<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mls-architecture" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mls-architecture-08">
   <front>
      <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture</title>
      <author initials="B." surname="Beurdouche" fullname="Benjamin Beurdouche">
         <organization>Inria &amp; Mozilla</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
         <organization>Mozilla</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="E." surname="Omara" fullname="Emad Omara">
         <organization>Google</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Inguva" fullname="Srinivas Inguva">
         <organization>Twitter</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Kwon" fullname="Albert Kwon">
         <organization>MIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Duric" fullname="Alan Duric">
         <organization>Wire</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="June" day="16" year="2022" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol [I-D.ietf-mls-protocol]
   specification has the role of defining a Group Key Agreement
   protocol, including all the cryptographic operations and
   serialization/deserialization functions necessary for scalable and
   secure group messaging.  The MLS protocol is meant to protect against
   eavesdropping, tampering, message forgery, and provide further
   properties such as Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security
   (PCS) in the case of past or future device compromises.

   This document describes a general secure group messaging
   infrastructure and its security goals.  It provides guidance on
   building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy
   tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of
   the MLS protocol (e.g., frequency of public encryption key rotation).

   The document also provides guidance for parts of the infrastructure
   that are not standardized by the MLS Protocol document and left to
   the application or the infrastructure architects to design.

   While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to
   follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, they affect
   the overall security guarantees that are achieved by a messaging
   application.  This is especially true in case of active adversaries
   that are able to compromise clients, the delivery service, or the
   authentication service.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mls-architecture-08" />
   
</reference>
