<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<reference anchor="I-D.zhang-sidrops-aspa-egress" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-zhang-sidrops-aspa-egress-05">
   <front>
      <title>ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification for BGP Export</title>
      <author initials="J." surname="Zhang" fullname="Jia Zhang">
         <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="Y." surname="Wang" fullname="Yangyang Wang">
         <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="M." surname="Matějka" fullname="Maria Matějka">
         <organization>CZ.NIC</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="M." surname="Xu" fullname="Mingwei Xu">
         <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="K." surname="Sriram" fullname="Kotikalapudi Sriram">
         <organization>USA National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
      </author>
      <author initials="N." surname="Geng" fullname="Nan Geng">
         <organization>Huawei</organization>
      </author>
      <date month="July" day="5" year="2026" />
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes AS_PATH verification based on Autonomous
   System Provider Authorization (ASPA) for egress eBGP speakers.  ASPA
   is a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) object that allows an
   AS to register its transit provider ASes.  Performing ASPA-based
   AS_PATH verification at egress can prevent inadvertent propagation of
   route leaks to external peers, check for local misconfigurations, and
   help detect potential ASPA registration errors.  This approach
   complements ingress-side verification and BGP Roles/Only to Customer
   (OTC); it also provides operational assurance for partial deployment
   and for export-side configuration or registration problems.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-zhang-sidrops-aspa-egress-05" />
   
</reference>
