<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape-05">
   <front>
      <title>BGP Attribute Escape</title>
      <author initials="J." surname="Haas" fullname="Jeff Haas">
         <organization>HPE</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="June" day="11" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   BGP-4 [RFC 4271] has been very successful in being extended over the
   years it has been deployed.  A significant part of that success is
   due to its ability to incrementally add new features to its Path
   Attributes when they are marked &quot;optional transitive&quot;.
   Implementations that are ignorant of a feature for an unknown Path
   Attribute that are so marked will propagate BGP routes with such
   attributes.

   Unfortunately, this blind propagation of unknown Path Attributes may
   happen for features that are intended to be used in a limited scope.
   When such Path Attributes inadvertently are carried beyond that
   scope, it can lead to things such as unintended disclosure of
   sensitive information, or cause improper routing.  In their worst
   cases, such propagation may be for malformed Path Attributes and lead
   to BGP session resets or crashes.

   This document calls such inadvertent propagation of BGP Path
   Attributes, &quot;attribute escape&quot;.  This document further describes some
   of the scenarios that leads to this behavior and makes
   recommendations on practices that may limit its impact.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-haas-idr-bgp-attribute-escape-05" />
   
</reference>
