<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix-08">
   <front>
      <title>Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies</title>
      <author initials="R." surname="Sparks" fullname="Robert Sparks">
         <organization>Tekelec</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="B." surname="Campen" fullname="Byron Campen">
         <organization>Tekelec</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Lawrence" fullname="Scott Lawrence">
         <organization>Nortel Networks</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Hawrylyshen" fullname="Alan Hawrylyshen">
         <organization>Ditech Networks Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="October" day="29" year="2008" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>This document normatively updates RFC 3261, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to address a security vulnerability identified in SIP proxy behavior. This vulnerability enables an attack against SIP networks where a small number of legitimate, even authorized, SIP requests can stimulate massive amounts of proxy-to-proxy traffic.

 This document strengthens loop-detection requirements on SIP proxies when they fork requests (that is, forward a request to more than one destination). It also corrects and clarifies the description of the loop-detection algorithm such proxies are required to implement. Additionally, this document defines a Max-Breadth mechanism for limiting the number of concurrent branches pursued for any given request. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-sip-fork-loop-fix-08" />
   
</reference>
