<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-06">
   <front>
      <title>TLS Server Identity Pinning with Tickets</title>
      <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Yaron Sheffer">
         <organization>Intuit</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="D." surname="Migault" fullname="Daniel Migault">
         <organization>Ericsson</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="March" day="18" year="2018" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   Misissued public-key certificates can prevent TLS clients from
   appropriately authenticating the TLS server.  Several alternatives
   have been proposed to detect this situation and prevent a client from
   establishing a TLS session with a TLS end point authenticated with an
   illegitimate public-key certificate, but none is currently in wide
   use.

   This document proposes to extend TLS with opaque pinning tickets as a
   way to pin the server&#x27;s identity.  During an initial TLS session, the
   server provides an original encrypted pinning ticket.  In subsequent
   TLS session establishment, upon receipt of the pinning ticket, the
   server proves its ability to decrypt the pinning ticket and thus the
   ownership if the pinning protection key.  The client can now safely
   conclude that the TLS session is established with the same TLS server
   as the original TLS session.  One of the important properties of this
   proposal is that no manual management actions are required.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sheffer-tls-pinning-ticket-06" />
   
</reference>
