<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.birkholz-scitt-receipts" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-03">
   <front>
      <title>Countersigning COSE Envelopes in Transparency Services</title>
      <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
         <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="M." surname="Riechert" fullname="Maik Riechert">
         <organization>Microsoft</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud" fullname="Antoine Delignat-Lavaud">
         <organization>Microsoft</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="C." surname="Fournet" fullname="Cedric Fournet">
         <organization>Microsoft</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="April" day="26" year="2023" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   A transparent and authentic Transparent Registry service in support
   of a supply chain&#x27;s integrity, transparency, and trust requires all
   peers that contribute to the Registry operations to be trustworthy
   and authentic.  In this document, a countersigning variant is
   specified that enables trust assertions on Merkle-tree based
   operations for global supply chain registries.  A generic procedure
   for producing payloads to be signed and validated is defined and
   leverages solutions and principles from the Concise Signing and
   Encryption (COSE) space.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-birkholz-scitt-receipts-03" />
   
</reference>
