MyAuberge K.K. Every action an AI agent takes is a decision. Right now, none of those decisions are signed. AI agents operating in automated workflows take actions without any normative mechanism for expressing why those actions are being taken. Access tokens declare what an agent is permitted to do; no existing standard declares what the agent believes it is doing, on what reasoning basis, and with what level of confidence, at the moment of action. This document defines the Intent Declaration Primitive (IDP): a structured per-transition declaration submitted by an AI agent to the Governing Enforcement Component (GEC) at each action step of an execution loop. The IDP is committed to a tamper-evident Event Log before the action executes, enabling post-hoc review of agent reasoning, richer authorization policy evaluation, and enriched denial responses that guide agent behaviour. The IDP also provides the technical basis for compliance with EU AI Act Article 12 logging requirements for high-risk AI systems. Version -05 adds: the intake_endorsement operation (Section 4.6) through which the GEC endorses a submitted EOD before the first SENSE delivery, making the EOD a GEC-signed artifact and preventing unendorsed IDPs from proceeding; the PD-EOD (Prompt-Derived EOD) branch (Section 4.7) for IDPs derived from natural-language prompts rather than structured input, with scope-bounding rules and HEM notification requirements; the mandate_reference field (Section 4.1) linking each IDP to an SPO URI for structural validation; confidence_ level calibration guidance (Section 7) including the CONFIDENCE_ MISCALIBRATION_WARNING trigger; RETRY_CONTINUATION normative strengthening with backward reference to AEP-02's what_changed requirement; and four new Security Considerations addressing prompt injection at intake, EOD scope manipulation, confidence_level inflation attacks, and COMMITMENT_GAP exploitation.