<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.hardman-verifiable-voice-protocol" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardman-verifiable-voice-protocol-08">
   <front>
      <title>Verifiable Voice Protocol</title>
      <author initials="D." surname="Hardman" fullname="Daniel Hardman">
         <organization>Provenant, Inc</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="October" day="5" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Verifiable Voice Protocol (VVP) authenticates and authorizes
   organizations and individuals making and/or receiving telephone
   calls.  This eliminates trust gaps that malicious parties exploit.
   Like related technologies such as SHAKEN, RCD, and BCID, VVP uses
   STIR to bind cryptographic evidence to a SIP INVITE, and verify this
   evidence downstream.  VVP can also let evidence flow the other way,
   proving things about the callee.  VVP builds from different technical
   and governance assumptions than alternatives, and uses richer,
   stronger evidence.  This allows VVP to cross jurisdictional
   boundaries easily and robustly.  It also makes VVP simpler, more
   decentralized, cheaper to deploy and maintain, more private, more
   scalable, and higher assurance.  Because it is easier to adopt, VVP
   can plug gaps or build bridges between other approaches, functioning
   as glue in hybrid ecosystems.  For example, it may justify an A
   attestation in SHAKEN, or an RCD passport for branded calling, when a
   call originates outside SHAKEN or RCD ecosystems.  VVP also works
   well as a standalone mechanism, independent of other solutions.  An
   extra benefit is that VVP enables two-way evidence sharing with
   verifiable text and chat (e.g., RCS and vCon), as well as with other
   industry verticals that need verifiability in non-telco contexts.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-hardman-verifiable-voice-protocol-08" />
   
</reference>
