IP Paris Telecom SudParis Managing certificate revocation remains a recurring challenge in the Web Public Key Infrastructure (WebPKI). Existing solutions such as Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) and the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) involve compromises in terms of propagation latency, availability, and user privacy. With the planned deprecation of OCSP by some major Certificate Authorities (CAs), there is renewed interest in alternatives. This document specifies a decentralized certificate revocation architecture based on a Distributed Revocation Ledger (DRL) managed collectively by CAs. The ledger state is maintained as a Sparse Merkle Tree (SMT) in which only revoked certificates occupy non- default leaves, so that a valid certificate is attested by a compact non-membership proof and no prior registration of valid certificates is required. This document further defines a new Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension enabling "DRL Stapling", which allows a server to provide a client with a cryptographic proof of a certificate's status, consisting of a Sparse Merkle audit path and an M-of-N threshold signature from the CA consortium. The approach builds on the Revocation Transparency proposal of Laurie and Kasper and on subsequent formalizations of Sparse Merkle Trees; its novel contributions are the decentralized threshold-signature trust model with deterministic finality and the concrete TLS wire format.