<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-00">
   <front>
      <title>Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in Transitive BGP Path Attributes</title>
      <author initials="J." surname="Snijders" fullname="Job Snijders">
         <organization>Fastly</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="T." surname="Fiebig" fullname="Tobias Fiebig">
         <organization>Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="M." surname="Stucchi" fullname="Massimiliano Stucchi">
         <organization>AS58280.net</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="April" day="9" year="2024" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) derived Validation States in Transitive Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes.  Annotating routes with
   attributes signaling validation state may flood needless BGP UPDATE
   messages through the global Internet routing system, when, for
   example, Route Origin Authorizations are issued, revoked, or RPKI-To-
   Router sessions are terminated.

   Operators SHOULD ensure Validation States are not signalled in
   transitive BGP Path Attributes.  Specifically, Operators SHOULD NOT
   group BGP routes by their Prefix Origin Validation state into
   distinct BGP Communities.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-00" />
   
</reference>
