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<reference anchor="I-D.das-purpose-execution-finality" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-das-purpose-execution-finality-02">
   <front>
      <title>Data-Purpose Laundering Prevention: Execution-Finality for Preventing Cross-Domain Data Reuse</title>
      <author initials="S." surname="Das" fullname="Sangam Das">
         <organization>Independent Inventor</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="September" day="10" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Consider a concrete case: a user invokes a highly capable AI model
   under a declared purpose of education, but the resulting capability
   is in fact used for a military or terrorist end -- an illustrative
   example, not a claim about any real deployment.  When such misuse
   surfaces, an unresolved question follows: is the model provider
   liable, is the user liable, or is the jurisdiction that permitted the
   deployment liable?  This document does not answer that question --
   liability determination remains an external legal question for the
   responsible court, regulator, or contracting parties -- but it
   addresses the technical gap that makes the question unanswerable
   today.  Systems that collect data, or grant capability, for one
   stated purpose routinely permit that data or capability to be
   consumed for a different purpose, not because the second use was
   authorized, but because nothing in the protocol path was capable of
   refusing it or of recording what was actually authorized.  The most
   common technical control in deployment today is a self-asserted
   purpose string: a &quot;purpose&quot; claim in a token, a field in an API
   request, a comment in a data-sharing agreement.  A self-asserted
   string is evidence of intent, not proof of authority, and it fails
   precisely when it matters most -- when the requester lies.  This
   architecture addresses that loophole deterministically: it makes an
   undeclared or purpose-switched use technically detectable and
   refusable at the point of use, and it produces verifiable evidence of
   what was actually authorized, so that any subsequent liability
   determination can be argued from that evidence rather than from an
   unverifiable self-assertion.  Achieving that determinism introduces a
   bounded, measurable amount of evaluation latency at the point of use;
   this document treats that latency as an acceptable, secured trade-off
   for closing an otherwise unverifiable gap, not as a cost to be
   minimized at the expense of the guarantee.  The premise is not that
   AI innovation should slow down, any more than cars should be built
   slower; it is that innovation moving this fast needs the technical
   equivalent of a seat belt.

   A runnable reference implementation accompanies this document at
   Purpose Execution Finality Validator -- Runnable Reference
   Implementation (https://github.com/sangmdas/Purpose-Execution-
   Finality-Validator-to-Prevent-Data-Purpose-Laundering-in-AI-Systems).

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-das-purpose-execution-finality-02" />
   
</reference>
