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DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
charter-ietf-dane-01-01

The information below is for an older proposed charter
Document Proposed charter DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities WG (dane) Snapshot
Title DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
Last updated 2014-06-05
State Start Chartering/Rechartering (Internal Steering Group/IAB Review)
WG State Active
IESG Responsible AD Stephen Farrell
Charter edit AD Stephen Farrell
Send notices to ogud@ogud.com, warren@kumari.net

charter-ietf-dane-01-01

DANE is a set of mechanisms and techniques that allow Internet
applications to establish cryptographically secured communications
by using information made available in DNS. By binding the key information
to a domain name and protecting that binding with DNSSEC,
applications can easily discover autenticated keys for services.

Objective:

The DANE WG will process documents that describe how to
incorporate DANE and DANE-like functionality in protocols, and
mechanisms to facilitate adoption of this functionality. The DANE
working group will also assist other working groups with adding
DANE functionality to their work. In addition the working group
will monitor and provide guidance to operators and tool developers.
When work on currently chartered documents is complete the WG
may re-charter if sufficiently pressing new work is identified.
DANE is not intended to be a long-lived catch-all WG
for all PKI in DNS issues and so will generally not adopt new
work items without re-chartering.

Problem Statement:

The DANE working group has developed a framework for securely
retrieving keying information from the DNS [RFC6698]. This
framework allows secure storing and looking up server public key
information in the DNS. This provides a binding between a domain
name providing a particular service and the key that can be used
to establish encrypted connection to that service.

By requiring DNSSEC protection for the lookup of the public key
information, DANE leverages the integrity protection provided by
DNSSEC to enable secure discovery of keying information. Operators
wanting to take advantage of DANE for their services must turn on
DNSSEC signing on the zones used in finding the services. Using
DNS this way, bindings of keys to domains are asserted by the entities that 
operate the DNS for that domain, not by external entities.

The DANE mechanisms provide flexibility in how the keying
information is presented. DANE supports both Certificates and raw
keys, further more Certificates and raw keys can be either the full
key or a hash of the key. 
The group will work on documenting the different approaches to use
DANE keying, and the security implication of each. In addition
the WG may develop a framework(s) to facilitate the lookup "client" DANE 
records for authorization/authentication purposes.

The group may also create documents that describe how protocol
entities can discover and validate these bindings in the execution
of specific applications. This work would be done in coordination
with the IETF Working Groups responsible for the protocols.

The group may in addition encourage interoperability testing and document
the results of such testing.