Profiling Use of PKI in IPSEC
charter-ietf-pki4ipsec-01

IPsec has been standardized for over 5 years, and the use of
X.509 certificates have been specified within the IPsec
standards for the same time. However, very few IPsec
deployments use certificates. One reason is the lack of a
clear description of how X.509 certificates should be used
with IPsec. Another is the lack of a simple, scalable, and
clearly specified way for IPsec systems to obtain certificates
and perform other certificate lifecycle operations with PKI systems.

THE WG WILL DELIVER:

1) A standards-track document that gives specific
instructions on how X.509 certificates should be
handled with respect to the IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols.
This document will include a certificate profile, addressing
which fields in the certificate should have which
values and how those values should be handled. This effort is
the WG's primary priority.

2) An informational document identifying and describing
requirements for a profile of a certificate management protocol to
handle PKI enrolment as well as certificate lifecycle interactions
between IPsec VPN systems and PKI systems. Enrolment is defined
as certificate request and retrieval. Certificate lifecycle
interactions is defined as certificate renewals/changes,
evocation, validation, and repository lookups.

     These requirements will be designed so that they meet
     the needs of enterprise scale IPsec VPN deployments.

Once the above to items enter WG last call, we will begin work on:

3) A standards-track document describing a detailed
profile of the CMC (Certificate Management Messages over CMS
protocol, RFC 2797 at this writing) that meets the requirements
laid out in the requirements document. Profile documents for other
enrolment and/or management protocols may also be created.

SCOPE
The working group will focus on the needs of enterprise scale
IPsec VPN deployments. Gateway-to-gateway access (tunnel and transport
mode) and end-user remote access to a gateway (either tunnel or
transport mode) are both in scope.

NON-GOALS

User-to-user IPsec connections will be considered, but are not
explicitly in scope. We will consider the requirements for this
scenario only until doing so significantly slows the progress of the
explicitly scoped items, at which point it will be dropped.

Specification of communications between an IPsec administrative
function and IPsec systems is explicitly out of scope.

Purely PKI to PKI issues will not be addressed. Cross-certification
will not be addressed. Long term non-repudiation will also not be
addressed.