-Hop MTU less than 1280 bytes. The result would be that IPv6 allows packets to contain a fragmentation header, without the packet being fragmented into multiple pieces. A NAT64 would receive IPv6 packets with fragmentation header in which "M" flag equal to 0 and "Fragment Offset" equal to 0. Those packets likely impact other fragments already queued with the same set of {IPv6 Source Address, IPv6 Destination Address, Fragment Identification}. If the NAT64 box is compliant with [RFC5722], there is risk that all the fragments have to be dropped.

[RFC6946] discusses how this situation could be exploited by an attacker to perform fragmentation-based attacks, and also proposes an improved handling of such packets. It required enhancements on NAT64 gateway implementations to isolate packet's processing. NAT64 should follow the recommendation and take steps to prevent the risks of fragmentation.

Another approach that potentially avoids this issue is to configure IPv4 MTU more than 1260 bytes. It would forbid the occurrence of PTB smaller than 1280 bytes. Such an operational consideration is hard to universally apply to the legacy "IPv4 Internet" NAT64-CGN bridged. However, it's a feasible approach in NAT64-FE cases, since a IPv4 network NAT64-FE connected is rather well-organized and operated by a IDC operator or content provider. Therefore, the MTU of IPv4 network in NAT64-FE case are strongly recommended to set to more than 1260 bytes.

8. ULA Usages

Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) are defined in [RFC4193] to be renumbered within a network site for local communications. Operators may use ULAs as NAT64 prefixes to provide site-local IPv6 connectivity. Those ULA prefixes are stripped when the packets going to the IPv4 Internet, therefore ULAs are only valid in the IPv6 site. The use of ULAs could help in identifying the translation traffic. [I-D.ietf-v6ops-ula-usage-recommendations] provides further guidance for the ULAs usages.

We configure ULAs as NAT64 prefixes on a NAT64-CGN. If a host is only assigned with an IPv6 address and connected to NAT64-CGN, when connect to an IPv4 service, it would receive AAAA record generated by the DNS64 with the ULA prefix. A Global Unicast Address (GUA) will be selected as the source address to the ULA destination address. When the host has both IPv4 and IPv6 address, it would initiate both A and AAAA record lookup, then both original A record and DNS64-generated AAAA record would be received. A host, which is compliant with [RFC6724], will never prefer ULA over IPv4. An IPv4 path will be always selected. It may be undesirable because the NAT64-CGN will never be used. Operators may consider to add additional site-specific rows into the default policy table for host address selection in order to steer traffic flows going through NAT64-CGN. However, it involves significant costs to change terminal's behavior. Therefore, operators are not suggested to configure ULAs on a NAT64-CGN.

ULAs can't work when hosts transit the Internet to connect with NAT64. Therefore, ULAs are inapplicable to the case of NAT64-FE.

9. Security Considerations

This document presents the deployment experiences of NAT64 in CGN and FE scenarios. In general, RFC 6146[RFC6146] provides TCP-tracking, address-dependent filtering mechanisms to protect NAT64 from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). In NAT64-CGN cases, operators also could adopt unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)[RFC3704] and black/white-list to enhance the security by specifying access policies. For example, NAT64-CGN should forbid establish NAT64 BIB for incoming IPv6 packets if uRPF in Strict or Loose mode check does not pass or whose source IPv6 address is associated to black-lists.

The stateful NAT64-FE creates state and maps that connection to an internally-facing IPv4 address and port. An attacker can consume the resources of the NAT64-FE device by sending an excessive number of connection attempts. Without a DDoS limitation mechanism, the NAT64-FE is exposed to attacks. Load Balancer is recommended to enable the capabilities of line rate DDOS defense, such as the employment of SYN PROXY-COOKIE. Security domain division is necessary as well in this case. Therefore, Load Balancers could not only serve for optimization of traffic distribution, but also prevent service from quality deterioration due to security attacks.

The DNS64 process will potentially interfere with the DNSSEC functions[RFC4035], since DNS response is modified and DNSSEC intends to prevent such changes. More detailed discussions can be found in [RFC6147].

10. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

11. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Testing Results of Application Behavior

We test several application behaviors in a lab environment to evaluate the impact when a primary NAT64 is out of service. In this testing, participants are asked to connect a IPv6-only WiFi network

using laptops, tablets or mobile phones. NAT64 is deployed as the gateway to connect Internet service. The tested applications are shown in the below table. Cold standby, warm standby and hot standby are taken turn to be tested. The participants may experience service interruption due to the NAT64 handover. Different interruption intervals are tested to gauge application behaviors. The results are illuminated as below.

Table 2: The acceptable delay of applications

APPs	Acceptable Interrupt Recovery	Session Continuity
Web Browse	As maximum as 6s	No
Http streaming	As maximum as 10s(cache)	Yes
Gaming	200ms~400ms	Yes
P2P streaming, file sharing	10~16s	Yes
Instant Message	1 minute	Yes
Mail	30 seconds	No
Downloading	1 minutes	No

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Abstract

As the deployment of third and fourth generation cellular networks progresses, a large number of cellular hosts are being connected to the Internet. Standardization organizations have made Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) mandatory in their specifications. However, the concept of IPv6 covers many aspects and numerous specifications. In addition, the characteristics of cellular links in terms of bandwidth, cost and delay put special requirements on how IPv6 is used. This document considers IPv6 for cellular hosts that attach to the General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), or Evolved Packet System (EPS) networks (Hereafter collectively referred to as 3GPP networks). This document also lists out specific IPv6 functionalities that need to be implemented in addition what is already prescribed in the IPv6 Node Requirements document. It also discusses some issues related to the use of these components when operating in these networks. This document obsoletes RFC 3316.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	4
1.1. Scope of this Document	4
1.2. Abbreviations	5
1.3. Cellular Host IPv6 Features	6
2. Basic IP	7
2.1. Internet Protocol Version 6	7
2.2. Neighbor Discovery in 3GPP Networks	7
2.3. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration	8
2.4. IP version 6 over PPP	9
2.5. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6	10
2.6. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in IPv6	10
2.7. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)	10
2.8. DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation	10
2.9. Router preferences and more specific routes	11
2.10. Neighbor Discovery and additional host configuration	11
3. IP Security	11
3.1. Extension header considerations	11
4. Mobility	11
5. IANA Considerations	12
6. Acknowledgements	12
7. Security Considerations	12
8. References	14
8.1. Normative references	14
8.2. Informative references	15
Appendix A. Cellular Host IPv6 Addressing in the 3GPP Model	16
Appendix B. Changes to RFC 3316	18
Authors' Addresses	19

1. Introduction

Technologies such as GPRS (General Packet Radio Service), UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System), Evolved Packet System (EPS), CDMA2000 (Code Division Multiple Access 2000) and eHRPD (Enhanced High Rate Packet Data) are making it possible for cellular hosts to have an always-on connection to the Internet. IPv6 [RFC2460] has become essential to such networks as the number of cellular hosts is increasing rapidly. Standardization organizations working with cellular technologies have recognized this and made IPv6 mandatory in their specifications.

Support for IPv6 and the introduction of UMTS started with 3GPP Release-99 networks and hosts. For the detailed description of IPv6 in 3GPP networks including the Evolved Packet System, see [RFC6459].

1.1. Scope of this Document

For the purpose of this document, a cellular interface is considered to be the interface to a cellular access network based on the following standards: 3GPP GPRS and UMTS Release-99, Release-4 to Release-11, and EPS Release-8 to Release-11 as well as future UMTS or EPS releases. A cellular host is considered to be a host with such a cellular interface.

This document complements the IPv6 node requirements [RFC6434] in places where clarifications are needed with discussion on the use of these selected IPv6 specifications when operating over a cellular interface. Such a specification is necessary in order to enable the optimal use of IPv6 in a cellular network environment. The description is made from a cellular host point of view. Complementary access technologies may be supported by the cellular host, but those are not discussed in detail. Important considerations are given in order to eliminate unnecessary user confusion over configuration options, ensure interoperability and to provide an easy reference for those who are implementing IPv6 in a cellular host. It is necessary to ensure that cellular hosts are good citizens of the Internet.

This document is informational in its nature, and it is not intended to replace, update, or contradict any IPv6 standards documents or the IPv6 node requirements [RFC6434].

This document is primarily targeted to the implementers of cellular hosts that will be used with the cellular networks listed in the scope. The document provides guidance on which IPv6 related specifications are to be implemented in such cellular hosts. Parts of this document may also apply to other cellular link types, but

this document does not provide any detailed analysis on other link types. This document should not be used as a definitive list of IPv6 functionalities for cellular links other than those listed above. Future changes in 3GPP networks that impact host implementations may result in updates to this document.

There are different ways to implement cellular hosts:

- o The host can be a "closed" device with optimized built-in applications, with no possibility to add or download applications that can have IP communications. An example of such a host is a very simple form of a mobile phone.
- o The host can be an open device, e.g., a "smart phone" where it is possible to download applications to expand the functionality of the device.
- o The cellular radio modem part can be separated from the host IP stack with an interface. One example of such host is a laptop computer that uses a USB cellular modem for the cellular access.

If a cellular host has additional IP capable interfaces, (such as Ethernet, WLAN, Bluetooth, etc.) then there may be additional requirements for the device, beyond what is discussed in this document. Additionally, this document does not make any recommendations on the functionality required on laptop computers having a cellular interface such as an embedded modem or a USB modem stick, other than recommending link specific behavior on the cellular link.

This document discusses IPv6 functionality as of the time when this document has been written. Ongoing work on IPv6 may affect what is required of future hosts.

Transition mechanisms used by cellular hosts are not in the scope of this document and are left for further study. The primary transition mechanism supported by the 3GPP is dual-stack [RFC4213]. Dual-stack capable bearer support has been added to GPRS starting from the 3GPP Release-9 and to EPS starting from the Release-8 [RFC6459], whereas the earlier 3GPP releases required multiple single IP version bearers to support dual-stack.

1.2. Abbreviations

2G Second Generation Mobile Telecommunications, such as GSM and GPRS technologies.

3G	Third Generation Mobile Telecommunications, such as UMTS technology.
4G	Fourth Generation Mobile Telecommunications, such as LTE technology.
3GPP	3rd Generation Partnership Project. Throughout the document, the term 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) networks refers to architectures standardized by 3GPP, in Second, Third and Fourth Generation releases: 99, 4, and 5, as well as future releases.
APN	Access Point Name. The APN is a logical name referring to a GGSN and/or a PGW, and an external network.
EPC	Evolved Packet Core.
EPS	Evolved Packet System.
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
GGSN	Gateway GPRS Support Node (a default router for 3GPP IPv6 cellular hosts in GPRS).
GPRS	General Packet Radio Service.
LTE	Long Term Evolution.
MT	Mobile Terminal, for example, a mobile phone handset.
MTU	Maximum Transmission Unit.
PDN	Packet Data Network.
PDP	Packet Data Protocol.
PGW	Packet Data Network Gateway (the default router for 3GPP IPv6 cellular hosts in EPS).
SGW	Serving Gateway. The user plane equivalent of an SGSN in EPS (and the default router for 3GPP IPv6 cellular hosts when using PMIPv6).
TE	Terminal Equipment, for example, a laptop attached through a 3GPP handset.
UMTS	Universal Mobile Telecommunications System.
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network.

1.3. Cellular Host IPv6 Features

This document lists IPv6 features for cellular hosts that are split into three groups.

Basic IP

In this group, a list of the basic IPv6 features essential for cellular hosts are described.

IP Security

In this group, the IP Security related parts are described.

Mobility

In this group, IP layer mobility issues are described.

2. Basic IP

For most parts refer to the IPv6 Node Requirements document [RFC6434].

2.1. Internet Protocol Version 6

The Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) is specified in [RFC2460]. This specification is a mandatory part of IPv6. A cellular host must conform to the generic IPv6 Host Requirements [RFC6434], unless specifically pointed out otherwise in this document.

2.2. Neighbor Discovery in 3GPP Networks

A cellular host must support Neighbor Solicitation and Neighbor Advertisement messages [RFC4861]. Some further notes on how these are applied in the particular type of an interface can be useful, however:

In 3GPP networks, some Neighbor Discovery messages can be unnecessary in certain cases. GPRS, UMTS and EPS links resemble a point-to-point link; hence, the cellular host's only neighbor on the cellular link is the default router that is already known through Router Discovery. The cellular host always solicits for routers when the cellular interface is brought up (as described in [RFC4861], Section 6.3.7).

There are no link layer addresses on the 3GPP cellular link technology. Therefore, address resolution and next-hop determination are not needed. If the cellular host still attempts to do the address resolution e.g., for the default router, it must be understood that the GGSN/PGW may not even answer the address resolution Neighbor Solicitations. And even if it does, the Neighbor Advertisement is unlikely to contain the Target link-layer address option as there are no link-layer addresses on the 3GPP cellular link technology.

The cellular host must support Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) as specified in [RFC4861]. Note that the link-layer address considerations above also apply to the NUD. The NUD triggered Neighbor Advertisement is also unlikely to contain the Target link-layer address option as there are no link-layer addresses. The cellular host should also be prepared for a router (i.e., GGSN/PGW) initiated NUD. However, it is unlikely a router to host NUD should

ever take place on a GPRS, UMTS and EPS links. See Appendix A for more discussion on the router to host NUD.

In 3GPP networks, it is desirable to reduce any additional periodic signaling. Therefore, the cellular host should include a mechanism in upper layer protocols to provide reachability confirmations when two-way IP layer reachability can be confirmed (see [RFC4861], Section 7.3.1). These confirmations would allow the suppression of NUD-related messages in most cases.

Host TCP implementation should provide reachability confirmation in the manner explained in [RFC4861], Section 7.3.1.

The widespread use of UDP in 3GPP networks poses a problem for providing reachability confirmation. As UDP itself is unable to provide such confirmation, applications running on top of UDP should provide the confirmation where possible. In particular, when UDP is used for transporting DNS, the DNS response should be used as a basis for reachability confirmation. Similarly, when UDP is used to transport RTP [RFC3550], the RTCP protocol [RFC3550] feedback should be used as a basis for the reachability confirmation. If an RTCP packet is received with a reception report block indicating some packets have gone through, then packets are reaching the peer. If they have reached the peer, they have also reached the neighbor.

When UDP is used for transporting SIP [RFC3261], responses to SIP requests should be used as the confirmation that packets sent to the peer are reaching it. When the cellular host is acting as the server side SIP node, no such confirmation is generally available. However, a host may interpret the receipt of a SIP ACK request as confirmation that the previously sent response to a SIP INVITE request has reached the peer.

2.3. Stateless Address Autoconfiguration

IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is defined in [RFC4862]. This specification is a mandatory part of IPv6 and also the only mandatory method to configure an IPv6 address in a 3GPP cellular host.

A cellular host in a 3GPP network must process a Router Advertisement as stated in [RFC4862]. The Router Advertisement contains a maximum of one prefix information option with lifetimes set to infinite (both valid and preferred lifetimes). The advertised prefix cannot ever be used for on-link determination (see [RFC6459], Section 5.2) and the lifetime of the advertised prefix is tied to the PDP Context/PDN Connection lifetime. Keeping the forward compatibility in mind there is no reason for the 3GPP cellular host to have 3GPP specific

handling of the prefix information option(s) although 3GPP specifications state that the Router Advertisement may contain a maximum of one prefix information option and the lifetimes are set to infinite.

Hosts in 3GPP networks can set DupAddrDetectTransmits equal to zero, as each assigned prefix is unique within its scope when advertised using the 3GPP IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration. In addition, the default router (GGSN/PGW) will not configure any addresses on its interfaces based on prefixes advertised to IPv6 cellular hosts on those interfaces. Thus, the host is not required to perform Duplicate Address Detection on the cellular interface.

Furthermore, the GGSN/PGW will provide the cellular host with an interface identifier that must be used for link-local address configuration. The link-local address configured from this interface identifier is guaranteed not to collide with the link-local address that the GGSN/PGW uses. Thus, the cellular host is not required to perform Duplicate Address Detection for the link-local address on the cellular interface.

See Appendix A for more details on 3GPP IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration.

2.4. IP version 6 over PPP

A cellular host in a 3GPP network that supports PPP [RFC1661] on the interface between the MT and the TE, must support the IPv6CP [RFC5072] interface identifier option. This option is needed to be able to connect other devices to the Internet using a PPP link between the cellular device (MT, e.g., a USB dongle) and other devices (TE, e.g., a laptop). The MT performs the PDP Context activation based on a request from the TE. This results in an interface identifier being suggested by the MT to the TE, using the IPv6CP option. To avoid any duplication in link-local addresses between the TE and the GGSN/PGW, the MT must always reject other suggested interface identifiers by the TE. This results in the TE always using the interface identifier suggested by the GGSN/PGW for its link-local address.

The rejection of interface identifiers suggested by the TE is only done for creation of link-local addresses, according to 3GPP specifications. The use of privacy addresses [RFC4941] or similar technologies for unique local IPv6 unicast addresses (ULA) [RFC4193] and global addresses is not affected by the above procedure.

2.5. Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6

Within 3GPP networks, hosts connect to their default routers (GGSN/PGW) via point-to-point links. Moreover, there are exactly two IP devices connected to the point-to-point link, and no attempt is made (at the link-layer) to suppress the forwarding of multicast traffic. Consequently, sending MLD reports for link-local addresses in a 3GPP environment is not necessary, although sending those cause no harm or interoperability issues. Refer Section 5.10 of [RFC6434] for MLD usage for multicast group knowledge that is not link-local.

2.6. Privacy Extensions for Address Configuration in IPv6

Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration [RFC4941] or other similar technologies may be supported by a cellular host. Privacy in general, is important for the Internet. In 3GPP networks the lifetime of an address assignment depends on many factors such as radio coverage, device status and user preferences. As a result also the prefix the cellular host uses is a subject to frequent changes.

Refer to Section 7 for a discussion of the benefits of privacy extensions in a 3GPP network.

2.7. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)

As of 3GPP Release-11 The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) [RFC3315] is neither required nor supported for address autoconfiguration. The IPv6 stateless autoconfiguration still remains the only mandatory address configuration method. However, DHCPv6 may be useful for other configuration needs on a cellular host. e.g. Stateless DHCPv6 [RFC3736] may be used to configure DNS and SIP server addresses, and DHCPv6 prefix delegation [RFC3633] may be used to delegate a prefix to the cellular host for use on its downstream non-cellular links.

2.8. DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation

Starting from Release-10 DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation was added as an optional feature to the 3GPP system architecture [RFC3633]. The prefix delegation model defined for Release-10 requires that the /64 IPv6 prefix assigned to the cellular host on the 3GPP link must aggregate with the shorter delegated IPv6 prefix. The cellular host should implement the Prefix Exclude Option for DHCPv6 Prefix Delegation [RFC6603] (see [RFC6459], Section 5.3 for further discussion).

2.9. Router preferences and more specific routes

The cellular host should implement the Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes extension to Router Advertisement messages [RFC4191]. These options may be useful for cellular hosts that also have additional interfaces on which IPv6 is used.

2.10. Neighbor Discovery and additional host configuration

The DNS server configuration is learned from the 3GPP link layer signaling. However, the cellular host should also implement the IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration [RFC6106]. DHCPv6 is still optional for cellular hosts, and learning the DNS server addresses from the link layer signaling can be cumbersome when the MT and the TE are separated using other techniques than PPP interface.

The cellular host should also honor the MTU option in the Router Advertisement (see [RFC4861], Section 4.6.4). 3GPP system architecture uses extensive tunneling in its packet core network below the 3GPP link and this may lead to packet fragmentation issues. Therefore, the GGSN/PGW may propose a MTU to the cellular host that takes the additional tunneling overhead into account.

3. IP Security

IPsec [RFC4301] is a fundamental but not mandatory part of IPv6. Refer to the IPv6 Node Requirements Section 11 of [RFC6434] for the security requirements that also apply to cellular hosts.

3.1. Extension header considerations

The support for the Routing Header Type 0 (RH0) has been deprecated [RFC5095]. Therefore, the cellular host should as a default setting follow the RH0 processing described in Section 3 of [RFC5095].

IPv6 packet fragmentation has known security concerns. The cellular host must follow the handling of overlapping fragments as described in [RFC5722] and the cellular host must not fragment any neighbor discovery messages as described in [RFC6980].

4. Mobility

For the purposes of this document, IP mobility is not relevant. The movement of cellular hosts within 3GPP networks is handled by link layer mechanisms in majority of cases. 3GPP Release-8 introduced the dual-stack Mobile IPv6 (DSMIPv6) for a client based mobility

[RFC5555]. Client based IP mobility is optional in 3GPP architecture.

5. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

6. Acknowledgements

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7. Security Considerations

This document does not specify any new protocols or functionalities, and as such, it does not introduce any new security vulnerabilities. However, specific profiles of IPv6 functionality are proposed for different situations, and vulnerabilities may open or close depending on which functionality is included and what is not. There are also aspects of the cellular environment that make certain types of vulnerabilities more severe. The following issues are discussed:

- o The suggested limitations (Section 3.1) in the processing of extension headers limits also exposure to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks through cellular hosts.
- o IPv6 addressing privacy [RFC4941] or similar technology may be used in cellular hosts. However, it should be noted that in the 3GPP model, the network would assign a new prefix, in most cases, to hosts in roaming situations and typically, also when the cellular hosts activate a PDP Context or a PDN Connection. 3GPP devices must not use interface identifiers that are unique to the device, so the only difference in address between to 3GPP devices using SLAAC is in the prefix. This means that 3GPP networks will already provide a limited form of addressing privacy, and no global tracking of a single host is possible through its address. On the other hand, since a GGSN/PGW's coverage area is expected to be very large when compared to currently deployed default routers (no handovers between GGSN/PGWs are possible), a cellular host can keep a prefix for a long time. Hence, IPv6 addressing privacy can be used for additional privacy during the time the host is on and in the same area. The privacy features can also be used to e.g., make different transport sessions appear to come from different IP addresses. However, it is not clear that these additional efforts confuse potential observers any further, as they could monitor only the network prefix part.
- o The use and recommendations of various security services such as IPsec or TLS [RFC5246] in the connection of typical applications that also apply to cellular hosts are discussed in Section 11 of [RFC6434].
- o The airtime used by cellular hosts is expensive. In some cases, users are billed according to the amount of data they transfer to and from their host. It is crucial for both the network and the users that the airtime is used correctly and no extra charges are applied to users due to misbehaving third parties. The cellular links also have a limited capacity, which means that they may not necessarily be able to accommodate more traffic than what the user selected, such as a multimedia call. Additional traffic might interfere with the service level experienced by the user. While Quality of Service mechanisms mitigate these problems to an extent, it is still apparent that DoS aspects may be highlighted in the cellular environment. It is possible for existing DoS attacks that use for instance packet amplification to be substantially more damaging in this environment. How these attacks can be protected against is still an area of further study. It is also often easy to fill the cellular link and queues on both sides with additional or large packets.
- o Within some service provider networks, it is possible to buy a prepaid cellular subscription without presenting personal identification. Attackers that wish to remain unidentified could leverage this. Note that while the user hasn't been identified,

the equipment still is; the operators can follow the identity of the device and block it from further use. The operators must have procedures in place to take notice of third party complaints regarding the use of their customers' devices. It may also be necessary for the operators to have attack detection tools that enable them to efficiently detect attacks launched from the cellular hosts.

- o Cellular devices that have local network interfaces (such as WLAN or Bluetooth) may be used to launch attacks through them, unless the local interfaces are secured in an appropriate manner. Therefore, local network interfaces should have access control to prevent others from using the cellular host as an intermediary.
- o The 3GPP link model mitigates most of the known IPv6 on-link and neighbor cache targeted attacks (see Section 2.2 and Appendix A).
- o Advice for implementations in the face of Neighbor Discovery DoS attacks may be useful in some environments [RFC6583].
- o Section 9 of [RFC6459] discusses further some recent concerns related to cellular hosts security.

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Appendix A. Cellular Host IPv6 Addressing in the 3GPP Model

The appendix aims to very briefly describe the 3GPP IPv6 addressing model for 2G (GPRS), 3G (UMTS) and 4G (EPS) cellular networks from Release-99 onwards. More information for 2G and 3G can be found from 3GPP Technical Specifications [TS.23060] and [TS.29061]. The equivalent documentation for 4G can be found from 3GPP Technical

Specifications [TS.23401], [TS.23402] and [TS.29061].

There are two possibilities to allocate the address for an IPv6 node: stateless and stateful autoconfiguration. The stateful address allocation mechanism needs a DHCP server to allocate the address for the IPv6 node. On the other hand, the stateless autoconfiguration procedure does not need any external entity involved in the address autoconfiguration (apart from the GGSN/PGW). At the time of writing this document, the IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration mechanism is still the only mandatory and supported address configuration method for the cellular 3GPP link.

In order to support the standard IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration mechanism as recommended by the IETF, the GGSN/PGW shall assign a single /64 IPv6 prefix that is unique within its scope to each primary PDP Context or PDN Connection that uses IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration. This avoids the necessity to perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) at the network level for any address built by the mobile host. The GGSN/PGW always provides an interface identifier to the mobile host. The Mobile host uses the interface identifier provided by the GGSN/PGW to generate its link-local address. The GGSN/PGW provides the cellular host with the interface identifier, usually in a random manner. It must ensure the uniqueness of such identifier on the link (i.e., no collisions between its own link-local address and the cellular host's).

In addition, the GGSN/PGW will not use any of the prefixes assigned to cellular hosts to generate any of its own addresses. This use of the interface identifier, combined with the fact that each PDP Context or PDN Connection is allocated a unique prefix, will eliminate the need for DAD messages over the air interface, and consequently reduces inefficient use of radio resources. Furthermore, the allocation of a prefix to each PDP Context or PDN Connection will allow hosts to implement the Privacy Extensions in [RFC4941] without the need for further DAD messages.

In practice, the GGSN/PGW only needs to route all traffic destined to the cellular host that falls under the prefix assigned to it. This implies the GGSN/PGW may implement a minimal neighbor discovery protocol subset; since, due the point-to-point link model and the absence of link-layer addressing the address resolution can be entirely statically configured per PDP Context or PDN Connection, and there is no need to defend any other address than the link-local address for very unlikely duplicates. This has also an additional effect on a router to host NUD. There is really no need for it, since from the GGSN/PGW point of view it does not need to care for a single address, just routes the whole prefix to the cellular host. However, the cellular host must be prepared for the unlikely event of

receiving a NUD against its link-local address. It should be noted that the 3GPP specifications at the time of writing this document are silent what should happen if the router to host NUD fails.

See Sections 5 of [RFC6459] for further discussion on 3GPP address allocation and link model.

Appendix B. Changes to RFC 3316

- o Clarified that [RFC4941] or similar technologies instead of plain [RFC4941] may be used for privacy purposes (as stated in [RFC6459]).
- o Clarified that MLD for link-local addresses is not necessary but doing it causes no harm (instead of saying it may not be needed in some cases).
- o Clarified that a cellular host should not do any changes in its stack to meet the 3GPP link restriction on the RA PIO options.
- o Clarified that a cellular host should not do any changes in its stack to meet the infinite prefix lifetime requirement the 3GPP link has.
- o Clarified that the prefix lifetime is tied to the PDP Context/PDN Connection lifetime.
- o Clarified explicitly that a NUD from the gateway side to the UE's link-local address is possible.
- o Added references to 3GPP specifications.
- o Additional clarification on NUD on 3GPP cellular links.
- o Added an explicit note that the prefix on the link is /64.
- o Clarified that DHCPv6 ([RFC3315]) is not used at all for address autoconfiguration.
- o Removal of all sections that can be directly found from [RFC6434].
- o Clarifications to 3GPP link model and how Neighbor Discovery works on it.
- o Addition of [RFC4191] recommendations.
- o Addition of DHCPv6-based Prefix Delegation recommendations.
- o Addition of [RFC6106] recommendations.
- o Addition of [RFC5555] regarding client based mobility.
- o Addition of Router Advertisement MTU option handling.
- o Addition of Evolved Packet System text.
- o Clarification on the primary 3GPP IPv6 transition mechanism.
- o Addition of [RFC5095] that deprecates the RH0.
- o Addition of [RFC5722] and [RFC6980] regarding the IPv6 fragmentation handling.
- o Addition of [RFC6583] for Neighbor Discovery denial-of-service attack considerations.
- o Made the PPP IPv6CP [RFC5072] support text conditional.

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Abstract

This document provides guidance of how to use ULA. It analyzes ULA usage scenarios and recommends use cases where ULA address may be beneficially used.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. ULA usage analysis	3
2.1. The features of ULA	3
2.1.1. Self-assigned	3
2.1.2. Globally unique	3
2.1.3. Independent address space	3
2.1.4. Well known prefix	4
2.1.5. Stable or Temporary Prefix	4
2.2. Enumeration of ULA use scenarios	4
2.2.1. Isolated network	4
2.2.2. Connected network	5
2.2.2.1. ULA-only Deployment	5
2.2.2.2. ULA along with GUA	6
3. Recommended ULA Use Cases	6
3.1. Used in Isolated Networks	6
3.2. ULA along with GUA	6
3.3. Special Use Cases	7
3.3.1. Special routing	7
3.3.2. Used as NAT64 prefix	7
3.3.3. Used as identifier	8
4. Security Considerations	8
5. IANA Considerations	8
6. Conclusions	9
7. References	9
7.1. Normative References	9
7.2. Informative References	9
8. Acknowledgments	10

1. Introduction

Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) are defined in [RFC4193] as provider-independent prefixes that can be used on isolated networks, internal networks, and VPNs. Although ULAs may be treated like global scope by applications, normally they are not used on the publicly routable internet.

However, the ULAs haven't been widely used since IPv6 hasn't been widely deployed yet.

The use of ULA addresses in various types of networks has been confused for network operators. Some network operators believe ULAs are not useful at all while other network operators run their entire networks on ULA address space. This document attempts to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of ULAs and how they can be most appropriately used.

2. ULA usage analysis

2.1. The features of ULA

2.1.1. Self-assigned

ULA is self-assigned, this feature allows automatic address allocation, which is beneficial for some lightweight systems and can leverage minimal human management.

2.1.2. Globally unique

ULA is intended to be globally unique to avoid collision. Since the hosts assigned with ULA may occasionally be merged into one network, this uniqueness is necessary. The prefix uniqueness is based on randomization of 40 bits and is considered random enough to ensure a high degree of uniqueness (refer to [RFC4193] section 3.2.3 for details) and make merging of networks simple and without the need to renumbering overlapping IP address space. Overlapping is cited as a deficiency with how [RFC1918] addresses were deployed, and ULA was designed to overcome this deficiency.

Notice that, as described in [RFC4864], in practice, applications may treat ULAs like global-scope addresses, but address selection algorithms may need to distinguish between ULAs and ordinary GUA (Global-scope Unicast Address) to ensure bidirectional communications.

2.1.3. Independent address space

ULA provides an internal address independence capability in IPv6 that is similar to how [RFC1918] is commonly used. ULA allows administrators to configure the internal network of each platform the same way it is configured in IPv4. But the ability to merge two ULA networks without renumbering (because of the uniqueness) is a big advantage over [RFC1918].

On the other hand, many organizations have security policies and architectures based around the local-only routing of [RFC1918] addresses and those policies may directly map to ULA. ULA can be used for internal communications without having any permanent or only intermittent Internet connectivity. And it needs no registration so that it can support on-demand usage and does not carry any RIR documentation burden or disclosures.

2.1.4. Well known prefix

The prefixes of ULAs are well known and they are easy to be identified and easy to be filtered.

This feature may be convenient to management of security policies and troubleshooting. For example, the administrators can decide what parameters have to be assembled or transmitted globally, by a separate function, through an appropriate gateway/firewall, to the Internet or to the telecom network.

2.1.5. Stable or Temporary Prefix

A ULA prefix can be generated once, at installation time or "factory reset", and then never change unless the network manager wants to change. Alternatively, it could be regenerated regularly, if desired for some reason.

2.2. Enumeration of ULA use scenarios

In this section, we try to cover plausible possible ULA use case. Some of them might have been discussed in other documents and are briefly reviewed in this document as well as other potential valid usage is discussed.

2.2.1. Isolated network

IP is used ubiquitously. Some networks like RS-485, or other type of industrial control bus, or even non-networked digital interface like MIL-STD-1397 began to use IP protocol. In such kind of networks, the system might lack the ability/requirement of connecting to the Internet.

Besides, some networks are explicitly designed to not connect to the internet. These networks may include machine-to-machine, sensor networks, or other types of SCADA networks which may include very large numbers of addresses and explicitly prohibited from connect to the global internet (electricity meters...).

ULA is a straightforward way to assign the IP addresses in these kinds of networks with minimal administrative cost or burden.

2.2.2. Connected network

2.2.2.1. ULA-only Deployment

In some situations, hosts/interfaces are assigned with ULA-only, but the networks need to communicate with the outside. For example, just like many implementations of private IPv4 address space [RFC1918]. One important reason of using private address space is the lack of IPv4 addresses, but this it is not an issue any more in IPv6. Another reason is regarding with security, private address space is designed by some administrators as one layer of a multilayer security. Such design is also applicable in IPv6 with using ULAs.

But we should eliminate the misunderstanding that ULA is designed to be the IPv6 version of [RFC1918] deployment model. If you chose non-globally routable address space for some reasons, ULA is a nature selection, but we need to know ULA itself is not designed for this intention.

ULA-only in connected network may include the following two models.

- o Using Network Prefix Translation

Network Prefix Translation (NPTv6) [RFC6296] is an experimental specification that provides a stateless one to one mapping between internal addresses and external addresses.

In some very constrained situations(for example, in the sensors), the network needs ULA as the on-demand and stable addressing which doesn't need much code to support address assignment mechanisms like DHCP or ND. And the network also needs to connect to the outside, then there can be a gateway to be the NAT which may not be so sensitive to the constrained resource. This behavior could refer NPTv6 [RFC6296].

- o Using application-layer proxies

The proxies terminate the network-layer connectivity of the hosts and delegate the outgoing/incoming connections.

There may be some scenarios that need this kind of deployment for some special purpose (strict application access control, content monitoring, e.g.).

2.2.2.2. ULA along with GUA

There are two classes of network probably to use ULA with GUA addresses:

- o Home network. Home networks are normally assigned with one or more globally routed PA prefixes to connect to the uplink of some an ISP. And besides, they may need internal routed networking even when the ISP link is down. Then ULA is a proper tool to fit the requirement. And in [RFC6204], it requires the CPE to support ULA.
- o Enterprise network. An enterprise network is usually a managed network with one or more PA prefixes or with a PI prefix, all of which are globally routed. The ULA could be used for internal connectivity redundancy and better internal connectivity or isolation of certain functions like OAM of servers.

3. Recommended ULA Use Cases

3.1. Used in Isolated Networks

As analyzed in section 2.2.1, ULA is very suitable for isolated networks. Especially when you have subnets in the isolated networks, ULA is almost the only choice.

3.2. ULA along with GUA

For either home networks or enterprise networks, the main purpose of using ULA along with GUA is to provide a logically local routing plane separated from the globally routing plane. The benefit is to ensure stable and specific local communication regardless of the ISP uplink failure. This benefit is especially meaningful for the home network or private OAM function in an enterprise.

In some special cases such as renumbering, enterprise administrators may want to avoid the need to renumber their internal-only, private nodes when they have to renumber the PA addresses of the whole network because of changing ISPs, ISPs restructure their address allocations, or whatever reasons. In these situations, ULA is an effective tool for the internal-only nodes.

Besides the internal-only nodes, the public nodes can also benefit from ULA for renumbering. When renumbering, as RFC4192 suggested, it has a period to keep using the old prefix(es) before the new prefix(es) is(are) stable. In the process of adding new prefix(es) and deprecating old prefix(es), it is not easy to keep the local communication immune of global routing plane change. If we use ULA

for the local communication, the separated local routing plane can isolate the affecting by global routing change.

But for the separated local routing plane, there always be some argument that in practice the ULA+PA makes terrible operational complexity. But it is not a ULA-specific problem; the multiple-addresses-per-interface is an important feature of IPv6 protocol. Running multiple prefixes in IPv6 might be very common, and we need to adapt this new operational model than that in IPv4.

Another issue is mentioned in [RFC5220], there is a possibility that the longest matching rule will not be able to choose the correct address between ULAs and global unicast addresses for correct intra-site and extra-site communication. In [RFC6724] , it claimed that a site-specific policy entry can be used to cause ULAs within a site to be preferred over global addresses.

3.3. Special Use Cases

3.3.1. Special routing

If you have a special routing scenario, of which [draft-baker-v6ops-b2b-private-routing] is an example, for various reasons you might want to have routing that you control and is separate from other routing. In the b2b case, even though two companies each have at least one ISP, they might choose to also use direct connectivity that only connects stated machines, such as a silicon foundry with client engineers that use it. A ULA provides a simple way to obtain such a prefix that would be used in accordance with an agreement between the parties.

3.3.2. Used as NAT64 prefix

Since the NAT64 pref64 is just a group of local fake addresses for the DNS64 to point traffic to a NAT64, the pref64 is a very good use of ULA. It ensures that only local systems can use the translation resources of the NAT64 system since the ULA is not globally routable and helps clearly identify traffic that is locally contained and destined to a NAT64. Using ULA for Pref64 is deployed and it is an operational model.

But there's an issue should be noticed. The NAT64 standard [RFC6146] mentioned the pref64 should align with [RFC6052], in which the IPv4-Embedded IPv6 Address format was specified. If we pick a /48 for NAT64, it happened to be a standard 48/ part of ULA (7bit ULA famous prefix+ 1 "L" bit + 40bit Global ID). Then the 40bit of ULA is not violated to be filled with part of the 32bit IPv4 address. This is

important, because the 40bit assures the uniqueness of ULA, if the prefix is shorter than /48, the 40bit would be violated, and this may cause conformance issue. But it is considered that the most common use case will be a /96 PREF64, or even /64 will be used. So it seems this issue is not common in current practice.

It is most common that ULA Pref64 will be deployed on a single internal network, where the clients and the NAT64 share a common internal network. ULA will not be effective as Pref64 when the access network must use an Internet transit to receive the translation service of a NAT64 since the ULA will not route across the internet.

3.3.3. Used as identifier

Since ULA could be self-generated and easily grabbed from the standard IPv6 stack, it is very suitable to be used as identifiers by the up layer applications. And since ULA is not intended to be globally routed, it is not harmful to the routing system.

Such kind of benefit has been utilized in real implementations. For example, in [RFC6281], the protocol BTMM (Back To My Mac) needs to assign a topology-independent identifier to each client host according to the following considerations:

- o TCP connections between two end hosts wish to survive in network changes.
- o Sometimes one needs a constant identifier to be associated with a key so that the Security Association can survive the location changes.

It should be noticed again that in theory ULA has the possibility of collision. However, the probability is desirable small enough and could be ignored by most of the cases when used as identifiers.

4. Security Considerations

Security considerations regarding ULAs, in general, please refer to the ULA specification [RFC4193].

5. IANA Considerations

None.

6. Conclusions

ULA is a useful tool, it have been successfully deployed in a diverse set of circumstances including large private machine-to-machine type networks, enterprise networks with private systems, and within service providers to limit Internet communication with non-public services such as caching DNS servers and NAT64 translation resources.

We should eliminate the misunderstanding that ULA is just an IPv6 version of [RFC1918]. The features of ULA could be beneficial for various use cases.

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IPv6 Operational Guidelines for Datacenters
draft-lopez-v6ops-dc-ipv6-05

Abstract

This document is intended to provide operational guidelines for datacenter operators planning to deploy IPv6 in their infrastructures. It aims to offer a reference framework for evaluating different products and architectures, and therefore it is also addressed to manufacturers and solution providers, so they can use it to gauge their solutions. We believe this will translate in a smoother and faster IPv6 transition for datacenters of these infrastructures.

The document focuses on the DC infrastructure itself, its operation, and the aspects related to DC interconnection through IPv6. It does not consider the particular mechanisms for making Internet services provided by applications hosted in the DC available through IPv6 beyond the specific aspects related to how their deployment on the Data Center (DC) infrastructure.

Apart from facilitating the transition to IPv6, the mechanisms outlined here are intended to make this transition as transparent as possible (if not completely transparent) to applications and services running on the DC infrastructure, as well as to take advantage of IPv6 features to simplify DC operations, internally and across the Internet.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	4
2. Architecture and Transition Stages	4
2.1. General Architecture	5
2.2. Experimental Stage. Native IPv4 Infrastructure	7
2.2.1. Off-shore v6 Access	8
2.3. Dual Stack Stage. Internal Adaptation	8
2.3.1. Dual-stack at the Aggregation Layer	10
2.3.2. Dual-stack Extended OS/Hypervisor	12
2.4. IPv6-Only Stage. Pervasive IPv6 Infrastructure	12
3. Other Operational Considerations	13
3.1. Addressing	13
3.2. Management Systems and Applications	14
3.3. Monitoring and Logging	15
3.4. Costs	15
4. Security Considerations	15
4.1. Neighbor Discovery Protocol attacks	16
4.2. Addressing	16
4.3. Edge filtering	17
4.4. Final Security Remarks	17
5. IANA Considerations	17
6. Acknowledgements	17
7. Informative References	17
Authors' Addresses	19

1. Introduction

The need for considering the aspects related to IPv4-to-IPv6 transition for all devices and services connected to the Internet has been widely mentioned elsewhere, and it is not our intention to make an additional call on it. Just let us note that many of those services are already or will soon be located in Data Centers (DC), what makes considering the issues associated to DC infrastructure transition a key aspect both for these infrastructures themselves, and for providing a simpler and clear path to service transition.

All issues discussed here are related to DC infrastructure transition, and are intended to be orthogonal to whatever particular mechanisms for making the services hosted in the DC available through IPv6 beyond the specific aspects related to their deployment on the infrastructure. General mechanisms related to service transition have been discussed in depth elsewhere (see, for example [I-D.ietf-v6ops-icp-guidance] and [I-D.ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6]) and are considered to be independent to the goal of this discussion. The applicability of these general mechanisms for service transition will, in many cases, depend on the supporting DC's infrastructure characteristics. However, this document intends to keep both problems (service vs. infrastructure transition) as different issues.

Furthermore, the combination of the regularity and controlled management in a DC interconnection fabric with IPv6 universal end-to-end addressing should translate in simpler and faster VM migrations, either intra- or inter-DC, and even inter-provider.

2. Architecture and Transition Stages

This document presents a transition framework structured along transition stages and operational guidance associated with the degree of penetration of IPv6 into the DC communication fabric. It is worth noting we are using these stages as a classification mechanism, and they have not to be associated with any a succession of steps from a v4-only infrastructure to full-fledged v6, but to provide a framework that operators, users, and even manufacturers could use to assess their plans and products.

There is no (explicit or implicit) requirement on starting at the stage describe in first place, nor to follow them in successive order. According to their needs and the available solutions, DC operators can choose to start or remain at a certain stage, and freely move from one to another as they see fit, without contravening this document. In this respect, the classification intends to

support the planning in aspects such as the adaptation of the different transition stages to the evolution of traffic patterns, or risk assessment in what relates to deploying new components and incorporating change control, integration and testing in highly-complex multi-vendor infrastructures.

Three main transition stages can be considered when analyzing IPv6 deployment in the DC infrastructure, all compatible with the availability of services running in the DC through IPv6:

- o Experimental. The DC keeps a native IPv4 infrastructure, with gateway routers (or even application gateways when services require so) performing the adaptation to requests arriving from the IPv6 Internet.
- o Dual stack. Native IPv6 and IPv4 are present in the infrastructure, up to whatever the layer in the interconnection scheme where L3 is applied to packet forwarding.
- o IPv6-Only. The DC has a fully pervasive IPv6 infrastructure, including full IPv6 hypervisors, which perform the appropriate tunneling or NAT if required by internal applications running IPv4.

2.1. General Architecture

The diagram in Figure 1 depicts a generalized interconnection schema in a DC.




Figure 1: DC Interconnection Schema

- o Hypervisors provide connection services (among others) to virtual machines running on physical servers.
- o Access elements provide connectivity directly to/from physical servers. The access elements are typically placed either top-of-rack (ToR) or end-of-row(EoR).
- o Aggregation elements group several (many) physical racks to achieve local integration and provide as much structure as possible to data paths.
- o Core elements connect all aggregation elements acting as the DC backbone.

- o One or several gateways connecting the DC to the Internet, Branch Offices, Partners, Third-Parties, and/or other DCs. The interconnectivity to other DC may be in the form of VPNs, WAN links, metro links or any other form of interconnection.

In many actual deployments, depending on DC size and design decisions, some of these elements may be combined (core and gateways are provided by the same routers, or hypervisors act as access elements) or virtualized to some extent, but this layered schema is the one that best accommodates the different options to use L2 or L3 at any of the different DC interconnection layers, and will help us in the discussion along the document.

2.2. Experimental Stage. Native IPv4 Infrastructure

This transition stage corresponds to the first step that many datacenters may take (or have taken) in order to make their external services initially accessible from the IPv6 Internet and/or to evaluate the possibilities around it, and corresponds to IPv6 traffic patterns totally originated out of the DC or their tenants, being a small percentage of the total external requests. At this stage, DC network scheme and addressing do not require any important change, if any.

It is important to remark that in no case this can be considered a permanent stage in the transition, or even a long-term solution for incorporating IPv6 into the DC infrastructure. This stage is only recommended for experimentation or early evaluation purposes.

The translation of IPv6 requests into the internal infrastructure addressing format occurs at the outmost level of the DC Internet connection. This can be typically achieved at the DC gateway routers, that support the appropriate address translation mechanisms for those services required to be accessed through native IPv6 requests. The policies for applying adaptation can range from performing it only to a limited set of specified services to providing a general translation service for all public services. More granular mechanisms, based on address ranges or more sophisticated dynamic policies are also possible, as they are applied by a limited set of control elements. These provide an additional level of control to the usage of IPv6 routable addresses in the DC environment, which can be especially significant in the experimentation or early deployment phases this stage is applicable to.

Even at this stage, some implicit advantages of IPv6 application come into play, even if they can only be applied at the ingress elements:

- o Flow labels can be applied to enhance load-balancing, as described in [I-D.ietf-6man-flow-ecmp]. If the incoming IPv6 requests are adequately labeled the gateway systems can use the flow labels as a hint for applying load-balancing mechanisms when translating the requests towards the IPv4 internal network.
- o During VM migration (intra- or even inter-DC), Mobile IP mechanisms can be applied to keep service availability during the transient state.

2.2.1. Off-shore v6 Access

This model is also suitable to be applied in an "off-shore" mode by the service provider connecting the DC infrastructure to the Internet, as described in [I-D.sunq-v6ops-contents-transition].

When this off-shore mode is applied, the original source address will be hidden to the DC infrastructure, and therefore identification techniques based on it, such as geolocation or reputation evaluation, will be hampered. Unless there is a specific trust link between the DC operator and the ISP, and the DC operator is able to access equivalent identification interfaces provided by the ISP as an additional service, the off-shore experimental stage cannot be considered applicable when source address identification is required.

2.3. Dual Stack Stage. Internal Adaptation

This stage requires dual-stack elements in some internal parts of the DC infrastructure. This brings some degree of partition in the infrastructure, either in a horizontal (when data paths or management interfaces are migrated or left in IPv4 while the rest migrate) or a vertical (per tenant or service group), or even both.

Although it may seem an artificial case, situations requiring this stage can arise from different requirements from the user base, or the need for technology changes at different points of the infrastructure, or even the goal of having the possibility of experimenting new solutions in a controlled real-operations environment, at the price of the additional complexity of dealing with a double protocol stack, as noted in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-icp-guidance] and elsewhere.

This transition stage can accommodate different traffic patterns, both internal and external, though it better fits to scenarios of a clear differentiation of different types of traffic (external vs. internal, data vs management...), and/or a more or less even distribution of external requests. A common scenario would include native dual stack servers for certain services combined with single

stack ones for others (web server in dual stack and database servers only supporting v4, for example).

At this stage, the advantages outlined above on load balancing based on flow labels and Mobile IP mechanisms are applicable to any L3-based mechanism (intra- as well as inter-DC). They will translate into enhanced VM mobility, more effective load balancing, and higher service availability. Furthermore, the simpler integration provided by IPv6 to and from the L2 flat space to the structured L3 one can be applied to achieve simpler deployments, as well as alleviating encapsulation and fragmentation issues when traversing between L2 and L3 spaces. With an appropriate prefix management, automatic address assignment, discovery, and renumbering can be applied not only to public service interfaces, but most notably to data and management paths.

Other potential advantages include the application of multicast scopes to limit broadcast floods, and the usage of specific security headers to enhance tenant differentiation.

On the other hand, this stage requires a much more careful planning of addressing (please refer to ([RFC5375]) schemas and access control, according to security levels. While the experimental stage implies relatively few global routable addresses, this one brings the advantages and risks of using different kinds of addresses at each point of the IPv6-aware infrastructure.

2.3.1. Dual-stack at the Aggregation Layer




Figure 2: Data Center Application Scheme

An initial approach corresponding to this transition stage relies on taking advantage of specific elements at the aggregation layer described in Figure 1, and make them able to provide dual-stack gatewaying to the IPv4-based servers and data infrastructure.

Typically, firewalls (FW) are deployed as the security edge of the whole service domain and provides safe access control of this service domain from other function domains. In addition, some application optimization based on devices and security devices (e.g. Load Balancers, SSL VPN, IPS and etc.) may be deployed in the aggregation level to alleviate the burden of the server and to guarantee deep security, as shown in Figure 2.

The load balancer (LB) or some other boxes could be upgraded to support the data transmission. There may be two ways to achieve this

at the edge of the DC: Encapsulation and NAT. In the encapsulation case, the LB function carries the IPv6 traffic over IPv4 using an encapsulation (IPv6-in-IPv4). In the NAT case, there are already some technologies to solve this problem. For example, DNS and NAT device could be concatenated for IPv4/IPv6 translation if IPv6 host needs to visit IPv4 servers. However, this may require the concatenation of multiple network devices, which means the NAT tables needs to be synchronized at different devices. As described below, a simplified IPv4/IPv6 translation model can be applied, which could be implemented in the LB device. The mapping information of IPv4 and IPv6 will be generated automatically based on the information of the LB. The host IP address will be translated without port translation.




Figure 3: Dual Stack LB mechanism

As shown in Figure 3, the LB can be considered divided into two parts: The dual-stack part facing the external border, and the IPv4-only part which contains the traditional LB functions. The IPv4 DC is allocated an IPv6 prefix which is for the VSIPv6 (Virtual Service IPv6 Address). We suggest that the IPv6 prefix is not the well-known prefix in order to avoid the IPv4 routings of the services in different DCs spread to the IPv6 network. The VSIPv4 (Virtual Service IPv4 Address) is embedded in VSIPv6 using the allocated IPv6 prefix. In this way, the LB has the stateless IP address mapping between VSIPv6 and VSIPv4, and synchronization is not required between LB and DNS64 server.

The dual-stack part of the LB has a private IPv4 address pool. When IPv6 packets arrive, the dual-stack part does the one-on-one SIP (source IP address) mapping (as defined in [I-D.sunq-v6ops-contents-transition]) between IPv4 private address and IPv6 SIP. Because there will be too many UDP/TCP sessions between the DC and Internet, the IP addresses binding tables between IPv6 and IPv4 are not session-based, but SIP-based. Thus, the dual-stack part of LB builds IP binding stateful tables for the host IPv6 address and private IPv4 address of the pool. When the following

IPv6 packets of the host come from Internet to the LB, the dual stack part does the IP address translation for the packets. Thus, the IPv6 packets were translated to IPv4 packets and sent to the IPv4 only part of the LB.

2.3.2. Dual-stack Extended OS/Hypervisor

Another option for deploying a infrastructure at the dual-stack stage would bring dual-stack much closer to the application servers, by requiring hypervisors, VMs and applications in the v6-capable zone of the DC to be able to operate in dual stack. This way, incoming connections would be dealt in a seamless manner, while for outgoing ones an OS-specific replacement for system calls like `gethostbyname()` and `getaddrinfo()` would accept a character string (an IPv4 literal, an IPv6 literal, or a domain name) and would return a connected socket or an error message, having executed a happy eyeballs algorithm ([RFC6555]).

If these hypothetical system call replacements were smart enough, they would allow the transparent interoperation of DCs with different levels of v6 penetration, either horizontal (internal data paths are not migrated, for example) or vertical (per tenant or service group). This approach requires, on the other hand, all the involved DC infrastructure to become dual-stack, as well as some degree of explicit application adaptation.

2.4. IPv6-Only Stage. Pervasive IPv6 Infrastructure

We can consider a DC infrastructure at the final stage when all network layer elements, including hypervisors, are IPv6-aware and apply it by default. Conversely with the experimental stage, access from the IPv4 Internet is achieved, when required, by protocol translation performed at the edge infrastructure elements, or even supplied by the service provider as an additional network service.

There are different drivers that could motivate DC managers to transition to this stage. In principle the scarcity of IPv4 addresses may require to reclaim IPv4 resources from portions of the network infrastructure which no longer need them. Furthermore, the unavailability of IPv4 address would make dual-stack environments not possible anymore and careful assessments will be perfumed to asses where to use the remaining IPv4 resources.

Another important motivation to move DC operations from dual-stack to IPv6-only is to save costs and operation activities that managing a single-stack network could bring in comparison with managing two stacks. Today, besides of learning to manage two different stacks, network and system administrators require to duplicate other tasks

such as IP address management, firewalls configuration, system security hardening and monitoring among others. These activities are not just costly for the DC management, they may also may lead to configuration errors and security holes.

This stage can be also of interest for new deployments willing to apply a fresh start aligned with future IPv6 widespread usage, when a relevant amount of requests are expected to be using IPv6, or to take advantage of any of the potential benefits that an IPv6 support infrastructure can provide. Other, and probably more compelling in many cases, drivers for this stage may be either a lack of enough IPv4 resources (whether private or globally unique) or a need to reclaim IPv4 resources from portions of the network which no longer need them. In these circumstances, a careful evaluation of what still needs to speak IPv4 and what does not will need to happen to ensure judicious use of the remaining IPv4 resources.

The potential advantages mentioned for the previous stages (load balancing based on flow labels, mobility mechanisms for transient states in VM or data migration, controlled multicast, and better mapping of L2 flat space on L3 constructs) can be applied at any layer, even especially tailored for individual services. Obviously, the need for a careful planning of address space is even stronger here, though the centralized protocol translation services should reduce the risk of translation errors causing disruptions or security breaches.

[V6DCS] proposes an approach to a next generation DC deployment, already demonstrated in practice, and claims the advantages of materializing the stage from the beginning, providing some rationale for it based on simplifying the transition process. It relies on stateless NAT64 ([RFC6052], [RFC6145]) to enable access from the IPv4 Internet.

3. Other Operational Considerations

In this section we review some operation considerations related addressing and management issues in V6 DC infrastructure.

3.1. Addressing

There are different considerations related on IPv6 addressing topics in DC. Many of these considerations are already documented in a variety of IETF documents and in general the recommendations and best practices mentioned on them apply in IPv6 DC environments. However we would like to point out some topics that we consider important to mention.

The first question that DC managers often have is the type of IPv6 address to use; that is Provider Aggregated (PA), Provider Independent (PI) or Unique Local IPv6 Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193]. Related to the use of PA vs. PI, we concur with [I-D.ietf-v6ops-icp-guidance] and [I-D.ietf-v6ops-enterprise-incremental-ipv6] that PI provides independence from the ISP and decreases renumbering issues, it may bring up other considerations as a fee for the allocation, a request process and allocation maintenance to the Regional Internet Registry, etc. In this respect, there is not a specific recommendation to use either PI vs. PA as it would depend also on business and management factors rather than pure technical.

ULAs should be used only in DC infrastructure that does not require access to the public Internet; such devices may be databases servers, application-servers, and management interfaces of web servers and network devices among others. This practice may decrease the renumbering issues when PA addressing is used, as only public faced devices would require an address change. Also we would like to know that although ULAs may provide some security the main motivation for it used should be address management.

Another topic to discuss is the length of prefixes within the DC. In general we recommend the use of subnets of 64 bits for each vlan or network segment used in the DC. Although subnet with prefixes longer than 64 bits may work, it is necessary that the reader understand that this may break stateless autoconfiguration and at least manual configuration must be employed. For details please read [RFC5375].

Address plans should follow the principles of being hierarchical and able to aggregate address space. We recommend at least to have a /48 for each data-center. If the DC provides services that require subassignment of address space we do not offer a single recommendation (i.e. request a /40 prefix from an RIR or ISP and assign /48 prefixes to customers), as this may depend on other no technical factors. Instead we refer the reader to [RFC6177].

For point-to-point links please refer to the recommendations in [RFC6164].

3.2. Management Systems and Applications

Data-centers may use Internet Protocol address management (IPAM) software, provisioning systems and other variety of software to document and operate. It is important that these systems are prepared and possibly modified to support IPv6 in their data models. In general, if IPv6 support for these applications has not been previously done, changes may take sometime as they may be not just

adding more space in input fields but also modifying data models and data migration.

3.3. Monitoring and Logging

Monitoring and logging are critical operations in any network environment and they should be carried at the same level for IPv6 and IPv4. Monitoring and management operations in V6 DC are by no means different than any other IPv6 networks environments. It is important to consider that the collection of information from network devices is orthogonal to the information collected. For example it is possible to collect data from IPv6 MIBs using IPv4 transport. Similarly it is possible to collect IPv6 data generated by Netflow9/IPFIX agents in IPv4 transport. In this way the important issue to address is that agents (i.e. network devices) are able to collect data specific to IPv6.

And as final note on monitoring, although IPv6 MIBs are supported by SNMP versions 1 and 2, we recommend to use SNMP version 3 instead.

3.4. Costs

It is very possible that moving from a single stack data-center infrastructure to any of the IPv6 stages described in this document may incur in capital expenditures. This may include but it is not confined to routers, load-balancers, firewalls and software upgrades among others. However the cost that most concern us is operational. Moving the DC infrastructure operations from a single-stack to a dual-stack may infer in a variety of extra costs such as application development and testing, operational troubleshooting and service deployment. At the same time, this extra cost may be seeing as saving when moving from a dual-stack DC to an IPv6-Only DC.

Depending of the complexity of the DC network, provisioning and other factors we estimate that the extra costs (and later savings) may be around between 15 to 20%.

4. Security Considerations

A thorough collection of operational security aspects for IPv6 network is made in [I-D.ietf-opsec-v6] . Most of them, with the probable exception of those specific to residential users, are applicable in the environment we consider in this document.

4.1. Neighbor Discovery Protocol attacks

The first important issue that V6 DC manager should be aware is the attacks against Neighbor Discovery Protocol [RFC6583]. This attack is similar to ARP attacks [RFC4732] in IPv4 but exacerbated by the fact that the common size of an IPv6 subnet is /64. In principle an attacker would be able to fill the Neighbor Cache of the local router and starve its memory and processing resources by sending multiple ND packets requesting information of non-existing hosts. The result would be the inability of the router to respond to ND requests, to update its Neighbor Cache and even to forward packets. The attack does need to be launched with malicious purposes; it could be just the result of bad stack implementation behavior.

R[RFC6583] mentions some options to mitigate the effects of the attacks against NDP. For example filtering unused space, minimizing subnet size when possible, tuning rate limits in the NDP queue and to rely in router vendor implementations to better handle resources and to prioritize NDP requests.

4.2. Addressing

Other important security considerations in V6 DC are related to addressing. Because of the large address space is commonly thought that IPv6 is not vulnerable to reconnaissance techniques such as scanning. Although that may be true to force brute attacks, [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning] shows some techniques that may be employed to speed up and improve results in order to discover IPv6 address in a subnet. The use of virtual machines and SLACC aggravate this problem due the fact that they tend to use automatically-generated MAC address well known patterns.

To mitigate address-scanning attacks it is recommended to avoid using SLAAC and if used stable privacy-enhanced addresses [I-D.ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses] should be the method of address generation. Also, for manually assigned addresses try to avoid IID low-byte address (i.e. from 0 to 256), IPv4-based addresses and wordy addresses especially for infrastructure without a fully qualified domain name.

In spite of the use of manually assigned addresses is the preferred method for V6 DC, SLACC and DHCPv6 may be also used for some special reasons. However we recommend paying special attention to RA [RFC6104] and DHCP [I-D.gont-opsec-dhcpv6-shield] hijack attacks. In these kinds of attacks the attacker deploys rogue routers sending RA messages or rogue DHCP servers to inject bogus information and possibly to perform a man in the middle attack. In order to mitigate this problem it is necessary to apply some techniques in access

switches such as RA-Guard [RFC6105] at least.

Another topic that we would like to mention related to addressing is the use of ULAs. As we previously mentioned, although ULAs may be used to hide host from the outside world we do not recommend to rely on them as a security tool but better as a tool to make renumbering easier.

4.3. Edge filtering

In order to avoid being used as a source of amplification attacks is it important to follow the rules of BCP38 on ingress filtering. At the same time it is important to filter-in on the network border all the unicast traffic and routing announcement that should not be routed in the Internet, commonly known as "bogus prefixes".

4.4. Final Security Remarks

Finally, let us just emphasize the need for careful configuration of access control rules at the translation points. This latter one is specially sensitive in infrastructures at the dual-stack stage, as the translation points are potentially distributed, and when protocol translation is offered as an external service, since there can be operational mismatches.

5. IANA Considerations

None.

6. Acknowledgements

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A Larger Loopback Prefix for IPv6
draft-smith-v6ops-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-04

Abstract

During the development and testing of a network application, it can be useful to run multiple instances of the application using the same transport layer protocol port on the same development host, while also having network access to the application instances limited to the local host. Under IPv4, this has commonly been possible by using different loopback addresses within 127/8. It is not possible under IPv6, as the loopback prefix of ::1/128 only provides a single loopback address. This memo proposes a new larger loopback prefix that will provide many IPv6 loopback addresses. The processing rules for this new larger loopback prefix also allow sending or forwarding of packets containing these addresses beyond the originating router under certain circumstances.

Status of this Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
1.1. Requirements Language	4
2. Larger Loopback Prefix Requirements	4
3. Proposed Larger Loopback Prefix	4
4. Address Assignment and Configuration	5
5. Larger Loopback Prefix Processing Rules	6
5.1. Host Rules	6
5.1.1. Packets Originated with Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses	6
5.1.2. Packets Received Externally With Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses	7
5.2. Router Rules	7
5.2.1. Packets Originated with Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses	8
5.2.2. Packets Received Externally With Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses	8
6. Default Address Selection	8
7. DNS Considerations	9
8. Acknowledgements	9
9. IANA Considerations	9
10. Security Considerations	9
11. Change Log [RFC Editor please remove]	10
12. References	11
12.1. Normative References	11
12.2. Informative References	11
Author's Address	12

1. Introduction

During the development and testing of a network application, it can be useful to run multiple instances of the application on the same development host. It may also be useful or important for network access to these application instances to be limited to only the development host itself.

Networked applications that use fixed and usually well known transport layer protocol ports will typically accept incoming traffic on that port for any address assigned to the host. This will prevent multiple instances of the application running on the same port. This port reuse limitation can be overcome by having each application instance bind to different individual addresses available on the host.

Under IPv4, the 127/8 loopback prefix [RFC1122] provides many addresses that have commonly been able to be used to run multiple instances of an application on the same port, while also limiting access to the local host.

The IPv6 addressing architecture [RFC4291] only specifies a single loopback address (::1/128). Multiple IPv6 loopback addresses are not available to bind application instances to when using the same port on the same host.

The IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Address form of 127/8, ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 [RFC4291], could be used to provide more host local loopback addresses. However these addresses do not have native IPv6 address properties. For example, they cannot accommodate 64 bit Interface Identifiers. Other current and future IPv6 address forms that contain IPv4 addresses or prefixes, such as IPv4-Embedded IPv6 Addresses [RFC6052], have or are likely to have similar or other drawbacks.

A Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Address (ULA) prefix [RFC4193] could be used to increase the number of addresses available on the local host. However this prefix would need to be generated and configured at least once by a system administrator or operator. Without additional configuration, traffic towards addresses not assigned to the local host would not be prevented from leaving the host, and access may not be limited to the local host. A ULA prefix would not be well known, and would not be easy to remember and type accurately without violating the randomness requirements of the Global ID component of a ULA prefix. Using hostnames in DNS or the local host's name resolution file (e.g., /etc/hosts) to overcome the effort required to remember or type a ULA prefix may not be possible for some types of applications which directly deal with IPv6 addresses.

This memo proposes a new larger IPv6 loopback prefix that provides many more loopback addresses, has properties of native IPv6 addresses, and is easy to remember and type accurately. As with `::1/128`, it is intended to be automatically configured during system initialisation, making it ubiquitous. Unlike `::1/128`, the processing rules for this prefix match those of IPv4's `127/8`. These rules allow sending or forwarding of packets with the new larger loopback prefix addresses beyond the originating router under certain circumstances.

This memo, if published, updates [RFC4291], [RFC5156], [RFC6303] and [RFC6724].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. Larger Loopback Prefix Requirements

A new larger loopback prefix should attempt to satisfy all of the following requirements. It should:

- o be a well known prefix,
- o be within an existing special purpose prefix, such as `0000::/8` (the parent prefix of the current IPv6 loopback address),
- o be easy for a human to remember [EASY-NUMBERS],
- o be easy for a human to type accurately [DOET],
- o cover the existing IPv6 loopback prefix,
- o support 64 bit Interface Identifiers,
- o provide a large number of /64 subnets.

3. Proposed Larger Loopback Prefix

Ideally, the prefix length of `::1/128` could be shortened, resulting in a new single larger loopback prefix for IPv6, such as `::/48`. However, if the existing loopback prefix length is shortened enough to satisfy all of the larger loopback prefix requirements, it would then cover the IPv4 Mapped IPv6 Address prefix, `::ffff:0.0.0.0/96`, and prevent its use described in [RFC4038].

Giving up the requirement of covering the existing IPv6 loopback prefix, the proposed new larger loopback prefix is:

0001:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000/32

or concisely,

1::/32

This prefix satisfies all remaining larger loopback prefix requirements.

Allocating a /32 prefix for the loopback function may seem excessive, as a /48 length prefix would satisfy the larger loopback prefix requirements. However, within the parent 0000::/8 special purpose prefix, there are approximately 16 million /32 prefixes, so a single /32 for the larger loopback prefix is easily afforded. A /32 larger loopback prefix will satisfy all current and likely future uses of the loopback function.

4. Address Assignment and Configuration

Consistent with the IPv6 Addressing Model [RFC4291], each address within the larger loopback prefix is always logically assigned to one of the node's interfaces, although not necessarily the same interface for all addresses. This means that the node acts as though all addresses within the larger loopback prefix have been configured on one or more interfaces. Applications will accept packets destined to any of the larger loopback prefix addresses, unless the application is bound to a specific larger loopback address. Typically the addresses will be logically assigned to one or more virtual "loopback" interfaces, which locally returns or loops outgoing packets back to the same node that originated the packets.

It is also common to configure a well known loopback address on the loopback interface during system initialisation, making a loopback address visible to the system operator or user [DOET]. For IPv4, this address is 127.0.0.1/8; for IPv6, it is ::1/128. For the new larger loopback prefix, the address automatically configured on the loopback interface should be:

1::1/64

This address will be easy for a human to both remember [EASY-NUMBERS] [DOET] and type accurately [DOET].

A /64 prefix length has been chosen over /32 to provide a 64 bit

Interface Identifier for the loopback interface. This is different from the use of the whole loopback prefix length when configuring 127.0.0.1/8 or ::1/128.

Some nodes may support more than one loopback interface. These subsequent loopback interfaces, when initialised, should be assigned a larger loopback /64 prefix locally unique within the node. All addresses within the assigned /64 are logically assigned to the interface. Additionally, the ":1" address for the subnet should be configured on the loopback interface, making it visible to a system operator or user [DOET].

/64 subnet identifier uniqueness could be achieved by using the loopback interface instance number as the subnet identifier, with the first instance numbered 0 to suit the use of 1::1/64 on the first loopback interface. For example, the second loopback interface could be assigned 1:0:0:1::/64, while the forth loopback interface could be assigned 1:0:0:3::/64. Alternatively, the interfaces' ifIndex [RFC1213] could be used to determine these subsequent interfaces' loopback /64 subnet identifier. Other schemes which ensure subnet identifier uniqueness would be acceptable.

It should be possible for an operator to remove these automatically configured loopback addresses. It should also be possible for an operator to configure further loopback addresses from within the assigned /64, or addresses from other parts of the larger loopback prefix, including other /64s assigned to other loopback interfaces. Other addresses within the assigned /64(s) would continue to be logically assigned to the subsequent loopback interface. Configuration of addresses is for operational visibility and convenience [DOET], and does not change the behaviour of non-visible logically assigned addresses.

The larger loopback prefix addresses that are outside of the subsequent loopback interface assigned /64s would continue to be logically assigned to the oldest loopback interface.

5. Larger Loopback Prefix Processing Rules

5.1. Host Rules

5.1.1. Packets Originated with Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses

Packets originated with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses MUST be returned to the origin host for standard processing by the local IPv6 protocol implementation. They MUST NOT be sent

over any external links attached to the host.

If the implementation supports multiple loopback interfaces, and they have been assigned prefixes and addresses from within the larger loopback prefix, the egress loopback interface SHOULD be the interface assigned the matching destination loopback address. The ingress loopback interface MUST be the interface assigned the matching destination loopback address. This will facilitate loopback interface specific handling of the looped traffic, such as traffic filtering or traffic conditioning, which may be useful during network application development. Note that standard IPv6 longest match packet forwarding will facilitate this multiple loopback interface processing.

All addresses within the larger loopback prefix MUST always be considered assigned to one of the host's interfaces, consistent with IPv6's Addressing Model [RFC4291]. Ingress packets, once they have passed any interface specific policies, MUST be delivered to the appropriate protocol module (e.g., such as TCP, SCTP, UDP or ICMPv6) interested in packets with the destination larger loopback prefix address for further processing.

5.1.2. Packets Received Externally With Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses

Packets with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses received over any of the external links attached to the host MUST be dropped. ICMPv6 error messages, such as Destination Unreachable messages, MUST NOT be generated for these dropped packets.

Implementation suggestion: For these dropped packets, it may be useful to generate an appropriate system log message, indicating a packet with an invalid source or destination address (a "martian" [RFC1812]) was received over an external interface. By default, these messages should be suppressed. If they are enabled, they should be appropriately rate limited to prevent a system log denial-of-service attack.

5.2. Router Rules

IPv4 loopback packet processing rules for routers, specified in [RFC1812], by default prohibited forwarding of packets with 127/8 destinations, other than those originated locally and returned back to the router itself. A software switch could be provided to disable this prohibition. This special case of allowing forwarding of packets towards 127/8 destinations has been taken advantage of by [RFC4379], for MPLS troubleshooting purposes. An equivalent function for IPv6 is provided by using the IPv4-Mapped IPv6 prefix of ::ffff:

127.0.0.0/104.

The existing ::1/128 packet processing rules for routers are the same as those for IPv6 hosts [RFC4291].

For the new larger loopback prefix, the IPv6 router processing rules are changed to match those of IPv4, to suit future uses similar to the MPLS troubleshooting case.

5.2.1. Packets Originated with Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses

By default, a router MUST follow the host processing rules, described previously, for packets originated with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses.

A software switch MAY be provided to permit packets with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses to be sent via an external interface. If provided, this software switch MUST default to being switched off.

5.2.2. Packets Received Externally With Larger Loopback Source and/or Destination Addresses

By default, a router MUST follow the host processing rules, described previously, for packets received externally with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses.

A software switch MAY be provided to permit received packets with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses to be forwarded via an external interface. This software switch MUST default to being switched off.

6. Default Address Selection

For the purposes of default address selection [RFC6724], as with ::1/128, addresses within the larger loopback prefix MUST be treated as having link-local scope, and must have a "preferred" configuration status.

Within the address selection default policy table [RFC6724], the larger loopback prefix is to be assigned a precedence value of 60. As the existing ::1/128 loopback address has a precedence value of 50, given a choice, a larger loopback prefix address will be chosen as a destination address over ::1/128.

Within the address selection default policy table [RFC6724], the

larger loopback prefix is to be assigned a label value of 14, for use during source address selection.

These default address selection changes should be enabled at the same time that the larger loopback prefix and corresponding processing rules are enabled on a node.

7. DNS Considerations

The DNS zone for 1::/32, 0.0.0.0.1.0.0.0.IP6.ARPA, SHOULD be served locally. [RFC6303] provides further discussion regarding local serving of DNS zones for non-global IP address spaces.

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This memo was prepared using the xml2rfc tool.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate 0001::/32 from within 0000::/8 of the Internet Protocol Version 6 Address Space, for use as a larger loopback prefix for IPv6, as detailed in this memo, and to record it in the [IANA-IPV6REG].

10. Security Considerations

During deployment of a new larger loopback prefix, there will be a transition period where some hosts and routers have implemented the larger loopback processing rules defined in this memo while others haven't. These legacy hosts and routers will forward larger loopback prefix traffic using conventional unicast processing. For traffic towards non-local larger loopback addresses, traffic will most likely leave the legacy originating host via its default route, and may be

forwarded by legacy routers using their default route. This may unintentionally disclose sensitive information.

Packet filters, matching traffic with larger loopback source and/or destination addresses, should be used to prevent unintended forwarding of loopback traffic. They should be deployed at the following locations:

- o on the legacy hosts themselves,
- o on legacy routers interconnecting different networks, such as on a router interconnecting a private network and the Internet,
- o on appropriate security domain boundary legacy routers within the local network, if not all legacy routers within the local network.

Routes for the new larger loopback prefix should not be announced or accepted if received, unless necessary for special cases where packets with larger loopback prefix addresses are allowed to be forwarded.

11. Change Log [RFC Editor please remove]

draft-smith-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-00, initial version,
2012-07-24

draft-smith-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-01, much less verbose
version, 2012-08-17

draft-smith-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-02, clarifications,
2013-01-07

- o clarification that the larger loopback prefix should fall within `::/8`, the parent prefix of `::/128` and `::1/128`
- o Change from `1::/48` to `1::/32`
- o text about logically assigning addresses to interface(s), as per IPv6 addressing model
- o automatic loopback address configuration to multiple loopback interfaces
- o local serving of `0.0.0.1.0.0.0.IP6.ARPA` zone in DNS

draft-smith-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-03, clarifications,
2013-02-07

- o default address selection precedence and label values
- o comment about other IPv4 in IPv6 address forms
- o more clarifications
- o grammar corrections

draft-smith-larger-ipv6-loopback-prefix-04, minor fixups, 2013-02-20

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- o minor clarifications
- o grammar corrections

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Balanced Security for IPv6 CPE
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Abstract

This document describes how an IPv6 residential Customer Premise Equipment (CPE) can have a balanced security policy that allows for a mostly end-to-end connectivity while keeping the major threats outside of the home. It is based on an actual IPv6 deployment by Swisscom and proposes to allow all packets inbound/outbound EXCEPT for some layer-4 ports where attacks and vulnerabilities (such as weak passwords) are well-known.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
2. Threats	2
3. Overview	3
3.1. Rules for Balanced Security Policy	3
3.2. Rules example for Layer-4 Protection as Used by Swisscom	4
4. IANA Considerations	5
5. Security Considerations	5
6. Acknowledgements	6
7. Informative References	6
Authors' Addresses	6

1. Introduction

Internet access in residential IPv4 deployments generally consist of a single IPv4 address provided by the service provider for each home. Residential CPE then translates the single address into multiple private IPv4 addresses allowing more than one device in the home, but at the cost of losing end-to-end reachability. IPv6 allows all devices to have a unique, global, IP address, restoring end-to-end reachability directly between any device. Such reachability is very powerful for ubiquitous global connectivity, and is often heralded as one of the significant advantages to IPv6 over IPv4. Despite this, concern about exposure to inbound packets from the IPv6 Internet (which would otherwise be dropped by the address translation function if they had been sent from the IPv4 Internet) remain. This document describes firewall functionality for an IPv6 CPE which departs from the "simple security" model described in [RFC6092]. The intention is to provide an example of a security model which allows most traffic, including incoming unsolicited packets and connections, to traverse the CPE unless the CPE identifies the traffic as potentially harmful based on a set of rules. This model has been deployed successfully in Switzerland by Swisscom without any known security incident.

This document is applicable to off-the-shelves CPE as well to managed Service Provider CPE or for mobile Service Providers (where it can be centrally implemented).

2. Threats

For a typical residential network connected to the Internet over a broadband connection, the threats can be classified into:

- o denial of service by packet flooding: overwhelming either the access bandwidth or the bandwidth of a slower link in the residential network (like a slow home automation network) or the CPU power of a slow IPv6 host (like networked thermostat or any other sensor type nodes);
- o denial of service by Neighbor Discovery cache exhaustion [RFC6583]: the outside attacker floods the inside prefix(es) with packets with a random destination address forcing the CPE to exhaust its memory and its CPU in useless Neighbor Solicitations;
- o denial of service by service requests: like sending print jobs from the Internet to an ink jet printer until the ink cartridge is empty or like filing some file server with junk data;
- o unauthorized use of services: like accessing a webcam or a file server which are open to anonymous access within the residential network but should not be accessed from outside of the home network or accessing to remote desktop or SSH with weak password protection;
- o exploiting a vulnerability in the host in order to get access to data or to execute some arbitrary code in the attacked host such as several against old versions of Windows;
- o trojanized host (belonging to a Botnet) can communicate via a covert channel to its master and launch attacks to Internet targets.

3. Overview

The basic goal is to provide a pre-defined security policy which aims to block known harmful traffic and allow the rest, restoring as much of end-to-end communication as possible. This pre-defined policy can be centrally updated and could also be a member of a security policy menu for the subscriber.

3.1. Rules for Balanced Security Policy

These are an example set of generic rules to be applied. Each would normally be configurable, either by the user directly or on behalf of the user by a subscription service.

If we name all nodes on the residential side of the CPE as 'inside' and all nodes on the Internet as 'outside', and any packet sent from

outside to inside as being 'inbound' and 'outbound' in the other direction, then the behavior of the CPE is described by a small set of rules:

1. Rule RejectBogon: apply ingress filtering in both directions per [RFC3704] and [RFC2827] for example with unicast reverse path forwarding (uRPF) checks (anti-spoofing) for all inbound and outbound traffic (implicitly blocking link-local and ULA in the same shot), this is basically the Section 2.1 Basic Sanitation and Section 3.1 Stateless Filters of [RFC6092];
2. Rule ProtectWeakServices: drop all inbound and outbound packets whose layer-4 destination is part of a limited set (see Section 3.2), the intent is to protect against the most common unauthorized access and avoid propagation of worms (even if the latter is questionable in IPv6); an advanced residential user should be able to modify this pre-defined list;
3. Rule Openess: allow all unsolicited inbound packets with rate limiting the initial packet of a new connection (such as TCP SYN, SCTP INIT or DCCP-request not applicable to UDP) to provide very basic protection against SYN port and address scanning attacks. All transport protocols and all non-deprecated extension headers are accepted. This is the major deviation from REC-11, REC-17 and REC-33 of [RFC6092].
4. All requirements of [RFC6092] except REC-11, REC-18 and REC-33 must be supported.

3.2. Rules example for Layer-4 Protection as Used by Swisscom

The rule ProtectWeakService can be implemented by using the following suggestions as implemented by Swisscom in 2013:

Transport	Port	Description
tcp	22	Secure Shell (SSH)
tcp	23	Telnet
tcp	80	HTTP
tcp	3389	Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol
tcp	5900	VNC remote desktop protocol

Table 1: Drop Inbound

Transport	Port	Description
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tcp-udp	88	Kerberos
tcp	111	SUN Remote Procedure Call
tcp	135	MS Remote Procedure Call
tcp	139	NetBIOS Session Service
tcp	445	Microsoft SMB Domain Server
tcp	513	Remote Login
tcp	514	Remote Shell
tcp	548	Apple Filing Protocol over TCP
tcp	631	Internet Printing Protocol
udp	1900	Simple Service Discovery Protocol
tcp	2869	Simple Service Discovery Protocol
udp	3702	Web Services Dynamic Discovery
udp	5353	Multicast DNS
udp	5355	Link-Lcl Mcast Name Resolution

Table 2: Drop Inbound and Outbound

This list should evolve with the time as new protocols and new threats appear, [DSHIELD] is used by Swisscom to keep those filters up to date. Another source of information could be the appendix A of [TR124]. The above proposal does not block GRE tunnels ([RFC2473]) so this is a deviation from [RFC6092].

Note: the authors believe that with this set the usual residential subscriber, the proverbial grand-ma, is protected. Of course, technical subscribers should be able to open other applications (identified by their TCP or UDP ports) through their CPE through some kind of user interface or even select a completely different security policy such as the open or 'closed' policies defined by [RFC6092].

4. IANA Considerations

There are no extra IANA consideration for this document.

5. Security Considerations

The authors of the documents believe and the Swisscom deployment shows that the following attack are mostly stopped:

- o Unauthorized access because vulnerable ports are blocked

This proposal cannot help with the following attacks:

- o Flooding of the CPE access link;

- o Malware which is fetched by inside hosts on a hostile web site (which is in 2012 the majority of infection sources).

6. Acknowledgements

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