<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00">
   <front>
      <title>Security Events for Revocation of Agent Delegations</title>
      <author initials="S." surname="Nandakumar" fullname="Suhas Nandakumar">
         <organization>Cisco</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="C. F." surname="Jennings" fullname="Cullen Fluffy Jennings">
         <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="November" day="19" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   When a person withdraws a task from an agent, or a delegating agent
   is compromised, every credential delegated below that point has to
   stop working, and the agents holding those credentials have to stop
   the work they were doing under them.  Token status lists and token
   introspection tell a verifier that asks whether one token is still
   valid.  They do not tell the agents further down a delegation chain,
   which may be in other organizations and which the revoking party may
   not know.  This document defines a Security Event Token that revokes
   a delegation and everything delegated from it, a subject identifier
   format that names a delegation token, the parties entitled to issue
   the event, how agents propagate it down the chain, and how verifiers
   check the status of a whole chain so that revocation reaches them
   even when the event does not.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-nandakumar-oauth-delegation-revocation-00" />
   
</reference>
