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<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mls-architecture" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mls-architecture-07">
   <front>
      <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture</title>
      <author initials="B." surname="Beurdouche" fullname="Benjamin Beurdouche">
         <organization>Inria &amp; Mozilla</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
         <organization>Mozilla</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="E." surname="Omara" fullname="Emad Omara">
         <organization>Google</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Inguva" fullname="Srinivas Inguva">
         <organization>Twitter</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Kwon" fullname="Albert Kwon">
         <organization>MIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Duric" fullname="Alan Duric">
         <organization>Wire</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="October" day="4" year="2021" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol [MLSPROTO] document has
   the role of defining a Group Key Agreement, all the necessary
   cryptographic operations, and serialization/deserialization functions
   necessary to create a scalable and secure group messaging protocol.
   The MLS protocol is meant to protect against eavesdropping,
   tampering, message forgery, and provide good properties such as
   forward-secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) in the case
   of past or future device compromises.

   This document, on the other hand is intended to describe a general
   secure group messaging infrastructure and its security goals.  It
   provides guidance on building a group messaging system and discusses
   security and privacy tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanism
   that are part of the MLS protocol (ie. frequency of public encryption
   key rotation).

   The document also extends the guidance to parts of the infrastructure
   that are not standardized by the MLS Protocol document and left to
   the application or the infrastructure architects to design.

   While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to
   follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, most will
   vastly influence the overall security guarantees that are achieved by
   the overall messaging system.  This is especially true in case of
   active adversaries that are able to compromise clients, the delivery
   service or the authentication service.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mls-architecture-07" />
   
</reference>
