<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-04">
   <front>
      <title>Improve TCP Handling of Out-of-Window Packets to Mitigate Ghost ACKs</title>
      <author initials="Y." surname="Pan" fullname="Yepeng Pan">
         <organization>CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="April" day="5" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Historically, TCP as specified in RFC 793 was threatened by the blind
   data injection attack because of the loose SEG.ACK value validation,
   where the SEG.ACK value of a TCP segment is considered valid as long
   as it does not acknowledge data ahead of what has been sent.  RFC
   5961 improved the input validation by shrinking the range of
   acceptable SEG.ACK values in a TCP segment.  Later, RFC 9293
   incorporated the updates proposed by RFC 5961 as a TCP stack
   implementation option.
   However, an endpoint that follows the RFC 9293 specifications can
   still accept a TCP segment containing an SEG.ACK value acknowledging
   data that the endpoint has never sent.  This document specifies small
   modifications to the way TCP verifies incoming TCP segments&#x27; SEG.ACK
   value to prevent TCP from accepting such invalid SEG.ACK values.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-ghost-acks-04" />
   
</reference>
