<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03">
   <front>
      <title>Defeating Attacks which employ Forged ICMPv4/ICMPv6 Error Messages</title>
      <author initials="F." surname="Gont" fullname="Fernando Gont">
         </author>
      <author initials="R." surname="Hunter" fullname="Ray Hunter">
         <organization>Globis Consulting BV</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="J." surname="Massar" fullname="Jeroen Massar">
         <organization>Massar Networking</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="W. S." surname="LIU" fullname="Will (Shucheng) LIU">
         <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="July" day="3" year="2017" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Over the years, a number of attack vectors that employ forged ICMPv4/
   ICMPv6 error messages have been disclosed and exploited in the wild.
   The aforementioned attack vectors do not require that the source
   address of the packets be forged, but do require that the addresses
   of the IPv4/IPv6 packet embedded in the ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload be
   forged.  This document discusses a simple, effective, and
   straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to
   mitigate attacks that use forged addresses in the IPv4/IPv6 packet
   embedded in an ICMPv4/ICMPv6 payload.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gont-opsec-icmp-ingress-filtering-03" />
   
</reference>
