<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.ranjbar-dane-did" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ranjbar-dane-did-01">
   <front>
      <title>Rooting Decentralized Identifiers in DNSSEC: A DANE-EE Key-Binding Profile</title>
      <author initials="K." surname="Ranjbar" fullname="Kaveh Ranjbar">
         <organization>Whisper Security (viaGraph B.V.)</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="A. A." surname="Aravind" fullname="Anivar A Aravind">
         <organization>Independent Researcher</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="August" day="1" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Several Decentralized Identifier (DID) methods root trust in a DNS
   name: did:web binds an identifier to a domain and today verifies its
   keys over the Web PKI, did:dns serves DID data from DNS resource
   records, and did:webvh retrieves its history from an HTTPS location
   derived from a name.  Each either depends on the Web PKI, treats
   DNSSEC as an optional recommendation, or does not bind the
   verification-method key to the name at all.  This document defines a
   single, normative DANE-EE key-binding profile that any DNS-anchored
   DID method can point at rather than reinventing: a verification
   method&#x27;s public key is published as a TLSA record with certificate
   usage DANE-EE(3), selector SubjectPublicKeyInfo(1), and matching type
   SHA2-256(1) under a DNSSEC-signed name, so that a relying party can
   confirm the key from the DNS root of trust with no certificate
   authority and no fetch from the subject.  The profile binds a name to
   a key and the key to the specific DID document it signs, and no
   further; it states precisely what it does not cover, including
   continuity of holding, and points to where those answers live.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ranjbar-dane-did-01" />
   
</reference>
