<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.gross-msec-ipsec-composite-group" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gross-msec-ipsec-composite-group-01">
   <front>
      <title>Multicast IP Security Composite Cryptographic Groups</title>
      <author initials="G." surname="Gross" fullname="George Gross">
         <organization>IdentAware</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="H." surname="Cruickshank" fullname="Haitham Cruickshank">
         <organization>CCSR, U. of Surrey</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="October" day="20" year="2006" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>The Multicast IP Security extension architecture [Weis] implicitly
   assumes a basic group endpoint population that shares homogeneous
   cryptographic capabilities and security policies. In practice, large-
   scale cryptographic groups may contain a heterogeneous endpoint
   population that can not be accommodated by that basic multicast IPsec
   architecture. For example, some endpoints may not have been upgraded
   to handle the successor algorithm for one that is being retired (e.g.
   SHA1 transition to SHA-ng). Group deployments that span multiple
   legal jurisdictions may have a different security policy in each
   jurisdiction (e.g. key strength). This document defines the
   &quot;composite cryptographic group&quot; IP security architecture capability.
   A composite cryptographic group allows multicast IPsec applications
   to transparently interact with the single logical group that is
   formed by the union of one or more basic cryptographic groups.
	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-gross-msec-ipsec-composite-group-01" />
   
</reference>
