<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-14">
   <front>
      <title>Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols</title>
      <author initials="C." surname="Cremers" fullname="Cas Cremers">
         <organization>CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="L." surname="Garratt" fullname="Luke Garratt">
         <organization>Cisco Meraki</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S. V." surname="Smyshlyaev" fullname="Stanislav V. Smyshlyaev">
         <organization>CryptoPro</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="N." surname="Sullivan" fullname="Nick Sullivan">
         <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
         <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="August" day="19" year="2020" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>Randomness is a crucial ingredient for Transport Layer Security (TLS) and related security protocols. Weak or predictable &quot;cryptographically secure&quot; pseudorandom number generators (CSPRNGs) can be abused or exploited for malicious purposes. An initial entropy source that seeds a CSPRNG might be weak or broken as well, which can also lead to critical and systemic security problems. This document describes a way for security protocol implementations to augment their CSPRNGs using long-term private keys. This improves randomness from broken or otherwise subverted CSPRNGs.

 This document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG) in the IRTF.
	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-randomness-improvements-14" />
   
</reference>
