<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.krawczyk-cfrg-opaque" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06">
   <front>
      <title>The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol</title>
      <author initials="H." surname="Krawczyk" fullname="Hugo Krawczyk">
         <organization>Algorand Foundation</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="June" day="19" year="2020" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This draft describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
   password authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
   authentication in a client-server setting without reliance on PKI and
   with security against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise.
   Prior aPAKE protocols did not use salt and if they did, the salt was
   transmitted in the clear from server to user allowing for the
   building of targeted pre-computed dictionaries.  OPAQUE security has
   been proven by Jarecki et al.  (Eurocrypt 2018) in a strong and
   universally composable formal model of aPAKE security.  In addition,
   the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to hide the
   password from the server even during password registration.

   Strong security, versatility through modularity, good performance,
   and an array of additional features make OPAQUE a natural candidate
   for practical use and for adoption as a standard.  To this end, this
   draft presents several instantiations of OPAQUE and ways of
   integrating OPAQUE with TLS.

   This draft presents a high-level description of OPAQUE, highlighting
   its components and modular design.  It also provides the basis for a
   specification for standardization but a detailed specification ready
   for implementation is beyond the scope of this document.

   Implementers of OPAQUE should ONLY follow the precise specification
   in the upcoming draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-krawczyk-cfrg-opaque-06" />
   
</reference>
