DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
|The information below is for an older proposed charter
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities WG
||DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
IESG Review (Charter for Approval, Selected by Secretariat)
||Charter Edit AD
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DANE is a set of mechanisms and techniques that allow Internet
applications to establish cryptographically secured communications
by using information made available in DNS. By binding the key information to
a domain name and protecting that binding with DNSSEC,
applications can easily discover autenticated keys for services.
The DANE WG will specify how to incorporate DANE and DANE-like
functionality into protocols. The WG will specify such mechanisms for
SMTP, SMIME, OPENPGP, and IPSEC. The DANE WG shall also
produce a set of implementation guidance for operators and tool
developers. The DANE working group will also assist other working
groups with adding DANE functionality to their work. When work on
the work items enumerated above is complete, the WG may
re-charter if sufficiently pressing new work is identified.
When work on currently chartered documents is complete the WG
may re-charter if sufficiently pressing new work is identified.
DANE is not intended to be a long-lived catch-all WG for all
public key distribution in DNS issues and so will generally not adopt
new work items without re-chartering.
The DANE working group has developed a framework for securely
retrieving keying information from the DNS [RFC6698]. This
framework allows secure storing and looking up server public key
information in the DNS. This provides a binding between a domain
name providing a particular service and the key that can be used
to establish encrypted connection to that service.
By requiring DNSSEC protection for the lookup of the public key
information, DANE leverages the integrity protection provided by
DNSSEC to enable secure discovery of keying information. Operators
wanting to take advantage of DANE for their services must turn on
DNSSEC signing on the zones used in finding the services. Using
DNS this way, bindings of keys to domains are asserted by the entities that
operate the DNS for that domain, not by external entities.
The DANE mechanisms provide flexibility in how the keying
information is presented. DANE supports both Certificates and raw
keys. Furthermore, the keys (raw or imbedded in certificates) can be full
keys or a hashes of keys.
The group will work on documenting the different approaches to use
DANE keying, and the security implication of each. In addition
the WG may develop a framework(s) to facilitate the lookup "client" DANE
records for authorization/authentication purposes.
The group may also create documents that describe how protocol
entities can discover and validate these bindings in the execution
of specific applications. This work would be done in coordination
with the IETF Working Groups responsible for the protocols.
The group may in addition encourage interoperability testing and document
the results of such testing.