<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-00">
   <front>
      <title>Key Exchange Without Forward Secrecy is Not Recommended</title>
      <author initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson" fullname="John Preuß Mattsson">
         <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="November" day="18" year="2020" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Key exchange without forward secrecy enables passive monitoring
   [RFC7258].  Massive pervasive monitoring attacks relying on key
   exchange without forward secrecy has been reported
   [I-D.ietf-emu-aka-pfs].  If key exchange without Diffe-Hellan is
   used, compromise of the long-term authenticatation key enables a
   passive attacker to compromise past and future sessions.  All TLS 1.2
   cipher suites without forward secrecy has been marked as NOT
   RECOMMENDED [RFC8447], and static RSA has been forbidden in TLS 1.3
   [RFC8446]. psk_ke does not provide forward secrecy and is NOT
   RECOMMENDED.  This document sets the IANA registration of psk_ke to
   NOT RECOMMENDED.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mattsson-tls-psk-ke-dont-dont-dont-00" />
   
</reference>
