Independent Inventor This architecture is specifically designed for high-risk AI systems, where standard engineering priorities shift from speed and latency toward absolute determinism and safety. An agentic model can emit a tool call that today's runtimes treat as something to execute. Allowlists, OAuth tokens, MCP server auth, sandboxes, output filters, and human approval decide whether an agent may reach a tool. They do not decide whether this generated call, with this argument digest, from this instruction chain, at this delegation depth, may take effect now. That gap is the incident surface. Prompt-injected content, poisoned retrieval, a malicious tool response, or a delegated sub-agent can produce a call that looks like ordinary tool use. If the dispatcher executes whatever the model selected, policy that lived upstream becomes advisory. This document specifies a dispatch-time gate. The model may compute a call. The call remains a Candidate Act. A Protected Enforcement Domain binds agent, tool, arguments, purpose, destination, provenance, and policy epochs, then issues scoped non-bearer authority. A Tool-Dispatch Finality Sink verifies that authority against the actual invocation immediately before the tool runs, then consumes it. The same gate applies to support, coding, payments, clinical, SOC, browser-use, and multi-agent MCP deployments. Tool selection is not execution authority. A runnable reference implementation for this dispatch-time gate is provided at tool_use Is Not invoke(): Binding Execution-Finality to Agentic Tool-Call Interfaces and MCP (https://github.com/sangmdas/ tool_use-Is-Not-invoke-Binding-Execution-Finality-to-Agentic-Tool- Call-Interfaces-and-MCP).