<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.lindem-ospfv3-dest-filter" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lindem-ospfv3-dest-filter-03">
   <front>
      <title>OSPFv3 Destination Address Filter</title>
      <author initials="A." surname="Lindem" fullname="Acee Lindem">
         <organization>Redback Networks</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="September" day="29" year="2004" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   OSPFv2 has been criticized for it vulnerability to Denial of Service
   (DOS) attacks.  With OSPFv3, it is a simple matter to filter on the
   destination address at an implementation dependent level in order to
   limit the scope of DOS attacks to directly attached routers.  Unlike
   hop limit checking mechanisms, it is compatible with the existing
   OSPFv3 behavior.  However, this level of protection will preclude the
   deployment of virtual links in topologies where the filtering is
   applied.
	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-lindem-ospfv3-dest-filter-03" />
   
</reference>
