<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-11">
   <front>
      <title>Guidance to Avoid Carrying RPKI Validation States in BGP Path Attributes</title>
      <author initials="J." surname="Snijders" fullname="Job Snijders">
         <organization>BSD Software Development</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="T." surname="Fiebig" fullname="Tobias Fiebig">
         <organization>Technische Universität Wien</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="M." surname="Stucchi" fullname="Massimiliano Stucchi">
         <organization>Glevia GmbH</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="June" day="12" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document provides guidance to avoid carrying Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) derived validation states in Border Gateway
   Protocol (BGP) Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE
   being sent across external BGP (EBGP) sessions.  Annotating routes
   with BGP Path Attributes carried across EBGP sessions signaling
   validation states may cause needless flooding of BGP UPDATE messages
   through the global Internet routing system, for example when Route
   Origin Authorizations (ROAs) are issued, or are revoked, or when
   RPKI-To-Router sessions are terminated.

   Operators should ensure RPKI-derived validation states are not
   signaled in BGP Path Attributes whose change triggers a BGP UPDATE
   being sent across EBGP sessions.  Specifically, operators should not
   associate Prefix Origin Validation state with BGP routes using any
   form of BGP Communities carried across EBGP session.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-sidrops-avoid-rpki-state-in-bgp-11" />
   
</reference>
