<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-00">
   <front>
      <title>TLS-Session-Bound Access Tokens for OAuth 2.0</title>
      <author initials="R." surname="Krishnan" fullname="Ramki Krishnan">
         <organization>JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A." surname="Prasad" fullname="A Prasad">
         <organization>Oracle</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="D." surname="Lopez" fullname="Diego Lopez">
         <organization>Telefonica</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="S." surname="Addepalli" fullname="Srinivasa Addepalli">
         <organization>Aryaka</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="March" day="18" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines a mechanism for binding OAuth 2.0 access tokens
   to a specific mutual TLS (mTLS) session.  The binding is achieved
   through a per-request proof token that incorporates the TLS Exporter
   value {{!RFC5705}} derived from the current session and an access
   token hash, signed by the client&#x27;s private key corresponding to its
   mTLS certificate.  This mechanism prevents stolen bearer tokens from
   being replayed on a different TLS connection.  While applicable to
   any OAuth 2.0 access token presented over mTLS, this specification is
   primarily motivated by the Token Exchange protocol {{!RFC8693}},
   where multi-hop delegation chains in autonomous, agent-driven
   architectures create elevated replay risk.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mw-oauth-tls-session-bound-tokens-00" />
   
</reference>
