Global Routing Operations
charter-ietf-grow-05

While these are technically 'no objection' comments, I would like to see these (and Gunter's) comments addressed.

In 2009, the starting paragraph focused on BGP, is that different now?  Is GROW still focused on BGP operational challenges?  Or has that focus expanded?  Has that scope creep been agreed with other working groups?

Most charters don't specify what is handled at IETF meetings vs on the mailing list.  Why is it necessary here?

nit:  problems//challenges

It is always useful to refresh a WG charter, so thanks for the job. Some comments anyway.

Should YANG be explicit in `The GROW working group will develop data models` ?

While I am fully supportive of `Agenda time at GROW sessions at IETF meetings...` paragraph, this is quite unusual for a WG, e.g., even the recent SRV6OPS WG only uses `Being a forum for network operators to discuss operational matters in SRv6 networks.`

I have more problems with `Document operational aspects of IP interconnection` as it is rather vague/broad and goes beyond BGP.

The line between SIDROPS and GROW is maybe a little vague.

When looking at the obsoleted charter of SIDR we find in the (old) SIDR charter:

"The purpose of the SIDR working group is to reduce vulnerabilities in
the inter-domain routing system."

The SIDROPS charter has following text:

"
Sidrops is responsible for
encouraging deployment of theSIDR technologies while ensuring as secure
of a global routing system, as possible, during the transition.
"

Now the new proposed GROW charter 04-02 states:

"
The working group will also provide inputs for
addressing operational and routing security requirements of Internet-
connected networks, and, where appropriate, recommend work to be
taken up by those working groups. 
"
and
"
Document the operational aspects of securing the Internet routing
system.
"

When reading this with a bit of a skeptical lens, there’s potential for some overlap to be interpreted. The text says that SIDR operations belong in SIDROPS, but what exactly does that mean, especially considering that SIDR’s focus is on building a secure routing system?

As I understand it, GROW wouldn’t be covering operational aspects of RPKI, origin validation of BGP announcements, or BGPSEC. Maybe it would help to call that out explicitly in the GROW charter, just to avoid any potential confusion down the road?

Concur with Gunter's assessment that clarity between SIDROPS and this new GROW charter text would be helpful.