Abstract

This document describes a convention for using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to protect the messages in the Network Time Security (NTS) protocol. NTS provides authentication of time servers as well as integrity protection of time synchronization messages using Network Time Protocol (NTP) or Precision Time Protocol (PTP).

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

Status of This Memo

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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 7, 2015.
1. Introduction

This document provides details on how to construct NTS messages in practice. NTS provides secure time synchronization with time servers using Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905] or Precision Time Protocol (PTP) [IEEE1588]. Among other things, this document...
describes a convention for using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] to protect messages in the Network Time Security (NTS) protocol. Encryption is used to provide confidentiality of secrets, and digital signatures are used to provide authentication and integrity of content.

Sometimes CMS is used in an exclusively ASN.1 [ASN1] environment. In this case, the NTS message may use any syntax that facilitates easy implementation.

2. CMS Conventions for NTS Message Protection

Regarding the usage of CMS, we differentiate between four archetypes according to which the NTS message types can be structured. They are presented below. Note that the NTS Message Object that is at the core of each structure does not necessarily contain all the data needed for the particular message type, but may contain only that data which needs to be secured directly with cryptographic operations using the CMS. Specific information about what is included can be found in Section 3.

NTS-Plain: This archetype is used for actual time synchronization messages (explicitly, the following message types: time_request, time_response, server_broad, see [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], Section 6) as well as for the very first messages of a unicast or a broadcast exchange (client_assoc or client_bpar, respectively) and the broadcast keycheck exchange (client_keycheck and server_keycheck). This archetype does not make use of any CMS structures. Figure 1 illustrates this structure.

NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed: This archetype is used for secure transmission of the cookie (only for the server_cook message type, see [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], Section 6). For this, the following CMS structure is used:
First, the NTS message MUST be encrypted using the EnvelopedData content type. EnvelopedData supports nearly any form of key management. In the NTS protocol the client provides a certificate in an unprotected message, and the public key from this certificate, if it is valid, will be used to establish a pairwise symmetric key for the encryption of the protected NTS message.

Second, the EnvelopedData content MUST be digitally signed using the SignedData content type. SignedData supports nearly any form of digital signature, and in the NTS protocol the server will include its certificate within the SignedData content type.

Third, the SignedData content type MUST be encapsulated in a ContentInfo content type.

Figure 2 illustrates this structure.

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NTS-Signed: This archetype is used for server_assoc and server_bpar message types. It uses the following CMS structure:
First, the NTS message object MUST be wrapped in a SignedData content type. The messages MUST be digitally signed, and certificates included. SignedData supports nearly any form of digital signature, and in the NTS protocol the server will include its certificate within the SignedData content type.

Second, the SignedData content type MUST be encapsulated in a ContentInfo content type.

Figure 3 illustrates this structure.

+---------------------------------------------------------+
|                                                         |
| ContentInfo                                             |
|                                                         |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |                                                     | |
| | SignedData                                          | |
| |                                                     | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| | |                                                 | | |
| | | NTS Message Object                              | | |
| | |                                                 | | |
| | +-------------------------------------------------+ | |
| |                                                     | |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+ |
|                                                         |
+---------------------------------------------------------+

NTS-Certified: This archetype is used for the client_cook message type. It uses a CMS structure much like the NTS-Signed archetype (see Figure 3), with the only difference being that messages SHOULD NOT be digitally signed. This archetype employs the CMS structure merely in order to transport certificates.

2.1. Fields of the employed CMS Content Types

Overall, three CMS content types are used for NTS messages by the archetypes above. Explicitly, those content types are ContentInfo, SignedData and EnvelopedData. The following is a description of how the fields of those content types are used in detail.

2.1.1. ContentInfo

The ContentInfo content type is used in all four archetypes. The fields of the SignedData content type are used as follows:
contentType -- indicates the type of the associated content. For the archetype NTS-Plain, it MUST identify the NTS message object that is included. For all other archetypes (NTS-Certified, NTS-Signed and NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed), it MUST contain the object identifier for the SignedData content type:

\[\text{id-signedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= \{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 2 \}}\]

content is the associated content. For the NTS-Plain archetype, it MUST contain the DER encoded NTS message object. For all other archetypes, it MUST contain the DER encoded SignedData content type.

2.1.2. SignedData

The SignedData content type is used in the NTS-Certified, NTS-Signed and NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed archetypes, but not in the NTS-Plain archetype. The fields of the SignedData content type are used as follows:

version -- the appropriate value depends on the optional items that are included. In the NTS protocol, the signer certificate MUST be included and other items MAY be included. The instructions in [RFC5652] Section 5.1 MUST be followed to set the correct value.

digestAlgorithms -- is a collection of message digest algorithm identifiers. In the NTS protocol, there MUST be exactly one algorithm identifier present. The instructions in Section 5.4 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.

encapContentInfo -- this structure is always present. In the NTS protocol, it MUST follow these conventions:

eContentType -- is an object identifier. In the NTS protocol, for the NTS-Certified and NTS-Signed archetypes, it MUST identify the type of the NTS message that was encapsulated. For the NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed archetype, it MUST contain the object identifier for the EnvelopedData content type:

\[\text{id-envelopedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= \{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 3 \}}\]

eContent is the content itself, carried as an octet string. For the NTS-Certified and NTS-Signed archetypes, it MUST contain the DER encoded encapsulated NTS message object. The instructions in Section 6.3 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed. For
the NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed archetype, it MUST contain the DER encoded EnvelopedData content type.

certificates -- is a collection of certificates. In the NTS protocol, it MUST contain the DER encoded certificate [RFC5280] of the sender. It is intended that the collection of certificates be sufficient for the recipient to construct a certification path from a recognized "root" or "top-level certification authority" to the certificate used by the sender.

crls -- is a collection of revocation status information. In the NTS protocol, it MAY contain one or more DER encoded CRLs [RFC5280]. It is intended that the collection contain information sufficient to determine whether the certificates in the certificates field are valid.

signerInfos -- is a collection of per-signer information. In the NTS protocol, for the NTS-Certified archetype, this SHOULD be left out. For both the NTS-Signed and the NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed archetypes, there MUST be exactly one SignerInfo structure present. The details of the SignerInfo type are discussed in Section 5.3 of [RFC5652]. In the NTS protocol, it MUST follow these conventions:

version -- is the syntax version number. In the NTS protocol, the SignerIdentifier is subjectKeyIdentifier, therefore the version MUST be 3.

sid -- identifies the signer’s certificate. In the NTS protocol, the "sid" field contains the subjectKeyIdentifier from the signer’s certificate.

digestAlgorithm -- identifies the message digest algorithm and any associated parameters used by the signer. In the NTS protocol, the identifier MUST match the single algorithm identifier present in the digestAlgorithms.

signedAttrs -- is a collection of attributes that are signed. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be present, and it MUST contain the following attributes:

   Content Type -- see Section 11.1 of [RFC5652].

   Message Digest -- see Section 11.2 of [RFC5652].

In addition, it MAY contain the following attributes:

   Signing Time -- see Section 11.3 of [RFC5652].
Binary Signing Time -- see Section 3 of [RFC5652].

signatureAlgorithm -- identifies the signature algorithm and any associated parameters used by the signer to generate the digital signature.

signature is the result of digital signature generation using the message digest and the signer’s private key. The instructions in Section 5.5 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.

unsignedAttrs -- is an optional collection of attributes that are not signed. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be absent.

2.1.3. EnvelopedData

The EnvelopedData content type is used only in the NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed archetype. The fields of the EnvelopedData content type are used as follows:

version -- the appropriate value depends on the type of key management that is used. The instructions in [RFC5652] Section 6.1 MUST be followed to set the correct value.

originatorInfo -- this structure is present only if required by the key management algorithm. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be present when a key agreement algorithm is used, and it MUST be absent when a key transport algorithm is used. The instructions in Section 6.1 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.

recipientInfos -- this structure is always present. In the NTS protocol, it MUST contain exactly one entry that allows the client to determine the key used to encrypt the NTS message. The instructions in Section 6.2 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.

encryptedContentInfo -- this structure is always present. In the NTS protocol, it MUST follow these conventions:

contentType -- indicates the type of content. In the NTS protocol, it MUST identify the type of the NTS message that was encrypted.

contentEncryptionAlgorithm -- identifies the content-encryption algorithm and any associated parameters used to encrypt the content.

encryptedContent -- is the encrypted content. In the NTS protocol, it MUST contain the encrypted NTS message. The instructions in Section 6.3 of [RFC5652] MUST be followed.
unprotectedAttrs -- this structure is optional. In the NTS protocol, it MUST be absent.

3. Implementation Notes: ASN.1 Structures and Use of the CMS

This section presents some hints about the structures of the NTS message objects for the different message types when one wishes to implement the security mechanisms.

3.1. Preliminaries

The following ASN.1 coded data type "NTSNonce" is needed for other types used below for NTS messages. It specifies a 128 bit nonce as required in several message types:

   NTSNonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))

3.2. Unicast Messages

3.2.1. Association Messages

3.2.1.1. Message Type: "client_assoc"

This message is structured according to the NTS-Plain archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "ClientAssocData" and structured as follows:

   ClientAssocData ::= SEQUENCE {
      nonce            NTSNonce,
      clientId         SubjectKeyIdentifier,
      digestAlgos      DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
      keyEncAlgos      KeyEncryptionAlgorithms,
      contentEncAlgos  ContentEncryptionAlgorithms
   }

3.2.1.2. Message Type: "server_assoc"

This message is structured according to the NTS-Signed archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "ServerAssocData" and structured as follows:
ServerAssocData ::= SEQUENCE {
    nonce                 NTSNonce,
    clientId              SubjectKeyIdentifier,
    digestAlgos           DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
    choiceDigestAlgo      DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    keyEncAlgos           KeyEncryptionAlgorithms,
    choiceKeyEncAlgo      KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    contentEncAlgos       ContentEncryptionAlgorithms
    choiceContentEncAlgo  ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
}

3.2.2. Cookie Messages

3.2.2.1. Message Type: "client_cook"

This message is structured according to the NTS-Certified archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "ClientCookieData" and structured as follows:

ClientCookieData ::= SEQUENCE {
    nonce       NTSNonce,
    signAlgo    SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
    digestAlgo  DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    encAlgo     ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    keyEncAlgo  KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
}

It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional values):

id-clientCookieData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 
    {nts(??) cookie(3) clientcookiedata(1)}

3.2.2.2. Message Type: "server_cook"

This message is structured according to the "NTS-Encrypted-and-Signed" archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "ServerCookieData" and structured as follows:

ServerCookieData ::= SEQUENCE {
    nonce     NTSNonce,
    cookie    OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
}

It is identified by the following object identifier (fictional values):

id-serverCookieData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 
   {nts(??) cookie(3) servercookiedata(2)}

3.2.3. Time Synchronization Messages

3.2.3.1. Message Type: "time_request"

This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype.

This message type requires additional data to that which is included in the NTS message object, namely it requires regular time synchronization data, as an unsecured packet from a client to a server would contain. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type "TimeRequestSecurityData", whose structure is as follows:

   TimeRequestSecurityData ::= 
      SEQUENCE { 
         nonce_t  NTSNonce, 
         digestAlgo  DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, 
         hashOfClientCert  BIT STRING 
      }

3.2.3.2. Message Type: "time_response"

This message is also structured according to "NTS-Plain".

It requires two items of data in addition to that which is transported in the NTS message object. Like "time_request", it requires regular time synchronization data. Furthermore, it requires the Message Authentication Code (MAC) to be generated over the whole rest of the packet (including the NTS message object) and transported in some way. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type "TimeResponseSecurityData", with the following structure:

   TimeResponseSecurityData ::= 
      SEQUENCE { 
         nonce_t  NTSNonce, 
      }

3.3. Broadcast Messages

3.3.1. Broadcast Parameter Messages
3.3.1.1. Message Type: "client_bpar"

This first broadcast message is structured according to the NTS-Plain archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastParameterRequest" and structured as follows:

BroadcastParameterRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    nonce     NTSNonce,
    clientId  SubjectKeyIdentifier
}

3.3.1.2. Message Type: "server_bpar"

This message is structured according to "NTS-Signed". There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastParameterResponse" and structured as follows:

BroadcastParameterResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    nonce               NTSNonce,
    oneWayAlgo1         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    oneWayAlgo2         DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
    lastKey             OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),
    intervalDuration    BIT STRING,
    disclosureDelay     INTEGER,
    nextIntervalTime    BIT STRING,
    nextIntervalIndex   INTEGER
}

3.3.2. Broadcast Time Synchronization Message

3.3.2.1. Message Type: "server_broad"

This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype. It requires regular broadcast time synchronization data in addition to that which is carried in the NTS message object. Like "time_response", this message type also requires a MAC, generated over all other data, to be transported within the packet. The NTS message object itself is an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastTime". It has the following structure:
BroadcastTime ::=  
SEQUENCE {  
  thisIntervalIndex INTEGER,  
  disclosedKey OCTET STRING (SIZE (16)),  
}

3.3.3. Broadcast Keycheck

3.3.3.1. Message Type: "client_keycheck"

This message is structured according to the "NTS-Plain" archetype. There is no data necessary besides that which is transported in the NTS message object, which is an ASN.1 object of type "ClientKeyCheckSecurityData" and structured as follows:

ClientKeyCheckSecurityData ::=  
SEQUENCE {  
  nonce_k NTSNonce,  
  interval_number INTEGER,  
  digestAlgo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,  
  hashOfClientCert BIT STRING  
}

3.3.3.2. Message Type: "server_keycheck"

This message is also structured according to "NTS-Plain". It requires only a MAC, generated over the NTS message object, to be included in the packet in addition to what the NTS message object itself contains. The latter is an ASN.1 object of type "ServerKeyCheckSecurityData", which is structured as follows:

ServerKeyCheckSecurityData ::=  
SEQUENCE {  
  nonce_t NTSNonce,  
  interval_number INTEGER  
}

4. Certificate Conventions

The syntax and processing rules for certificates are specified in [RFC5652]. In the NTS protocol, the server certificate MUST contain the following extensions:

- Subject Key Identifier -- see Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5652].
- Key Usage -- see Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5652].
- Extended Key Usage -- see Section 4.2.1.22 of [RFC5652].
The Extended Key Usage extension MUST include the id-kp-NTSserver object identifier. When a certificate issuer includes this object identifier in the extended key usage extension, it provides an attestation that the certificate subject is a time server that supports the NTS protocol.

The id-kp-NTSserver object identifier is:

```plaintext
id-kp-NTSserver OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }
```

5. IANA Considerations

IANA needs to assign an object identifier for the id-kp-NTSserver key purpose and another one for the ASN.1 module in the appendix.

6. Security Considerations

To be written.

7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


Appendix A. ASN.1 Module

The ASN.1 module contained in this appendix defines the id-kp-NTSserver object identifier.

```
NTSserverKeyPurpose
  { TBD }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

id-kp-NTSserver OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { TBD }

END
```

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Abstract

This document describes Network Time Security (NTS), a collection of measures that enable secure time synchronization with time servers using protocols like the Network Time Protocol (NTP) or the Precision Time Protocol (PTP). Its design considers the special requirements of precise timekeeping which are described in Security Requirements of Time Protocols in Packet Switched Networks [RFC7384].

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

Time synchronization protocols are increasingly utilized to synchronize clocks in networked infrastructures. Successful attacks against the time synchronization protocol can seriously degrade the reliable performance of such infrastructures. Therefore, time synchronization protocols have to be secured if they are applied in environments that are prone to malicious attacks. This can be accomplished either by utilization of external security protocols, like IPsec or TLS, or by intrinsic security measures of the time synchronization protocol.

The two most popular time synchronization protocols, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905] and the Precision Time Protocol (PTP)
[IEEE1588], currently do not provide adequate intrinsic security precautions. This document specifies security measures which enable these and possibly other protocols to verify the authenticity of the time server/master and the integrity of the time synchronization protocol packets. The utilization of these measures for a given specific time synchronization protocol has to be described in a separate document.

[RFC7384] specifies that a security mechanism for timekeeping must be designed in such a way that it does not degrade the quality of the time transfer. This implies that for time keeping the increase in bandwidth and message latency caused by the security measures should be small. Also, NTP as well as PTP work via UDP and connections are stateless on the server/master side. Therefore, all security measures in this document are designed in such a way that they add little demand for bandwidth, that the necessary calculations can be executed in a fast manner, and that the measures do not require a server/master to keep state of a connection.

2. Terminology

2.1. Terms and Abbreviations

MITM   Man In The Middle
NTS    Network Time Security
TESLA  Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication
MAC    Message Authentication Code
HMAC   Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code

2.2. Common Terminology for PTP and NTP

This document refers to different time synchronization protocols, in particular to both the PTP and the NTP. Throughout the document the term "server" applies to both a PTP master and an NTP server. Accordingly, the term "client" applies to both a PTP slave and an NTP client.

3. Security Threats

4. Objectives

The objectives of the NTS specification are as follows:

- **Authenticity**: NTS enables a client to authenticate its time server(s).
- **Integrity**: NTS protects the integrity of time synchronization protocol packets via a message authentication code (MAC).
- **Confidentiality**: NTS does not provide confidentiality protection of the time synchronization packets.
- **Authorization**: NTS optionally enables the server to verify the client’s authorization.
- **Request-Response-Consistency**: NTS enables a client to match an incoming response to a request it has sent. NTS also enables the client to deduce from the response whether its request to the server has arrived without alteration.
- **Integration with protocols**: NTS can be used to secure different time synchronization protocols, specifically at least NTP and PTP. A client or server running an NTS-secured version of a time protocol does not negatively affect other participants who are running unsecured versions of that protocol.

5. NTS Overview

NTS applies X.509 certificates to verify the authenticity of the time server and to exchange a symmetric key, the so-called cookie. A client needs a public/private key pair for encryption, with the public key enclosed in a certificate. A server needs a public/private key pair for signing, with the public key enclosed in a certificate. If a participant intends to act as both a client and a server, it MUST have two different key pairs for these purposes.

After the cookie is exchanged, the client then uses it to protect the authenticity and the integrity of subsequent unicast-type time synchronization packets. In order to do this, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is attached to each time synchronization packet. The calculation of the MAC includes the whole time synchronization packet and the cookie which is shared between client and server. The cookie is calculated according to:

$$\text{cookie} = \text{MSB}<b> (\text{HMAC}(\text{server seed, } H(\text{certificate of client})))$$,
with the server seed as the key, where \( H \) is a hash function, and
where the function \( \text{MSB}_{<b>} \) cuts off the \( b \) most significant bits of
the result of the HMAC function. The client’s certificate contains
the client’s public key and enables the server to identify the
client, if client authorization is desired. The server seed is a
random value of bit length \( b \) that the server possesses, which has to
remain secret. The cookie never changes as long as the server seed
stays the same, but the server seed has to be refreshed periodically
in order to provide key freshness as required in [RFC7384]. See
Section 7 for details on seed refreshing.

Since the server does not keep a state of the client, it has to
recalculate the cookie each time it receives a unicast time
synchronization request from the client. To this end, the client has
to attach the hash value of its certificate to each request (see
Section 6.3).

For broadcast-type messages, authenticity and integrity of the time
synchronization packets are also ensured by a MAC, which is attached
to the time synchronization packet by the sender. Verification of
the broadcast-type packets’ authenticity is based on the TESLA
protocol, in particular on its "not re-using keys" scheme, see
Section 3.7.2 of [RFC4082]. TESLA uses a one-way chain of keys,
where each key is the output of a one-way function applied to the
previous key in the chain. The server securely shares the last
element of the chain with all clients. The server splits time into
intervals of uniform duration and assigns each key to an interval in
reverse order, starting with the penultimate. At each time interval,
the server sends a broadcast packet appended by a MAC, calculated
using the corresponding key, and the key of the previous disclosure
interval. The client verifies the MAC by buffering the packet until
disclosure of the key in its associated disclosure interval occurs.
In order to be able to verify the timeliness of the packets, the
client has to be loosely time synchronized with the server. This has
to be accomplished before broadcast associations can be used. For
checking timeliness of packets, NTS uses another, more rigorous check
in addition to just the clock lookup used in the TESLA protocol. For
a more detailed description of how NTS employs and customizes TESLA,
see Appendix B.

6. Protocol Messages

This section describes the types of messages needed for secure time
synchronization with NTS.

For some guidance on how these message types can be realized in
practice, and integrated into the communication flow of existing time
synchronization protocols, see [I-D.ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message], a
6.1. Association Message Exchange

In this message exchange, the participants negotiate the hash and encryption algorithms that are used throughout the protocol. In addition, the client receives the certification chain up to a trusted anchor. With the established certification chain the client is able to verify the server’s signatures and, hence, the authenticity of future NTS messages from the server is ensured.

6.1.1. Goals of the Association Exchange

The association exchange:

- enables the client to verify any communication with the server as authentic,
- lets the participants negotiate NTS version and algorithms,
- guarantees authenticity of the negotiation result to the client,
- guarantees to the client that the negotiation result is based on the client’s original, unaltered request.

6.1.2. Message Type: "client_assoc"

The protocol sequence starts with the client sending an association message, called client_assoc. This message contains

- the NTS message ID "client_assoc",
- a nonce,
- the version number of NTS that the client wants to use (this SHOULD be the highest version number that it supports),
- the hostname of the client,
- a selection of accepted hash algorithms, and
- a selection of accepted encryption algorithms.
6.1.3. Message Type: "server_assoc"

This message is sent by the server upon receipt of client_assoc. It contains

- the NTS message ID "server_assoc",
- the nonce transmitted in client_assoc,
- the client’s proposal for the version number, selection of accepted hash algorithms and selection of accepted encryption algorithms, as transmitted in client_assoc,
- the version number used for the rest of the protocol (which SHOULD be determined as the minimum over the client’s suggestion in the client_assoc message and the highest supported by the server),
- the hostname of the server,
- the server’s choice of algorithm for encryption and for cryptographic hashing, all of which MUST be chosen from the client’s proposals,
- a signature, calculated over the data listed above, with the server’s private key and according to the signature algorithm which is also used for the certificates that are included (see below), and
- a chain of certificates, which starts at the server and goes up to a trusted authority; each certificate MUST be certified by the one directly following it.

6.1.4. Procedure Overview of the Association Exchange

For an association exchange, the following steps are performed:

1. The client sends a client_assoc message to the server. It MUST keep the transmitted values for the version number and algorithms available for later checks.

2. Upon receipt of a client_assoc message, the server constructs and sends a reply in the form of a server_assoc message as described in Section 6.1.3. Upon unsuccessful negotiation for version number or algorithms the server_assoc message MUST contain an error code.
3. The client waits for a reply in the form of a server_assoc message. After receipt of the message it performs the following checks:

* The client checks that the message contains a conforming version number.

* It checks that the nonce sent back by the server matches the one transmitted in client_assoc.

* It also verifies that the server has chosen the encryption and hash algorithms from its proposal sent in the client_assoc message and that this proposal was not altered.

* Furthermore, it performs authenticity checks on the certificate chain and the signature.

If one of the checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.

---

| o Choose version |
| o Choose algorithms |
| o Acquire certificates |
| o Assemble response |
| o Create signature |

---

Procedure for association and cookie exchange.

6.2. Cookie Messages

During this message exchange, the server transmits a secret cookie to the client securely. The cookie will later be used for integrity protection during unicast time synchronization.
6.2.1. Goals of the Cookie Exchange

The cookie exchange:

- enables the server to check the client’s authorization via its certificate (optional),
- supplies the client with the correct cookie for its association to the server,
- guarantees to the client that the cookie originates from the server and that it is based on the client’s original, unaltered request.
- guarantees that the received cookie is unknown to anyone but the server and the client.

6.2.2. Message Type: "client_cook"

This message is sent by the client upon successful authentication of the server. In this message, the client requests a cookie from the server. The message contains

- the NTS message ID "client_cook",
- a nonce,
- the negotiated version number,
- the negotiated signature algorithm,
- the negotiated encryption algorithm,
- the negotiated hash algorithm H,
- the client’s certificate.

6.2.3. Message Type: "server_cook"

This message is sent by the server upon receipt of a client_cook message. The server generates the hash of the client’s certificate, as conveyed during client_cook, in order to calculate the cookie according to Section 5. This message contains

- the NTS message ID "server_cook"
- the version number as transmitted in client_cook,
o a concatenated datum which is encrypted with the client’s public key, according to the encryption algorithm transmitted in the client_cook message. The concatenated datum contains

- the nonce transmitted in client_cook, and
- the cookie.

o a signature, created with the server’s private key, calculated over all of the data listed above. This signature MUST be calculated according to the transmitted signature algorithm from the client_cook message.

6.2.4. Procedure Overview of the Cookie Exchange

For a cookie exchange, the following steps are performed:

1. The client sends a client_cook message to the server. The client MUST save the included nonce until the reply has been processed.

2. Upon receipt of a client_cook message, the server checks whether it supports the given cryptographic algorithms. It then calculates the cookie according to the formula given in Section 5. The server MAY use the client’s certificate to check that the client is authorized to use the secure time synchronization service. With this, it MUST construct a server_cook message as described in Section 6.2.3.

3. The client awaits a reply in the form of a server_cook message; upon receipt it executes the following actions:

* It verifies that the received version number matches the one negotiated beforehand.

* It verifies the signature using the server’s public key. The signature has to authenticate the encrypted data.

* It decrypts the encrypted data with its own private key.

* It checks that the decrypted message is of the expected format: the concatenation of a 128 bit nonce and a 128 bit cookie.

* It verifies that the received nonce matches the nonce sent in the client_cook message.

If one of those checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.
6.3. Unicast Time Synchronisation Messages

In this message exchange, the usual time synchronization process is executed, with the addition of integrity protection for all messages that the server sends. This message can be repeatedly exchanged as often as the client desires and as long as the integrity of the server’s time responses is verified successfully.

6.3.1. Goals of the Unicast Time Synchronization Exchange

The unicast time synchronization exchange:

- exchanges (unicast) time synchronization data as specified by the appropriate time synchronization protocol,
- guarantees to the client that the response originates from the server and is based on the client’s original, unaltered request.

6.3.2. Message Type: "time_request"

This message is sent by the client when it requests a time exchange. It contains

- the NTS message ID "time_request",
- the negotiated version number,
o a nonce,
o the negotiated hash algorithm H,
o the hash of the client’s certificate under H.

6.3.3. Message Type: "time_response"

This message is sent by the server after it has received a time_request message. Prior to this the server MUST recalculate the client’s cookie by using the hash of the client’s certificate and the transmitted hash algorithm. The message contains

o the NTS message ID "time_response",
o the version number as transmitted in time_request,
o the server’s time synchronization response data,
o the nonce transmitted in time_request,
o a MAC (generated with the cookie as key) for verification of all of the above data.

6.3.4. Procedure Overview of the Unicast Time Synchronization Exchange

For a unicast time synchronization exchange, the following steps are performed:

1. The client sends a time_request message to the server. The client MUST save the included nonce and the transmit_timestamp (from the time synchronization data) as a correlated pair for later verification steps.

2. Upon receipt of a time_request message, the server re-calculates the cookie, then computes the necessary time synchronization data and constructs a time_response message as given in Section 6.3.3.

3. It awaits a reply in the form of a time_response message. Upon receipt, it checks:

   * that the transmitted version number matches the one negotiated previously,
   * that the transmitted nonce belongs to a previous time_request message,
* that the transmit_timestamp in that time_request message
  matches the corresponding time stamp from the synchronization
  data received in the time_response, and

* that the appended MAC verifies the received synchronization
  data, version number and nonce.

If at least one of the first three checks fails (i.e. if the
version number does not match, if the client has never used the
nonce transmitted in the time_response message, or if it has used
the nonce with initial time synchronization data different from
that in the response), then the client MUST ignore this
time_response message. If the MAC is invalid, the client MUST do
one of the following: abort the run or go back to step 5 (because
the cookie might have changed due to a server seed refresh). If
both checks are successful, the client SHOULD continue time
synchronization by going back to step 7.

+-----------------------+
| o Re-generate cookie  |
| o Assemble response   |
| o Generate MAC        |
+-----------------------+

Server ----------------------------------------------->
     
<---+->

Client ----------------------------------------------->

Procedure for unicast time synchronization exchange.

6.4. Broadcast Parameter Messages

In this message exchange, the client receives the necessary
information to execute the TESLA protocol in a secured broadcast
association. The client can only initiate a secure broadcast
association after successful association and cookie exchanges and
only if it has made sure that its clock is roughly synchronized to
the server's.
See Appendix B for more details on TESLA.

6.4.1. Goals of the Broadcast Parameter Exchange

The broadcast parameter exchange

- provides the client with all the information necessary to process broadcast time synchronization messages from the server, and
- guarantees authenticity, integrity and freshness of the broadcast parameters to the client.

6.4.2. Message Type: "client_bpar"

This message is sent by the client in order to establish a secured time broadcast association with the server. It contains

- the NTS message ID "client_bpar",
- the NTS version number negotiated during association,
- a nonce,
- the client’s hostname, and
- the signature algorithm negotiated during association.

6.4.3. Message Type: "server_bpar"

This message is sent by the server upon receipt of a client_bpar message during the broadcast loop of the server. It contains

- the NTS message ID "server_bpar",
- the version number as transmitted in the client_bpar message,
- the nonce transmitted in client_bpar,
- the one-way functions used for building the key chain, and
- the disclosure schedule of the keys. This contains:
  - the last key of the key chain,
  - time interval duration,
  - the disclosure delay (number of intervals between use and disclosure of a key),
* the time at which the next time interval will start, and
* the next interval’s associated index.

The message also contains a signature signed by the server with its private key, verifying all the data listed above.

### 6.4.4. Procedure Overview of the Broadcast Parameter Exchange

A broadcast parameter exchange consists of the following steps:

1. The client sends a client_bpar message to the server. It MUST remember the transmitted values for the nonce, the version number and the signature algorithm.

2. Upon receipt of a client_bpar message, the server constructs and sends a server_bpar message as described in Section 6.4.3.

3. The client waits for a reply in the form of a server_bpar message, on which it performs the following checks:

   * The message must contain all the necessary information for the TESLA protocol, as listed in Section 6.4.3.

   * The message must contain a nonce belonging to a client_bpar message that the client has previously sent.

   * Verification of the message’s signature.

   If any information is missing or if the server’s signature cannot be verified, the client MUST abort the broadcast run. If all checks are successful, the client MUST remember all the broadcast parameters received for later checks.
Procedure for unicast time synchronization exchange.

6.5. Broadcast Time Synchronization Exchange

Via a stream of messages of the following message type, the server keeps sending broadcast time synchronization messages to all participating clients.

6.5.1. Goals of the Broadcast Time Synchronization Exchange

The broadcast time synchronization exchange:

- transmits (broadcast) time synchronization data from the server to the client as specified by the appropriate time synchronization protocol,
- guarantees to the client that the received synchronization data has arrived in a timely manner as required by the TESLA protocol and is trustworthy enough to be stored for later checks,
- additionally guarantees authenticity of a certain broadcast synchronization message in the client's storage.

6.5.2. Message Type: "server_broad"

This message is sent by the server over the course of its broadcast schedule. It is part of any broadcast association. It contains

- the NTS message ID "server_broad",
the version number that the server is working under,
- time broadcast data,
- the index that belongs to the current interval (and therefore identifies the current, yet undisclosed, key),
- the disclosed key of the previous disclosure interval (current time interval minus disclosure delay),
- a MAC, calculated with the key for the current time interval, verifying
  * the message ID,
  * the version number, and
  * the time data.

### 6.5.3. Procedure Overview of Broadcast Time Synchronization Exchange

A broadcast time synchronization message exchange consists of the following steps:

1. The server follows the TESLA protocol by regularly sending server_broad messages as described in Section 6.5.2, adhering to its own disclosure schedule.

2. The client awaits time synchronization data in the form of a server_broadcast message. Upon receipt, it performs the following checks:

   * Proof that the MAC is based on a key that is not yet disclosed (packet timeliness). This is achieved via a combination of checks. First, the disclosure schedule is used, which requires loose time synchronization. If this is successful, the client obtains a stronger guarantee via a key check exchange (see below). If its timeliness is verified, the packet will be buffered for later authentication. Otherwise, the client MUST discard it. Note that the time information included in the packet will not be used for synchronization until its authenticity could also be verified.

   * The client checks that it does not already know the disclosed key. Otherwise, the client SHOULD discard the packet to avoid a buffer overrun. If this check is successful, the client ensures that the disclosed key belongs to the one-way key chain by applying the one-way function until equality with a
previous disclosed key is shown. If it is falsified, the client MUST discard the packet.

* If the disclosed key is legitimate, then the client verifies the authenticity of any packet that it has received during the corresponding time interval. If authenticity of a packet is verified, then it is released from the buffer and its time information can be utilized. If the verification fails, then authenticity is not given. In this case, the client MUST request authentic time from the server by means other than broadcast messages. Also, the client MUST re-initialize the broadcast sequence with a "client_bpar" message if the one-way key chain expires, which it can check via the disclosure schedule.


Server ------------------------------->
\   \ server_
 \   broad
|---
Client ------------------------------->
< Broadcast > <- Client-side ->
time sync.       validity and
exchange         timeliness
                  checks

Procedure for broadcast time synchronization exchange.

6.6. Broadcast Keycheck

This message exchange is performed for an additional check of packet timeliness in the course of the TESLA scheme, see Appendix B.

6.6.1. Goals of the Broadcast Keycheck Exchange

The keycheck exchange:

- guarantees to the client that the key belonging to the respective TESLA interval communicated in the exchange had not been disclosed before the client_keycheck message was sent.

- guarantees to the client the timeliness of any broadcast packet secured with this key if it arrived before client_keycheck was sent.
6.6.2. Message Type: "client_keycheck"

A message of this type is sent by the client in order to initiate an additional check of packet timeliness for the TESLA scheme. It contains

- the NTS message ID "client_keycheck",
- the NTS version number negotiated during association,
- a nonce,
- an interval number from the TESLA disclosure schedule,
- the hash algorithm H negotiated during association, and
- the hash of the client’s certificate under H.

6.6.3. Message Type: "server_keycheck"

A message of this type is sent by the server upon receipt of a client_keycheck message during the broadcast loop of the server. Prior to this, the server MUST recalculate the client’s cookie by using the hash of the client’s certificate and the transmitted hash algorithm. It contains

- the NTS message ID "server_keycheck"
- the version number as transmitted in "client_keycheck",
- the nonce transmitted in the client_keycheck message,
- the interval number transmitted in the client_keycheck message, and
- a MAC (generated with the cookie as key) for verification of all of the above data.

6.6.4. Procedure Overview of the Broadcast Keycheck Exchange

A broadcast keycheck message exchange consists of the following steps:

1. The client sends a client_keycheck message. It MUST memorize the nonce and the time interval number that it sends as a correlated pair.
2. Upon receipt of a client_keycheck message, the server looks up whether it has already disclosed the key associated with the interval number transmitted in that message. If it has not disclosed it, it constructs and sends the appropriate server_keycheck message as described in Section 6.6.3. For more details, see also Appendix B.

3. The client awaits a reply in the form of a server_keycheck message. On receipt, it performs the following checks:

* that the transmitted version number matches the one negotiated previously,
* that the transmitted nonce belongs to a previous client_keycheck message,
* that the TESLA interval number in that client_keycheck message matches the corresponding interval number from the server_keycheck, and
* that the appended MAC verifies the received data.

```
+----------------------+
| o Assemble response  |
| o Re-generate cookie |
| o Generate MAC       |
+----------------------+
```

Procedure for extended broadcast time synchronization exchange.

7. Server Seed Considerations

The server has to calculate a random seed which has to be kept secret. The server MUST generate a seed for each supported hash algorithm, see Section 8.1.
According to the requirements in [RFC7384], the server MUST refresh each server seed periodically. Consequently, the cookie memorized by the client becomes obsolete. In this case, the client cannot verify the MAC attached to subsequent time response messages and has to respond accordingly by re-initiating the protocol with a cookie request (Section 6.2).

8. Hash Algorithms and MAC Generation

8.1. Hash Algorithms

Hash algorithms are used at different points: calculation of the cookie and the MAC, and hashing of the client’s certificate. The client and the server negotiate a hash algorithm H during the association message exchange (Section 6.1) at the beginning. The selected algorithm H is used for all hashing processes in that run.

In the TESLA scheme, hash algorithms are used as pseudo-random functions to construct the one-way key chain. Here, the utilized hash algorithm is communicated by the server and is non-negotiable.

Note:

Any hash algorithm is prone to be compromised in the future. A successful attack on a hash algorithm would enable any NTS client to derive the server seed from its own cookie. Therefore, the server MUST have separate seed values for its different supported hash algorithms. This way, knowledge gained from an attack on a hash algorithm H can at least only be used to compromise such clients who use hash algorithm H as well.

8.2. MAC Calculation

For the calculation of the MAC, client and server use a Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) approach [RFC2104]. The HMAC is generated with the hash algorithm specified by the client (see Section 8.1).

9. IANA Considerations

10. Security Considerations

10.1. Privacy

The payload of time synchronization protocol packets of two-way time transfer approaches like NTP and PTP consists basically of time stamps, which are not considered secret [RFC7384]. Therefore, encryption of the time synchronization protocol packet’s payload is
not considered in this document. However, an attacker can exploit the exchange of time synchronization protocol packets for topology detection and inference attacks as described in [I-D.iab-privsec-confidentiality-threat]. To make such attacks more difficult, that draft recommends the encryption of the packet payload. Yet, in the case of time synchronization protocols the confidentiality protection of time synchronization packet’s payload is of secondary role since the packets metadata (IP addresses, port numbers, possibly packet size and regular sending intervals) carry more information than the payload. To enhance the privacy of the time synchronization partners, the usage of tunnel protocols such as IPsec and MACsec, where applicable, is therefore more suited than confidentiality protection of the payload.

10.2. Initial Verification of the Server Certificates

The client has to verify the validity of the certificates during the certification message exchange (Section 6.1.3). Since it generally has no reliable time during this initial communication phase, it is impossible to verify the period of validity of the certificates. To solve this chicken-and-egg problem, the client has to rely on external means.

10.3. Revocation of Server Certificates

According to Section 7, it is the client’s responsibility to initiate a new association with the server after the server’s certificate expires. To this end, the client reads the expiration date of the certificate during the certificate message exchange (Section 6.1.3). Furthermore, certificates may also be revoked prior to the normal expiration date. To increase security the client MAY periodically verify the state of the server’s certificate via OCSP.

10.4. Mitigating Denial-of-Service for broadcast packets

TESLA authentication buffers packets for delayed authentication. This makes the protocol vulnerable to flooding attacks, causing the client to buffer excessive numbers of packets. To add stronger DoS protection to the protocol, the client and the server use the "not re-using keys" scheme of TESLA as pointed out in Section 3.7.2 of RFC 4082 [RFC4082]. In this scheme the server never uses a key for the MAC generation more than once. Therefore, the client can discard any packet that contains a disclosed key it already knows, thus preventing memory flooding attacks.

Note that an alternative approach to enhance TESLA’s resistance against DoS attacks involves the addition of a group MAC to each packet. This requires the exchange of an additional shared key.
common to the whole group. This adds additional complexity to the protocol and hence is currently not considered in this document.

10.5. Delay Attack

In a packet delay attack, an adversary with the ability to act as a MITM delays time synchronization packets between client and server asymmetrically [RFC7384]. This prevents the client from accurately measuring the network delay, and hence its time offset to the server [Mizrahi]. The delay attack does not modify the content of the exchanged synchronization packets. Therefore, cryptographic means do not provide a feasible way to mitigate this attack. However, several non-cryptographic precautions can be taken in order to detect this attack.

1. Usage of multiple time servers: this enables the client to detect the attack, provided that the adversary is unable to delay the synchronization packets between the majority of servers. This approach is commonly used in NTP to exclude incorrect time servers [RFC5905].

2. Multiple communication paths: The client and server utilize different paths for packet exchange as described in the I-D [I-D.shpiner-multi-path-synchronization]. The client can detect the attack, provided that the adversary is unable to manipulate the majority of the available paths [Shpiner]. Note that this approach is not yet available, neither for NTP nor for PTP.

3. Usage of an encrypted connection: the client exchanges all packets with the time server over an encrypted connection (e.g. IPsec). This measure does not mitigate the delay attack, but it makes it more difficult for the adversary to identify the time synchronization packets.

4. For unicast-type messages: Introduction of a threshold value for the delay time of the synchronization packets. The client can discard a time server if the packet delay time of this time server is larger than the threshold value.

Additional provision against delay attacks has to be taken for broadcast-type messages. This mode relies on the TESLA scheme which is based on the requirement that a client and the broadcast server are loosely time synchronized. Therefore, a broadcast client has to establish time synchronization with its broadcast server before it starts utilizing broadcast messages for time synchronization.

One possible way to achieve this initial synchronization is to establish a unicast association with its broadcast server until time
synchronization and calibration of the packet delay time is achieved. After that, the client can establish a broadcast association with the broadcast server and utilizes TESLA to verify integrity and authenticity of any received broadcast packets.

An adversary who is able to delay broadcast packets can cause a time adjustment at the receiving broadcast clients. If the adversary delays broadcast packets continuously, then the time adjustment will accumulate until the loose time synchronization requirement is violated, which breaks the TESLA scheme. To mitigate this vulnerability the security condition in TESLA has to be supplemented by an additional check in which the client, upon receipt of a broadcast message, verifies the status of the corresponding key via a unicast message exchange with the broadcast server (see Appendix B.4 for a detailed description of this check). Note that a broadcast client should also apply the above-mentioned precautions as far as possible.

10.6. Random Number Generation

At various points of the protocol, the generation of random numbers is required. The employed methods of generation need to be cryptographically secure. See [RFC4086] for guidelines concerning this topic.

11. Acknowledgements

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12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


Appendix A. (informative) TICTOC Security Requirements

The following table compares the NTS specifications against the TICTOC security requirements [RFC7384].

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Comparison of NTS specification against Security Requirements of Time Protocols in Packet Switched Networks (RFC 7384)

Appendix B. (normative) Using TESLA for Broadcast-Type Messages

For broadcast-type messages, NTS adopts the TESLA protocol with some customizations. This appendix provides details on the generation and usage of the one-way key chain collected and assembled from [RFC4082]. Note that NTS uses the "not re-using keys" scheme of TESLA as described in Section 3.7.2. of [RFC4082].

B.1. Server Preparation

server setup:

1. The server determines a reasonable upper bound $B$ on the network delay between itself and an arbitrary client, measured in milliseconds.

2. It determines the number $n+1$ of keys in the one-way key chain. This yields the number $n$ of keys that are usable to authenticate broadcast packets. This number $n$ is therefore also the number of time intervals during which the server can send authenticated broadcast messages before it has to calculate a new key chain.

3. It divides time into $n$ uniform intervals $I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_n$. Each of these time intervals has length $L$, measured in milliseconds. In order to fulfill the requirement 3.7.2. of RFC 4082, the time interval $L$ has to be shorter than the time interval between the broadcast messages.

*) See discussion in Section 10.5.
4. The server generates a random key $K_n$.

5. Using a one-way function $F$, the server generates a one-way chain of $n+1$ keys $K_0, K_1, ..., K_n$ according to

   $$K_i = F(K_{i+1}).$$

6. Using another one-way function $F'$, it generates a sequence of $n$ MAC keys $K'_0, K'_1, ..., K'_{n-1}$ according to

   $$K'_i = F'(K_i).$$

7. Each MAC key $K'_i$ is assigned to the time interval $I_i$.

8. The server determines the key disclosure delay $d$, which is the number of intervals between using a key and disclosing it. Note that although security is provided for all choices $d>0$, the choice still makes a difference:

   * If $d$ is chosen too short, the client might discard packets because it fails to verify that the key used for its MAC has not yet been disclosed.

   * If $d$ is chosen too long, the received packets have to be buffered for an unnecessarily long time before they can be verified by the client and be subsequently utilized for time synchronization.

   The server SHOULD calculate $d$ according to

   $$d = \text{ceil}( \frac{2*B}{L} ) + 1,$$

   where $\text{ceil}$ yields the smallest integer greater than or equal to its argument.
A schematic explanation of the TESLA protocol’s one-way key chain

B.2. Client Preparation

A client needs the following information in order to participate in a TESLA broadcast:

- One key $K_i$ from the one-way key chain, which has to be authenticated as belonging to the server. Typically, this will be $K_0$.

- The disclosure schedule of the keys. This consists of:
  * the length $n$ of the one-way key chain,
  * the length $L$ of the time intervals $I_1$, $I_2$, ..., $I_n$,
  * the starting time $T_i$ of an interval $I_i$. Typically this is the starting time $T_1$ of the first interval;
  * the disclosure delay $d$.

- The one-way function $F$ used to recursively derive the keys in the one-way key chain,

- The second one-way function $F'$ used to derive the MAC keys $K'_0$, $K'_1$, ..., $K'_n$ from the keys in the one-way chain.

- An upper bound $D_t$ on how far its own clock is "behind" that of the server.
Note that if $D_t$ is greater than $(d - 1) * L$, then some authentic packets might be discarded. If $D_t$ is greater than $d * L$, then all authentic packets will be discarded. In the latter case, the client should not participate in the broadcast, since there will be no benefit in doing so.

B.3. Sending Authenticated Broadcast Packets

During each time interval $I_i$, the server sends at most one authenticated broadcast packet $P_i$. Such a packet consists of:

- a message $M_i$,
- the index $i$ (in case a packet arrives late),
- a MAC authenticating the message $M_i$, with $K'_i$ used as key,
- the key $K_{(i-d)}$, which is included for disclosure.

B.4. Authentication of Received Packets

When a client receives a packet $P_i$ as described above, it first checks that it has not already received a packet with the same disclosed key. This is done to avoid replay/flooding attacks. A packet that fails this test is discarded.

Next, the client begins to check the packet’s timeliness by ensuring that according to the disclosure schedule and with respect to the upper bound $D_t$ determined above, the server cannot have disclosed the key $K_i$ yet. Specifically, it needs to check that the server’s clock cannot read a time that is in time interval $I_{(i+d)}$ or later. Since it works under the assumption that the server’s clock is not more than $D_t$ “ahead” of the client’s clock, the client can calculate an upper bound $t_i$ for the server’s clock at the time when $P_i$ arrived. This upper bound $t_i$ is calculated according to

$$t_i = R + D_t,$$

where $R$ is the client’s clock at the arrival of $P_i$. This implies that at the time of arrival of $P_i$, the server could have been in interval $I_x$ at most, with

$$x = \text{floor}((t_i - T_1) / L) + 1,$$

where floor gives the greatest integer less than or equal to its argument. The client now needs to verify that

$$x < i + d$$
is valid (see also Section 3.5 of [RFC4082]). If it is falsified, it is discarded.

If the check above is successful, the client performs another more rigorous check: it sends a key check request to the server (in the form of a client_keycheck message), asking explicitly if K_i has already been disclosed. It remembers the time stamp t_check of the sending time of that request as well as the nonce it used correlated with the interval number i. If it receives an answer from the server stating that K_i has not yet been disclosed and it is able to verify the HMAC on that response, then it deduces that K_i was undisclosed at t_check and therefore also at R. In this case, the client accepts P_i as timely.

Next the client verifies that a newly disclosed key K_{i-d} belongs to the one-way key chain. To this end, it applies the one-way function F to K_{i-d} until it can verify the identity with an earlier disclosed key (see Clause 3.5 in RFC 4082, item 3).

Next the client verifies that the transmitted time value s_i belongs to the time interval I_i, by checking

\[ T_i \leq s_i \text{, and} \]
\[ s_i < T_{i+1}. \]

If it is falsified, the packet MUST be discarded and the client MUST reinitialize its broadcast module by performing time synchronization by other means than broadcast messages, and it MUST perform a new broadcast parameter exchange (because a falsification of this check yields that the packet was not generated according to protocol, which suggests an attack).

If a packet P_i passes all the tests listed above, it is stored for later authentication. Also, if at this time there is a package with index i-d already buffered, then the client uses the disclosed key K_{i-d} to derive K'_{i-d} and uses that to check the MAC included in package P_{i-d}. Upon success, it regards M_{i-d} as authenticated.

Appendix C. (informative) Dependencies
### Issuer | Type | Owner | Description
--- | --- | --- | ---
Server PKI | private key (signature) | server | Used for server_assoc, server_cook, server_bpar. The server uses the private key to sign these messages. The client uses the public key to verify them.
| public key (signature) | client | The certificate is used in server_assoc messages, for verifying authentication and (optionally) authorization.
| certificate | server | The certificate is used in server_assoc messages, for verifying authentication and (optionally) authorization.

Client PKI | private key (encryption) | client | The server uses the client’s public key to encrypt the content of server_cook messages. The client uses the private key to decrypt them. The certificate is sent in client_cook messages, where it is used for transportation of the public key as well as (optionally) for verification of client authorization.
| public key (encryption) | server |
| certificate | client |
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Abstract

This document describes how to use the measures described in the Network Time Security (NTS) specification to secure time synchronization with servers using the Network Time Protocol (NTP).

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

One of the most popular time synchronization protocols, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [RFC5905], currently does not provide adequate intrinsic security precautions. The Network Time Security draft [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security] specifies security measures which can be used to enable time synchronization protocols to verify authenticity of the time server and integrity of the time synchronization protocol packets.

This document provides detail on how to specifically use those measures to secure time synchronization between NTP clients and servers.

2. Objectives

The objectives of the NTS specification are as follows:

- **Authenticity**: NTS enables an NTP client to authenticate its time server(s).
- **Integrity**: NTS protects the integrity of NTP time synchronization protocol packets via a message authentication code (MAC).
- **Confidentiality**: NTS does not provide confidentiality protection of the time synchronization packets.
- **Authorization**: NTS optionally enables the server to verify the client’s authorization.
- **Request-Response-Consistency**: NTS enables a client to match an incoming response to a request it has sent. NTS also enables the client to deduce from the response whether its request to the server has arrived without alteration.
- **Modes of operation**: Both the unicast and the broadcast mode of NTP are supported.
- **Hybrid mode**: Both secure and insecure communication modes are possible for both NTP servers and clients.
- **Compatibility**:
  - Unsecured NTP associations are not be affected.
  - An NTP server that does not support NTS are not affected by NTS-secured authentication requests.
3. Terms and Abbreviations

MITM  Man In The Middle
NTP   Network Time Protocol [RFC5905]
NTS   Network Time Security
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
MAC   Message Authentication Code
HMAC  Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code

4. Overview of NTS-Secured NTP

4.1. Symmetric and Client/Server Mode

The server does not keep a state of the client. NTS applies X.509 certificates to verify the authenticity of the time server and to exchange a symmetric key, the so-called cookie. The "association" and "cookie" message exchanges are utilized for this. In subsequent "unicast time synchronization" message exchanges, the cookie is then used to protect authenticity and integrity of NTP unicast time synchronization packets. This is achieved by a MAC attached to each time synchronization packet.

4.2. Broadcast Mode

After the client has accomplished the necessary initial time synchronization via client-server mode, a "broadcast parameter" message exchange is utilized to communicate the necessary broadcast parameters to the client. Subsequently, "broadcast time synchronization" message exchanges are utilized in combination with optional "broadcast keycheck" exchanges to protect authenticity and integrity of NTP broadcast time synchronization packets. This is also achieved by MACs.

5. Protocol Sequence

5.1. The Client

5.1.1. The Client in Unicast Mode

For a unicast run, the client performs the following steps:
1. It sends a client_assoc message to the server. It MUST keep the transmitted nonce as well as the values for the version number and algorithms available for later checks.

2. It waits for a reply in the form of a server_assoc message. After receipt of the message it performs the following checks:
   * The client checks that the message contains a conforming version number.
   * It checks that the nonce sent back by the server matches the one transmitted in client_assoc,
   * It also verifies that the server has chosen the encryption and hash algorithms from its proposal sent in the client_assoc message and that this proposal was not altered.
   * Furthermore, it performs authenticity checks on the certificate chain and the signature.

   If one of the checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.

Discussion:

   Note that by performing the above message exchange and checks, the client validates the authenticity of its immediate NTP server only. It does not recursively validate the authenticity of each NTP server on the time synchronization chain. Recursive authentication (and authorization) as formulated in RFC 7384 [RFC7384] depends on the chosen trust anchor.

3. Next it sends a client_cook message to the server. The client MUST save the included nonce until the reply has been processed.

4. It awaits a reply in the form of a server_cook message; upon receipt it executes the following actions:
   * It verifies that the received version number matches the one negotiated beforehand.
   * It verifies the signature using the server’s public key. The signature has to authenticate the encrypted data.
   * It decrypts the encrypted data with its own private key.
   * It checks that the decrypted message is of the expected format: the concatenation of a 128 bit nonce and a 128 bit cookie.
It verifies that the received nonce matches the nonce sent in the client_cook message.

If one of those checks fails, the client MUST abort the run.

5. The client sends a time_request message to the server. The client MUST save the included nonce and the transmit_timestamp (from the time synchronization data) as a correlated pair for later verification steps.

6. It awaits a reply in the form of a time_response message. Upon receipt, it checks:

* that the transmitted version number matches the one negotiated previously,
* that the transmitted nonce belongs to a previous time_request message,
* that the transmit_timestamp in that time_request message matches the corresponding time stamp from the synchronization data received in the time_response, and
* that the appended MAC verifies the received synchronization data, version number and nonce.

If at least one of the first three checks fails (i.e. if the version number does not match, if the client has never used the nonce transmitted in the time_response message, or if it has used the nonce with initial time synchronization data different from that in the response), then the client MUST ignore this time_response message. If the MAC is invalid, the client MUST do one of the following: abort the run or go back to step 5 (because the cookie might have changed due to a server seed refresh). If both checks are successful, the client SHOULD continue time synchronization by repeating the exchange of time_request and time_response messages.

The client’s behavior in unicast mode is also expressed in Figure 1.

5.1.2. The Client in Broadcast Mode

To establish a secure broadcast association with a broadcast server, the client MUST initially authenticate the broadcast server and securely synchronize its time with it up to an upper bound for its time offset in unicast mode. After that, the client performs the following steps:
1. It sends a client_bpar message to the server. It MUST remember the transmitted values for the nonce, the version number and the signature algorithm.

2. It waits for a reply in the form of a server_bpar message after which it performs the following checks:

   * The message must contain all the necessary information for the TESLA protocol, as specified for a server_bpar message.

   * The message must contain a nonce belonging to a client_bpar message that the client has previously sent.

   * Verification of the message’s signature.

If any information is missing or if the server’s signature cannot be verified, the client MUST abort the broadcast run. If all checks are successful, the client MUST remember all the broadcast parameters received for later checks.

3. The client awaits time synchronization data in the form of a server_broadcast message. Upon receipt, it performs the following checks:

   1. Proof that the MAC is based on a key that is not yet disclosed (packet timeliness). This is achieved via a combination of checks. First, the disclosure schedule is used, which requires loose time synchronization. If this is successful, the client obtains a stronger guarantee via a key check exchange: it sends a client_keycheck message and waits for the appropriate response. Note that it needs to memorize the nonce and the time interval number that it sends as a correlated pair. For more detail on both of the mentioned timeliness checks, see [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]. If its timeliness is verified, the packet will be buffered for later authentication. Otherwise, the client MUST discard it. Note that the time information included in the packet will not be used for synchronization until its authenticity could also be verified.

   2. The client checks that it does not already know the disclosed key. Otherwise, the client SHOULD discard the packet to avoid a buffer overrun. If verified, the client ensures that the disclosed key belongs to the one-way key chain by applying the one-way function until equality with a previous disclosed key is shown. If it is falsified, the client MUST discard the packet.
3. If the disclosed key is legitimate, then the client verifies the authenticity of any packet that it has received during the corresponding time interval. If authenticity of a packet is verified it is released from the buffer and the packet’s time information can be utilized. If the verification fails, then authenticity is no longer given. In this case, the client MUST request authentic time from the server by means of a unicast time request message. Also, the client MUST re-initialize the broadcast sequence with a "client_bpar" message if the one-way key chain expires, which it can check via the disclosure schedule.


The client MUST restart the broadcast sequence with a client_bpar message ([I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]) if the one-way key chain expires.

The client’s behavior in broadcast mode can also be seen in Figure 2.

5.2. The Server

5.2.1. The Server in Unicast Mode

To support unicast mode, the server MUST be ready to perform the following actions:

- Upon receipt of a client_assoc message, the server constructs and sends a reply in the form of a server_assoc message as described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security].

- Upon receipt of a client_cook message, the server checks whether it supports the given cryptographic algorithms. It then calculates the cookie according to the formula given in Section 4.1. With this, it MUST construct a server_cook message as described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security].

- Upon receipt of a time_request message, the server re-calculates the cookie, then computes the necessary time synchronization data and constructs a time_response message as given in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security].

The server MUST refresh its server seed periodically (see [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]).
5.2.2. The Server in Broadcast Mode

A broadcast server MUST also support unicast mode in order to provide the initial time synchronization, which is a precondition for any broadcast association. To support NTS broadcast, the server MUST additionally be ready to perform the following actions:

- Upon receipt of a client_bpar message, the server constructs and sends a server_bpar message as described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security].

- Upon receipt of a client_keycheck message, the server looks up whether it has already disclosed the key associated with the interval number transmitted in that message. If it has not disclosed it, it constructs and sends the appropriate server_keycheck message as described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security]. For more details, see also [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security].

- The server follows the TESLA protocol in all other aspects, by regularly sending server_broad messages as described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security], adhering to its own disclosure schedule.

It is also the server’s responsibility to watch for the expiration date of the one-way key chain and generate a new key chain accordingly.

6. Implementation Notes: ASN.1 Structures and Use of the CMS

This section presents some hints about the structures of the communication packets for the different message types when one wishes to implement NTS for NTP. See document [I-D.ietf-ntp-cms-for-nts-message] for descriptions of the archetypes for CMS structures as well as for the ASN.1 structures that are referenced here.

6.1. Unicast Messages

6.1.1. Association Messages

6.1.1.1. Message Type: "client_assoc"

This message is realized as an NTP packet with an extension field which holds an "NTS-Plain" archetype CMS structure. This structure contains in its core an NTS message object of the type "ClientAssociationData", which holds all the data necessary for the NTS security mechanisms.
6.1.1.2. Message Type: "server_assoc"

Like "client_assoc", this message is realized as an NTP packet with an extension field which holds an "NTS-Plain" archetype CMS structure. This structure contains in its core an NTS message object of the type "ServerAssociationData". The latter holds all the data necessary for NTS.

6.1.2. Cookie Messages

6.1.2.1. Message Type: "client_cook"

This message type is realized as an NTP packet with an extension field which holds a CMS structure of archetype "NTS-Certified", containing in its core an NTS message object of the type "ClientCookieData". The latter holds all the data necessary for the NTS security mechanisms.

6.1.2.2. Message Type: "server_cook"

This message type is realized as an NTP packet with an extension field containing a CMS structure of archetype "NTS-Signed-and-Encrypted". The NTS message object in that structure is a "ServerCookieData" object, which holds all data required by NTS for this message type.

6.1.3. Time Synchronization Messages

6.1.3.1. Message Type: "time_request"

This message type is realized as an NTP packet which actually contains regular NTP time synchronization data, as an unsecured NTP packet from a client to a server would. Furthermore, the packet has an extension field which contains an ASN.1 object of type "TimeRequestSecurityData" (packed in a CMS structure of archetype "NTS-Plain"), whose structure is as follows:

6.1.3.2. Message Type: "time_response"

This message is also realized as an NTP packet with regular NTP time synchronization data. The packet also has an extension field which contains an ASN.1 object of type "TimeResponseSecurityData". Finally, this NTP packet has a MAC field which contains a Message Authentication Code generated over the whole packet (including the extension field).
6.2. Broadcast Messages

6.2.1. Broadcast Parameter Messages

6.2.1.1. Message Type: "client_bpar"

This first broadcast message is realized as an NTP packet which is empty except for an extension field which contains an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastParameterRequest" (packed in a CMS structure of archetype "CMS-Plain"). This is sufficient to transport all data specified by NTS.

6.2.1.2. Message Type: "server_bpar"

This message type is realized as an NTP packet whose extension field carries the necessary CMS structure (archetype: "NTS-Signed"). The NTS message object in this case is an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastParameterResponse".

6.2.2. Broadcast Time Synchronization Message

6.2.2.1. Message Type: "server_broad"

This message’s realization works via an NTP packet which carries regular NTP broadcast time data as well as an extension field, which contains an ASN.1 object of type "BroadcastTime" (packed in a CMS structure with archetype "NTS-Plain"). In addition to all this, this packet has a MAC field which contains a Message Authentication Code generated over the whole packet (including the extension field).

6.2.3. Broadcast Keycheck

6.2.3.1. Message Type: "client_keycheck"

This message is realized as an NTP packet with an extension field, which transports a CMS structure of archetype "NTS-Plain" containing an ASN.1 object of type "ClientKeyCheckSecurityData".

6.2.3.2. Message Type: "server_keycheck"

This message is also realized as an NTP packet with an extension field, which contains an ASN.1 object of type "ServerKeyCheckSecurityData" (packed in a CMS structure of archetype "NTS-Plain"). Additionally, this NTP packet has a MAC field which contains a Message Authentication Code generated over the whole packet (including the extension field).
7. Security Considerations

7.1. Usage of NTP Pools

The certification-based authentication scheme described in [I-D.ietf-ntp-network-time-security] is not applicable to the concept of NTP pools. Therefore, NTS is unable to provide secure usage of NTP pools.

7.2. Server Seed Lifetime

tbd

7.3. Supported Hash Algorithms

The list of the hash algorithms supported by the server has to fulfill the following requirements:

- it MUST NOT include SHA-1 or weaker algorithms,
- it MUST include SHA-256 or stronger algorithms.

8. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. Flow Diagrams of Client Behaviour
Figure 1: The client’s behavior in NTS unicast mode.
Figure 2: The client’s behaviour in NTS broadcast mode.
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Enterprise Profile for the Precision Time Protocol
With Mixed Multicast and Unicast Messages

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Abstract

This document describes a profile for the use of the Precision Time Protocol in an IPv4 or IPv6 Enterprise information system environment. The profile uses the End to End Delay Measurement Mechanism, allows both multicast and unicast Delay Request and Delay Response Messages.

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1. Introduction

The Precision Time Protocol ("PTP"), standardized in IEEE 1588, has been designed in its first version (IEEE 1588-2002) with the goal to minimize configuration on the participating nodes. Network communication was based solely on multicast messages, which unlike NTP did not require that a receiving node ("slave clock") in [IEEE1588] needs to know the identity of the time sources in the network (the Master Clocks).

The so-called "Best Master Clock Algorithm" ([IEEE1588] Clause 9.3), a mechanism that all participating PTP nodes must follow, set up strict rules for all members of a PTP domain to determine which node shall be the active sending time source (Master Clock). Although the multicast communication model has advantages in smaller networks, it complicated the application of PTP in larger networks, for example in environments like IP based telecommunication networks or financial data centers. It is considered inefficient that, even if the content of a message applies only to one receiver, it is forwarded by the underlying
network (IP) to all nodes, requiring them to spend network bandwidth and other resources like CPU cycles to drop the message.

The second revision of the standard (IEEE 1588-2008) is the current version (also known as PTPv2) and introduced the possibility to use unicast communication between the PTP nodes in order to overcome the limitation of using multicast messages for the bi-directional information exchange between PTP nodes. The unicast approach avoided that, in PTP domains with a lot of nodes, devices had to throw away up to 99% of the received multicast messages because they carried information for some other node. PTPv2 also introduced so-called "PTP profiles" ([IEEE1588] Clause 19.3). This construct allows organizations to specify selections of attribute values and optional features, simplifying the configuration of PTP nodes for a specific application. Instead of having to go through all possible parameters and configuration options and individually set them up, selecting a profile on a PTP node will set all the parameters that are specified in the profile to a defined value. If a PTP profile definition allows multiple values for a parameter, selection of the profile will set the profile-specific default value for this parameter. Parameters not allowing multiple values are set to the value defined in the PTP profile. A number of PTP features and functions are optional and a profile should also define which optional features of PTP are required, permitted or prohibited. It is possible to extend the PTP standard with a PTP profile by using the TLV mechanism of PTP (see [IEEE1588] Clause 13.4), defining an optional Best Master Clock Algorithm and a few other ways. PTP has its own management protocol (defined in [IEEE1588] Clause 15.2) but allows a PTP profile specify an alternative management mechanism, for example SNMP.

2. Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119 [RFC2119].

   In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying RFC-2119 significance.

3. Technical Terms

   Acceptable Master Table: A PTP Slave Clock may maintain a list of masters which it is willing to synchronize to.

   Alternate Master: A PTP Master Clock, which is not the Best Master, may act as a master with the Alternate Master flag set on the messages it sends.
Announce message: Contains the master clock properties of a Master clock. Used to determine the Best Master.

Best Master: A clock with a port in the master state, operating consistently with the Best Master Clock Algorithm.

Best Master Clock Algorithm: A method for determining which state a port of a PTP clock should be in. The algorithm works by identifying which of several PTP Master capable clocks is the best master. Clocks have priority to become the acting Grandmaster, based on the properties each Master Clock sends in its Announce Message.

Boundary Clock: A device with more than one PTP port. Generally boundary clocks will have one port in slave state to receive timing and then other ports in master state to re-distribute the timing.

Clock Identity: In IEEE 1588-2008 this is a 64-bit number assigned to each PTP clock which must be unique. Often the Ethernet MAC address is used since there is already an international infrastructure for assigning unique numbers to each device manufactured.

Domain: Every PTP message contains a domain number. Domains are treated as separate PTP systems in the network. Slaves, however, can combine the timing information derived from multiple domains.

End to End Delay Measurement Mechanism: A network delay measurement mechanism in PTP facilitated by an exchange of messages between a Master Clock and Slave Clock.

Grandmaster: the primary master clock within a domain of a PTP system

IEEE 1588: The timing and synchronization standard which defines PTP, and describes the node, system, and communication properties necessary to support PTP.

Master clock: a clock with at least one port in the master state.

NTP: Network Time Protocol, defined by RFC 5905, see [NTP].

Ordinary Clock: A clock that has a single Precision Time Protocol (PTP) port in a domain and maintains the timescale used in the domain. It may serve as a master clock, or be a slave clock.

Peer to Peer Delay Measurement Mechanism: A network delay measurement mechanism in PTP facilitated by an exchange of messages between adjacent devices in a network.

Preferred Master: A device intended to act primarily as the Grandmaster of a PTP system, or as a backup up to a Grandmaster.
PTP: The Precision Time Protocol, the timing and synchronization protocol define by IEEE 1588.

PTP port: An interface of a PTP clock with the network. Note that there may be multiple PTP ports running on one physical interface, for example a unicast slave which talks to several Grandmaster clocks in parallel.

PTPv2: Refers specifically to the second version of PTP defined by IEEE 1588-2008.

Rogue Master: A clock with a port in the master state, even though it should not be in the master state according to the Best Master Clock Algorithm, and does not set the alternate master flag.

Slave clock: a clock with at least one port in the slave state, and no ports in the master state.

Slave Only Clock: An Ordinary clock which cannot become a Master clock.

TLV: Type Length Value, a mechanism for extending messages in networked communications.

Transparent Clock. A device that measures the time taken for a PTP event message to transit the device and then updates the message with a correction for this transit time.

Unicast Discovery: A mechanism for PTP slaves to establish a unicast communication with PTP masters using a configures table of master IP addresses and Unicast Message Negotiation.

Unicast Negotiation: A mechanism in PTP for Slave Clocks to negotiate unicast Sync, announce and Delay Request Message Rates from a Master Clock.

4. Problem Statement

This document describes a version of PTP intended to work in large enterprise networks. Such networks are deployed, for example, in financial corporations. It is becoming increasingly common in such networks to perform distributed time tagged measurements, such as one-way packet latencies and cumulative delays on software systems spread across multiple computers. Furthermore there is often a desire to check the age of information time tagged by a different machine. To perform these measurements it is necessary to deliver a common precise time to multiple devices on a network. Accuracy currently required in the Financial Industry range from 100 microseconds to 500 nanoseconds to the Grandmaster. This profile does not specify timing performance requirements, but such requirements explain why the needs cannot always be met by NTP, as commonly implemented. Such accuracy cannot usually be achieved with a traditional time transfer such as NTP, without adding
non-standard customizations such as hardware time stamping, and on
path support. These features are currently part of PTP, or are
allowed by it. Because PTP has a complex range of features and
options it is necessary to create a profile for enterprise
networks to achieve interoperability between equipment
manufactured by different vendors.

Although enterprise networks can be large, it is becoming
increasingly common to deploy multicast protocols, even across
multiple subnets. For this reason it is desired to make use of
multicast whenever the information going to many destinations is
the same. It is also advantageous to send information which is
unique to one device as a unicast message. The latter can be
essential as the number of PTP slaves becomes hundreds or
thousands.

PTP devices operating in these networks need to be robust. This
includes the ability to ignore PTP messages which can be
identified as improper, and to have redundant sources of time.

5. Network Technology

This PTP profile SHALL operate only in networks characterized by
UDP [RFC768] over either IPv4 [RFC791] or IPv6 [RFC2460], as
described by Annexes D and E in [IEEE1588] respectively. If a
network contains both IPv4 and IPv6, then they SHALL be treated as
separate communication paths. Clocks which communicate using IPv4
can interact with clocks using IPv6 if there is an intermediary
device which simultaneously communicates with both IP versions. A
boundary clock might perform this function, for example. A PTP
domain SHALL use either IPv4 or IPv6 over a communication path,
but not both. The PTP system MAY include switches and routers.
These devices MAY be transparent clocks, boundary clocks, or
neither, in any combination. PTP Clocks MAY be Preferred Masters,
Ordinary Clocks, or Boundary Clocks. The ordinary clocks may be
Slave Only Clocks, or be master capable.

Note that clocks SHOULD always be identified by their clock ID and
not the IP or Layer 2 address. This is important in IPv6 networks
since Transparent clocks are required to change the source address
of any packet which they alter. In IPv4 networks some clocks
might be hidden behind a NAT, which hides their IP addresses from
the rest of the network. Note also that the use of NATs may place
limitations on the topology of PTP networks, depending on the port
forwarding scheme employed. Details of implementing PTP with NATs
are out of scope of this document.

Similar to NTP, PTP makes the assumption that the one way network
delay for Sync Messages and Delay Response Messages are the same.
When this is not true it can cause errors in the transfer of time
from the Master to the Slave. It is up to the system integrator to
design the network so that such effects do not prevent the PTP
system from meeting the timing requirements. The details of
network asymmetry are outside the scope of this document. See for example, [G8271].

6. Time Transfer and Delay Measurement

Master clocks, Transparent clocks and Boundary clocks MAY be either one-step clocks or two-step clocks. Slave clocks MUST support both behaviors. The End to End Delay Measurement Method MUST be used.

Note that, in IP networks, Sync messages and Delay Request messages exchanged between a master and slave do not necessarily traverse the same physical path. Thus, wherever possible, the network SHOULD be traffic engineered so that the forward and reverse routes traverse the same physical path. Traffic engineering techniques for path consistency are out of scope of this document.

Sync messages MUST be sent as PTP event multicast messages (UDP port 319) to the PTP primary IP address. Two step clocks SHALL send Follow-up messages as PTP general messages (UDP port 320). Announce messages MUST be sent as multicast messages (UDP port 320) to the PTP primary address. The PTP primary IP address is 224.0.1.129 for IPv4 and FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:181 for IPv6, where X can be a value between 0x0 and 0xF, see [IEEE1588] Annex E, Section E.3.

Delay Request Messages MAY be sent as either multicast or unicast PTP event messages. Master clocks SHALL respond to multicast Delay Request messages with multicast Delay Response PTP general messages. Master clocks SHALL respond to unicast Delay Request PTP event messages with unicast Delay Response PTP general messages. This allow for the use of Ordinary clocks which do not support the Enterprise Profile, as long as they are slave Only Clocks.

Clocks SHOULD include support for multiple domains. The purpose is to support multiple simultaneous masters for redundancy. Leaf devices (non-forwarding devices) can use timing information from multiple masters by combining information from multiple instantiations of a PTP stack, each operating in a different domain. Redundant sources of timing can be ensembled, and/or compared to check for faulty master clocks. The use of multiple simultaneous masters will help mitigate faulty masters reporting as healthy, network delay asymmetry, and security problems. Security problems include man-in-the-middle attacks such as delay attacks, packet interception / manipulation attacks. Assuming the path to each master is different, failures malicious or otherwise would have to happen at more than one path simultaneously. Whenever feasible, the underlying network transport technology SHOULD be configured so that timing messages in different domains traverse different network paths.
7. Default Message Rates

The Sync, Announce and Delay Request default message rates SHALL each be once per second. The Sync and Delay Request message rates MAY be set to other values, but not less than once every 128 seconds, and not more than 128 messages per second. The Announce message rate SHALL NOT be changed from the default value. The Announce Receipt Timeout Interval SHALL be three Announce Intervals for Preferred Masters, and four Announce Intervals for all other masters. Unicast Discovery and Unicast Message Negotiation options MUST NOT be utilized.

8. Requirements for Master Clocks

Master clocks SHALL obey the standard Best Master Clock Algorithm from [IEEE1588]. PTP systems using this profile MAY support multiple simultaneous Grandmasters as long as each active Grandmaster is operating in a different PTP domain.

A port of a clock SHALL NOT be in the master state unless the clock has a current value for the number of UTC leap seconds. A clock with a port in the master state SHOULD indicate the maximum adjustment to its internal clock within one sync interval. The maximum phase adjustment is indicated in the Enterprise Profile announce TLV field for Maximum Phase Adjustment.

The Announce Messages SHALL include a TLV which indicates that the clock is operating in the Enterprise Profile. The TLV shall have the following structure:

TLV Type (Enumeration16): ORGANIZATION_EXTENSION value = 0003 hex
Length Field (UInteger16): value = 10. The number of TLV octets
Organization Unique Identifier (3 Octets): The Organization ID value for IETF assigned by IEEE = 00005Ehex
IETF Profile number (UInteger8): value = 1
Revision number (UInteger8): value = 1
Port Number (UInteger16): The Port Number of the port transmitting the TLV. The all-ones Port Number, with value FFFFhex, is used to indicate that the identified profile is applicable to all ports on the clock.

Maximum Absolute Phase Adjustment Value within one sync interval (UInteger16): value
Maximum Phase Adjustment Units (Enumeration8):
Value 0 = unknown
Value 1 = seconds
Value 3 = milliseconds
Value 6 = microseconds
Value 9 = nanoseconds
Value 12 = picoseconds
Value 15 = femtoseconds
All other values reserved for future use

Slaves can use the Maximum Phase Adjustment to determine if the
clock is slewing to rapidly for the applications which are of
interest. For example if the clock set by slave is used to
measure time intervals then it might be desired that that the
amount which the time changes during the intervals is limited.

9. Requirements for Slave Clocks

Slave clocks MUST be able to operate properly in a network which
contains multiple Masters in multiple domains. Slaves SHOULD make
use of information from the all Masters in their clock control
subsystems. Slave Clocks MUST be able to operate properly in the
presence of a Rogue Master. Slaves SHOULD NOT Synchronize to a
Master which is not the Best Master in its domain. Slaves will
continue to recognize a Best Master for the duration of the
Announce Time Out Interval. Slaves MAY use an Acceptable Master
Table. If a Master is not an Acceptable Master, then the Slave
MUST NOT synchronize to it. Note that IEEE 1588-2008 requires
slave clocks to support both two-step or one-step Master clocks.
See [IEEE1588], section 11.2.

Since Announce messages are sent as multicast messages slaves can
obtain the IP addresses of master from the Announce messages. Note
that the IP source addresses of Sync and Follow-up messages may
have been replaced by the source addresses of a transparent clock,
so slaves MUST send Delay Request messages to the IP address in the
Announce message. Sync and Follow-up messages can be correlated
with the Announce message using the clock ID, which is never
altered by Transparent clocks in this profile.

10. Requirements for Transparent Clocks

Transparent clocks SHALL NOT change the transmission mode of an
Enterprise Profile PTP message. For example a Transparent clock
SHALL NOT change a unicast message to a multicast message.
 Transparent clocks SHALL NOT alter the Enterprise Profile TLV of
 an Announce message, or any other part of an Announce message.
 Transparent Clocks SHOULD support multiple domains. Transparent
Clocks which syntonize to the master clock will need to maintain
separate clock rate offsets for each of the supported domains.
11. Requirements for Boundary Clocks

Boundary Clocks SHOULD support multiple simultaneous PTP domains. This will require them to maintain servo loops for each of the domains supported, at least in software. Boundary clocks MUST NOT combine timing information from different domains.

12. Management and Signaling Messages

PTP Management messages MAY be used. Any PTP management message which is sent with the targetPortIdentity.clockIdentity set to all 1s (all clocks) MUST be sent as a multicast message. Management messages with any other value of for the Clock Identity is intended for a specific clock and MUST be sent as a unicast message. Similarly, if any signaling messages are used they MUST also be sent as unicast messages whenever the message is intended for a specific clock.

13. Forbidden PTP Options

Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile SHALL NOT use peer to peer timing for delay measurement. Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile SHALL NOT use Unicast Message Negotiation to determine message rates. Slave clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile SHALL NOT use Unicast Discovery to establish connection to Master clocks. Grandmaster Clusters are NOT ALLOWED. The Alternate Master option is also forbidden. Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile SHALL NOT use Alternate Timescales.

14. Interoperation with Other PTP Profiles

Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile will not interoperate with clocks operating in the Power Profile [C37.238], because the Enterprise Profile requires the End to End Delay Measurement Mechanism and the Power Profile requires the Peer to Peer Delay Measurement Mechanism.

Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile will not interoperate with clocks operating in the Telecom Profile for Frequency Synchronization[G8265.1], because the Enterprise Profile forbids Unicast Message Negotiation. This feature is part of the default manner of operation for the Telecom Profile for Frequency Synchronization.

Clocks operating in the Enterprise Profile will interoperate with clocks operating in the Default Profile described in [IEEE1588] Annex J.3. This variant of the Default Profile uses the End to End Delay Measurement Mechanism. In addition the Default Profile would have to operates over IPv4 or IPv6 networks, and use management messages in unicast when those messages are directed at a specific clock. If either of these requirements are not met than Enterprise
Profile clocks will not interoperate with Annex J.3 Default Profile Clocks. The Enterprise Profile Profile will not interoperate with the Annex J.4 variant of the Default Profile which requires use of the Peer to Peer Delay Measurement Mechanism.

Enterprise Profile Clocks will interoperate with clocks operating in other profiles if the clocks in the other profiles obey the rules of the Enterprise Profile. These rules MUST NOT be changed to achieve interoperability with other profiles.

15. Security Considerations

Protocols used to transfer time, such as PTP and NTP can be important to security mechanisms which use time windows for keys and authorization. Passing time through the networks poses a security risk since time can potentially be manipulated. The use of multiple simultaneous masters, using multiple PTP domains can mitigate problems from rogue masters and man-in-the-middle attacks. See sections 9 and 10. Additional security mechanisms are outside the scope of this document.

16. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA requirements in this specification.

17. References

17.1. Normative References


17.2. Informative References


18. Acknowledgments

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Abstract

This document defines a YANG data model for Network Time Protocol implementations. The data model includes configuration data and state data.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction


The data model convers configuration of system parameters of NTP, such as access rules, authentication and VRF binding, and also associations of NTP in different modes and parameters of per-interface. It also provides information about running state of NTP implementations.

1.1. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [RFC6020]:

- configuration data
- data model
- module
- state data

The terminology for describing YANG data models is found in [RFC6020].
1.2. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams is as follows:

- Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
- Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration data (read-write), and "ro" means state data (read-only).
- Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" means a presence container, and "*" denotes a list and leaf-list.
- Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").
- Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

2. NTP data model

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-ntp", which has the following structure:

```yang
module: ietf-ntp
  +--rw ntp-cfg!
      +--rw ntp-enabled? boolean
      +--rw refclock-master
          +--rw master? boolean
          +--rw master-stratum? ntp-stratum
      +--rw authentication!
          +--rw auth-enabled? boolean
          +--rw trusted-key? uint32
          +--rw authentication-keys* [key-id]
              +--rw key-id uint32
              +--rw algorithm? enumeration
              +--rw password? union
          +--rw access-rules
              +--rw access-rule* [access-mode]
                  +--rw access-mode enumeration
                  +--rw acl-number
                      +--rw (acl-type)?
                          +--:(ipv4)
                          |   +--rw acl-number-ipv4? uint16
                          +--:(ipv6)
                          |   +--rw acl-number-ipv6? uint16
                      +--rw associations
```

This data model defines two primary containers, one for NTP configuration and the other is for NTP running state. The NTP configuration container includes data nodes for access rules, authentication, associations and interfaces. In the NTP running state container, there are data nodes for system status and associations.

3. Relationship to NTPv4-MIB

If the device implements the NTPv4-MIB [RFC5907], data nodes in container ntp-cfg and ntp-state from YANG module can be mapped to table entries in NTPv4-MIB.

The following tables list the YANG data nodes with corresponding objects in the NTPv4-MIB.
YANG NTP Configuration Data Nodes and Related NTPv4-MIB Objects

YANG data nodes in /ntp-cfg/
- ntp-enabled

YANG data nodes in /ntp-cfg/associations/peers/peer
- address

YANG data nodes in /ntp-cfg/associations/servers/server
- address

YANG NTP State Data Nodes and Related NTPv4-MIB Objects

YANG data nodes in /ntp-state/system-status
- clock-state
- clock-stratum
- clock-refid
- clock-precision
- clock-offset
- root-dispersion

YANG data nodes in /ntp-state/associations-status/association-status/
- association-source
- association-stratum
- association-refid
- association-offset
- association-delay
- association-dispersion
- association-sent
- association-received
- association-dropped

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4. NTP YANG Module

//<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-ntp@2015-01-28.yang"

module ietf-ntp {

    namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-ntp";
    prefix "ntp";

    import ietf-yang-types {
        prefix "yang";
    }

    import ietf-inet-types {
        prefix "inet";
    }

    import ietf-interfaces {
        prefix "if";
    }

    import ietf-ip {
        prefix "ip";
    }

    organization
    "IETF NTP (Network Time Protocol) Working Group";

    contact
    "WG Web:  <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/ntp/>
    WG List:  <mailto: ntpwg@lists.ntp.org
    WG Chair: Karen O’Donoghue
        <mailto:odonoghue@isoc.org>
    Editor:   Eric Wu
        <mailto:eric.wu@huawei.com>";

    description
    "This YANG module defines essential components for the management
    of a routing subsystem.

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    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
    without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
    the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
    forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust’s Legal Provisions"
typedef ntp-stratum {
  type uint8;
  description
    "The level of each server in the hierarchy is defined by a stratum number. Primary servers are assigned stratum one; secondary servers at each lower level are assigned stratum numbers one greater than the preceding level";
}

typedef ntp-version {
  type uint8 {
    range "1..4";
  }
  default "3";
  description
    "The current NTP version supported by corresponding association.";
}

typedef ntp-minpoll {
  type uint8 {
    range "4..17";
  }
  default "6";
  description
    "The minimul poll interval for this NTP association.";
}

typedef ntp-maxpoll {
  type uint8 {
    range "4..17";
  }
  default "10";
typedef multicast-client-v4address {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    default "224.0.1.1";
    description "The IPv4 address for NTP multicast client.";
}

typedef multicast-client-v6address {
    type inet:ipv6-address;
    default "FF0E::0101";
    description "The IPv6 address for NTP multicast client.";
}

/* Groupings */
grouping authentication-key {
    description "To define an authentication key for a NTP time source.";
    leaf key-id {
        type uint32 {
            range "1..max";
        }
        description "Authentication key identifier.";
    }
    leaf algorithm {
        type enumeration {
            enum md5 {
                description "Message Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm.";
            }
            enum hmac-sha256 {
                description "Secure Hash Algorithm 256 algorithm.";
            }
        }
        description "Authentication algorithm.";
    }
    leaf password {
        type union {
            type string {
                length "1..255";
            }
        }
    }
}
type string {
    length "20..392";
}

description
"Clear or encrypted mode for password text.";

grouping association-param {
    description
"To define parameters for a NTP associations.";
    leaf version {
        type ntp-version;
        description
"NTP version.";
    }
    leaf address {
        type inet:ip-address;
        description
"The IP address of this association.";
    }
    leaf key-id {
        type leafref {
key-id";
        }
        description
"Authentication key id referenced in this association.";
    }
    leaf minpoll {
        type ntp-minpoll;
        description
"The minimul poll interval used in this association.";
    }
    leaf maxpoll {
        type ntp-maxpoll;
        description
"The maximul poll interval used in this association.";
    }
    leaf prefer {
        type boolean;
        default "false";
        description
"Whether this association is preferred.";
    }
    leaf burst {
        type boolean;
        default "false";
    }
}
description
"Sends a series of packets instead of a single packet
within each synchronization interval to achieve
faster synchronization.";
}
leaf iburst {
  type boolean;
  default "false";
  description
  "Sends a series of packets instead of a single packet
  within the initial synchronization interval to achieve
  faster initial synchronization.";
}
leaf vrf {
  type string;
  description
  "The VRF instance this association binded to.";
}
leaf source {
  type leafref {
    path "/if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name";
  }
  description
  "The interface whose ip address this association used as source add
  ress.";
}

/* Configuration data nodes */
container ntp-cfg {
  presence
  "Enables NTP unless the 'ntp-enabled' leaf
  (which defaults to 'true') is set to 'false'";
  description
  "Configuration parameters for NTP.";
  leaf ntp-enabled {
    type boolean;
    default true;
    description
    "Controls whether NTP is enabled or disabled on this device.";
  }
  container refclock-master {
    leaf master {
      type boolean;
      default false;
      description
      "Use its own NTP master clock to synchronize with peers when true.";
    }
}
leaf master-stratum {
    type ntp-stratum;
    default "16";
    description
        "Use its own NTP master clock to synchronize with peers when true.";
}

container authentication {
    presence
        "Enables NTP authentication when the 'auth-enabled'
         leaf is set to 'true'.";
    description
        "Configuration of authentication.";
    leaf auth-enabled {
        type boolean;
        default false;
        description
            "Controls whether NTP authentication is enabled or disabled
             on this device.";
    }
    leaf trusted-key {
        type uint32;
        description
            "The key trusted by NTP.";
    }
    list authentication-keys {
        key "key-id";
        uses authentication-key;
    }
}

container access-rules {
    list access-rule {
        key "access-mode";
        leaf access-mode {
            type enumeration {
                enum peer {
                    description
                        "Sets the fully access authority.
                        Both time request and control query can be performed
                        on the local NTP service, and the local clock can be
                        synchronized to the remote server.";
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
enum server {
    description
        "Enables the server access and query. Both time requests and control query can be performed on the local NTP service, but the local clock cannot be synchronized to the remote server.";
}

enum synchronization {
    description
        "Enables the server to access. Only time request can be performed on the local NTP service.";
}

enum query {
    description
        "Sets the maximum access limitation. Control query can be performed only on the local NTP service.";
}

description
        "NTP access mode.";
}

container acl-number {
    choice acl-type {
        case ipv4 {
            leaf acl-number-ipv4 {
                type uint16;
                description "IPv4 acl number.";
            }
        }
        case ipv6 {
            leaf acl-number-ipv6 {
                type uint16;
                description "IPv6 acl number.";
            }
        }
    }
}

container associations {
    container peers {
        description
            "Peer associations.";
        list peer {
            key "address vrf";
        }
    }
}
uses association-param;
}
}
container servers {
    description "Server associations."
    list server {
        key "address vrf";
        uses association-param;
    }
}

container ntp-interfaces {
    description "Configuration parameters for NTP interfaces.";
    list ntp-interface {
        key "ntp-ifname";
        leaf ntp-ifname {
            type leafref {
                path "/if:interfaces/if:interface/if:name";
            }
        }
    }
    container multicast-client {
        leaf multicast-client-address {
            type union {
                type multicast-client-v4address;
                type multicast-client-v6address;
            }
            description "The IP address of the multicast group to join.";
        }
    }
    container multicast-server {
        leaf multicast-server-address {
            type inet:ip-address;
            description "The IP address to send NTP multicast packets.";
        }
        leaf multicast-server-ttl {
            type uint8;
            description "Specifies the time to live (TTL) of a multicast packet.";
        }
        leaf multicast-server-version {
            type ntp-version;
            description
"Specifies the version a multicast packet."
};
leaf multicast-server-keyid {
  type leafref {
    path "/ntp:ntp-cfg/ntp:authentication/ntp:authentications/ntp:key-id";
  }
  description
  "Specifies the authentication key id of a multicast packet."
};
}
}
}

close broadcast-client {
  leaf broadcast-client-enabled {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Allows a device to receive NTP broadcast packets on an interface.";
  }
}

container broadcast-server {
  leaf broadcast-server-version {
    type ntp-version;
    description
    "Specifies the version of a broadcast packet."
  }
  leaf broadcast-server-keyid {
    type leafref {
      path "/ntp:ntp-cfg/ntp:authentication/ntp:authentications/ntp:key-id";
    }
    description
    "Specifies the authentication key id of a broadcast packet."
  }
}

/* Operational state data */
container ntp-state {
  config "false";
  description
  "Operational state of the NTP."
}
}

container system-status {
  description
  "System status of NTP."
  leaf clock-state {
    type enumeration {

enum synchronized {
    description
        "Indicates that the local clock has been
        synchronized with an NTP server
        or the reference clock.";
}
enum unsynchronized {
    description
        "Indicates that the local clock has not been
        synchronized with any NTP server.";
}

description
    "Indicates the state of system clock.";

leaf clock-stratum {
    type ntp-stratum;
    description
        "Indicates the stratum of the reference clock.";
}

leaf clock-refid {
    type union {
        type inet:ipv4-address;
        type binary {
            length "4";
        }
        type string {
            length "4";
        }
    }
    description
        "IPv4 address or first 32 bits of the MD5 hash
        of the IPv6 address or reference clock of the peer
        to which clock is synchronized.";
}

leaf nominal-freq {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 4;
    }
    description
        "Indicates the nominal frequency of the local clock, in Hz.";
}

leaf actual-freq {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 4;
    }
    description
        "Indicates the actual frequency of the local clock, in Hz.";
leaf clock-precision {
    type uint8;
    description
        "Precision of the clock of this system in Hz.(prec=2^(-n))";
}
leaf clock-offset {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 4;
    }
    description
        "Offset of clock to synchronized peer, in milliseconds."
}
leaf root-delay {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 2;
    }
    description
        "Total delay along path to root clock, in milliseconds."
}
leaf root-dispersion {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 2;
    }
    description
        "Indicates the dispersion between the local clock 
        and the master reference clock, in milliseconds."
}
leaf peer-dispersion {
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 2;
    }
    description
        "Indicates the dispersion between the local clock 
        and the peer clock, in milliseconds."
}
leaf reference-time {
    type string;
    description "Indicates reference timestamp."
}
leaf sync-state {
    type enumeration {
        enum clock-not-set {
            description
                "Indicates the clock is not updated.";
        }
        enum freq-set-by-cfg {
            description
                "";
    }
"Indicates the clock frequency is set by NTP configuration."
}
enum clock-set {
    description
    "Indicates the clock is set.";
}
enum freq-not-determined {
    description
    "Indicates the clock is set but the frequency is not determined.";
}
enum clock-synchronized {
    description
    "Indicates that the clock is synchronized.";
}
enum spike {
    description
    "Indicates a time difference of more than 128 milliseconds is detected between NTP server and client clock. The clock change will take effect in XXX seconds.";
}
}
description
"Indicates the synchronization status of the local clock.";
}

container associations-status {
    description
    "System status of NTP.";
    list association-status {
        key "association-source";
        leaf association-source {
            type union {
                type inet:ipv4-address;
                type inet:ipv6-address;
            }
            description
            "IPv4 or IPv6 address of the peer. If a nondefault VRF is configured for the peer, the VRF follows the address."
        }
        leaf association-stratum {
            type ntp-stratum;
            description
            "Indicates the stratum of the reference clock.";
        }
    }
}
leaf association-refid {
  type union {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    type binary {
      length "4";
    }
    type string {
      length "4";
    }
  }
  description
    "Reference clock type or address for the peer.";
}
leaf association-reach {
  type uint8;
  description
    "Indicates the reachability of the configured server or peer.";
}
leaf association-poll {
  type uint8;
  description
    "Indicates the polling interval for current, in seconds."
}
leaf association-now {
  type uint32;
  description
    "Indicates the time since the NTP packet was not received or last synchronized, in seconds.";
}
leaf association-offset {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 4;
  }
  description
    "Indicates the offset between the local clock and the superior reference clock.";
}
leaf association-delay {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 2;
  }
  description
    "Indicates the delay between the local clock and the superior reference clock.";
}
leaf association-dispersion {
  type decimal64 {

fraction-digits 2;
}
description
"Indicates the dispersion between the local clock
and the superior reference clock."
)
leaf association-sent {
  type uint32;
  description
    "Indicates the total number of packets
    this association sent.";
}
leaf association-sent-fail {
  type uint32;
  description
    "Indicates the number of times packet sending
    failed by this association.";
}
leaf association-received {
  type uint32;
  description
    "Indicates the total number of packets
    this association received.";
}
leaf association-dropped {
  type uint32;
  description
    "Indicates the number of packets
    this association dropped.";
}
}
)
container ntp-statistics {
  description
    "Packet statistics of NTP."
  leaf packet-sent {
    type uint32;
    description
      "Indicates the total number of packets sent.";
  }
  leaf packet-sent-fail {
    type uint32;
    description
      "Indicates the number of times packet sending failed.";
  }
  leaf packet-received {
    type uint32;

5. IANA Considerations

This document registers a URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]. Following the format in RFC 3688, the following registration has been made.


Registrant Contact: The NETMOD WG of the IETF.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document registers a YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020].

Name: ietf-ntp


Prefix: ntp

Reference: RFC XXXX

6. Security Considerations

The YANG module defined in this memo is designed to be accessed via the NETCONF protocol [RFC6241]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is SSH [RFC6242]. The NETCONF access control model [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular
NETCONF users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF protocol operations and content.

There are a number of data nodes defined in the YANG module which are writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., <edit-config>) to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.

7. Acknowledgments

TBD.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References


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