<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.huelsing-cfrg-hash-sig-xmss" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huelsing-cfrg-hash-sig-xmss-00">
   <front>
      <title>XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures</title>
      <author initials="A." surname="Huelsing" fullname="Andreas Huelsing">
         <organization>TU Eindhoven</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="D." surname="Butin" fullname="Denis Butin">
         <organization>TU Darmstadt</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Gazdag" fullname="Stefan-Lukas Gazdag">
         <organization>genua mbH</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Mohaisen" fullname="Aziz Mohaisen">
         <organization>Verisign Labs</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="March" day="23" year="2015" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This note describes the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS), a
   hash-based digital signature system.  It follows existing
   descriptions in scientific literature.  The note specifies the WOTS+
   one-time signature scheme, a single-tree (XMSS) and a multi-tree
   variant (XMSS^MT) of XMSS.  Both variants use WOTS+ as a main
   building block.  XMSS provides cryptographic digital signatures
   without relying on the conjectured hardness of mathematical problems.
   Instead, it is proven that it only relies on the properties of
   cryptographic hash functions.  XMSS provides strong security
   guarantees and, besides some special instantiations, is even secure
   when the collision resistance of the underlying hash function is
   broken.  It is suitable for compact implementations, relatively
   simple to implement, and naturally resists side-channel attacks.
   Unlike most other signature systems, hash-based signatures withstand
   attacks using quantum computers.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-huelsing-cfrg-hash-sig-xmss-00" />
   
</reference>
