<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03">
   <front>
      <title>Verifiable Attenuated Delegation for AI Agent Chains</title>
      <author initials="R." surname="Asor" fullname="Rafael Asor">
         <organization>Attenu</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="October" day="27" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   AI agents increasingly delegate tasks to other agents.  Each
   delegation should convey only a subset of the delegating party&#x27;s
   authority, that subset should be bounded in scope, magnitude, and
   time, and any enforcement point should be able to verify -- offline,
   with no call to an authorization server -- that a token presented at
   hop N carries authority no greater than the token at hop N-1, back to
   a trusted root, and that every hop acts under the same accountable
   principal.  OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693) models two-party
   delegation and records prior actors in a nested &quot;act&quot; claim, but that
   claim is informational only and cannot enforce attenuation across a
   chain of depth two or more.  This document defines the Agent
   Delegation Chain: a profile of OAuth 2.0 JWT access tokens (RFC 9068)
   that carries authority as Rich Authorization Requests (RFC 9396),
   binds the chain to one principal and names the agent acting at each
   hop, links each delegation to its parent by a cryptographic byte-
   commitment, and specifies a deterministic offline verification
   algorithm that enforces monotonic attenuation, bounded depth,
   monotonic expiry, and principal invariance.  It reuses existing JOSE,
   proof-of-possession (RFC 9449), and status-list machinery (the OAuth
   Status List draft) and introduces no new cryptography.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-asor-wimse-agent-delegation-chain-03" />
   
</reference>
