DKIM Crypto Update
charter-ietf-dcrup-02

Editorial comments only:

1: Original: 

DCRUP will consider four types of changes to DKIM: additional signing
algorithms such as those based on elliptic curves, changes to key
strength advice and requirements, deprecating the use of SHA1,
and new public key forms, such as
putting the public key in the signature and a hash of the key in the
DNS to bypass bugs in DNS provisioning software that prevent publishing
longer keys as DNS TXT records.  

This sentence is really long, and I got lost in it. It says that there are 4 changes, but the wording makes it hard to figure out which they are.

Proposed (semi-colons to separate from the "such as"). Or, perhaps make this bullets instead?:
DCRUP will consider four types of changes to DKIM: additional signing
algorithms such as those based on elliptic curves; changes to key
strength advice and requirements; deprecating the use of SHA1;
and new public key forms, such as
putting the public key in the signature and a hash of the key in the
DNS to bypass bugs in DNS provisioning software that prevent publishing
longer keys as DNS TXT records. 



2: "It will limit itself to existing implemented algorithms and key forms."
The "it will limit itself" sounds odd in a charter;  I'd suggest "It will be limited to..." or something similar (otherwise it sounds like this is an internal decision)

I'm glad to see this work going forward and am also fine with skipping external review.

I'm fine with doing this, without external review.

I'm a Yes for this one, but Alexey needs to be a Yes before it's approved, of course. But definitely the right thing to do.

I did see

    DKIM also currently supports use of SHA1 coupled with RSA.  SHA1 has been	
 	formally deprecated due to weakness especially when used in the context	
 	transport security, though the risk of a successful preimage attack is
    
I may be unaware of a well-known term of art, but I'm guessing "context transport security" is missing "of" (so, "context of transport security")?    
    
 	less severe.  Still, the community wishes to discourage its continued use	
 	in the DKIM context.

Looks fine to me. Have no strong feelings about external review.