<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04">
   <front>
      <title>Route-Leaks &amp; MITM Attacks Against BGPSEC</title>
      <author initials="D. R." surname="McPherson" fullname="Danny R. McPherson">
         <organization>Verisign, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Amante" fullname="Shane Amante">
         <organization>Level 3 Communications, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="E." surname="Osterweil" fullname="Eric Osterweil">
         <organization>Verisign, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="D." surname="Mitchell" fullname="Dave Mitchell">
         <organization>Twitter, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="April" day="30" year="2014" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes a very simple attack vector that illustrates
   how RPKI-enabled BGPSEC machinery as currently defined can be easily
   circumvented in order to launch a Man In The Middle (MITM) attack via
   BGP.  It is meant to serve as input to the IETF&#x27;s Global Routing
   Operations Working group (GROW) during routing security requirements
   discussions and subsequent specification.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-04" />
   
</reference>
