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<reference anchor="I-D.sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-10">
   <front>
      <title>Design Discussion and Comparison of Protection Mechanisms for Replay Attack and Withdrawal Suppression in BGPsec</title>
      <author initials="K." surname="Sriram" fullname="Kotikalapudi Sriram">
         <organization>US NIST</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="D." surname="Montgomery" fullname="Doug Montgomery">
         <organization>US NIST</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="April" day="18" year="2018" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   In the context of BGPsec, a withdrawal suppression occurs when an
   adversary AS suppresses a prefix withdrawal with the intension of
   continuing to attract traffic for that prefix based on a previous
   (signed and valid) BGPsec announcement that was earlier propagated.
   Subsequently if the adversary AS had a BGPsec session reset with a
   neighboring BGPsec speaker and when the session is restored, the AS
   replays said previous BGPsec announcement (even though it was
   withdrawn), then such a replay action is called a replay attack.  The
   BGPsec protocol should incorporate a method for protection from
   Replay Attack and Withdrawal Suppression (RAWS), at least to control
   the window of exposure.  This informational document provides design
   discussion and comparison of multiple alternative RAWS protection
   mechanisms weighing their pros and cons.  This is meant to be a
   companion document to the standards track draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-
   rollover that will specify a method to be used with BGPsec for RAWS
   protection.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sriram-replay-protection-design-discussion-10" />
   
</reference>
